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What students are required to do, for example, an essay 
question, a project topic. 
Those who assess student performance, for example, 
academics and tutors. 
A community of people who are involved in a sustained 
pursuit of a common social project. 
The complexity of contingencies which assessors bring to 
bear in their assessment of student performance. 
The consistency of assessment results. 
The actual product or multiple products which students 
submit for assessment purposes. 
The process of evaluating the soundness of interpretations. 
Validation is a form of evaluation. 
ii 
All the mechanisms which a community of practice has in 
place to ensure the reliability and validity of the assessment 
of student performance. 
The soundness of the interpretations of student 
performance. 
The actual discourse which academic staff use to interpret 
student performance and justify their interpretations to 
students, colleagues or the researcher. 
The systematic investigation through research of validity 
issues in order to theorize the concept. 
Those who validate assessment interpretations, for example 
external examiners. 
ACRONYMS 
CDA - Critical discourse analysis 
DEM- Departmental examination meeting 
EF - The engineering field of study 
ES - The area of specialization within the field of study 
HOD- Head of Department 
MW - Marking workshop 
OCD L - Oxford Concise Dictionary of Linguistics 




The premise of this study is that the assessment of student performance is an 
interpretive process. This raises a fundamental validity question: on what basis do 
academic communities evaluate the soundness of their interpretations? The central 
problem which this study explores is how academic assessors validate their 
interpretations of student performance on complex tasks. I explore this problem by 
focusing specifically on the assessment of final year undergraduate projects through two 
case studies of disciplinary communities of practice, one in the Humanities faculty and 
the other in the Engineering faculty of a South African university. 
Drawing on Bourdieu' s theory of social practice on the one hand, and the methods of 
critical discourse analysis and ethnography on the other, I construct a theory and method 
of inquiry which illumines aspects of assessment as an interpretive process, aspects 
which have been obscured by traditional approaches to assessment. This analysis 
priYileges the context of assessment, the inevitability of difference in assessment 
interpretations and the equally inevitable effects of power. My methodological approach 
identifies four elements which constitute social practice- social structure, conjuncture. 
eYent and text. These constitutive elements operationalize into a series of analytical 
stages which expose different aspects of social practice. My approach is consistent with 
Fairclough· s method of critical discourse analysis. although I also include ethnographic 
methods. 
My case study analysis was guided by a series of premises from which my key 
questions emerged. Firstly. academic communities of practice, by definition, share some 
common ground. Thus I inquired: what is the basis of this common ground? What 
explains the manner in which academic assessors, with minimal co-ordination or explicit 
articulation of criteria, are able to get on with the numerous classificatory acts which are 
required of them as members of a particular disciplinary field? 
v 
Secondly, despite this common ground it is not unusual to find multiple 
interpretations of the same instance of student performance. Thus I inquired: what 
explanation is there for these differences in interpretation? What can dissensus within a 
community of interpreters expose about the complexities of assessment as an interpretive 
process? 
Thirdly, reaching consensus between assessors about what value to assign an 
instance of student performance is often difficult. The negotiation of interpretive 
·differences can be a site of struggle, and this struggle implies that there are certain stakes 
in the resolution. Thus I inquired: in the context of collegial dialogue, what is at stake in 
the resolution of differences? 
Finally I asked: if consensus is not a given, how then are differences resolved? 
Specifically, how is power exercised in the resolution of these differences? 
The significant contribution of this study is to enrich our understanding of the 
complex interpretive environment out of which academic professional judgment emerges. 
By ·drilling down' into differences of interpretation, I illuminate the multiple contexts 
which constitute academics' judgments. These multiple contexts include: the macro-
social conditions of the field and the ways in which these conditions legitimate particular 
classificatory systems; the meso-level context of disciplinary (and sub-disciplinary) 
communities of practice with their specific epistemological orientations; and finally the 
micro-level context of assessors' interpretive matrices, which are significantly constituted 
by assessors· disciplinary interests, professional experience and levels of involvement. 
My study argues that ·context matters· by exposing the multiple layers of contingency 
that shape assessors' interpretive acts in predictable and unpredictable ways. 
Finally. the study unexpectedly shed light onto the patterns of rationality which 
underlie academic professional judgment- an alternative form of rationality which is 
neither ·objectivist" or ·subjectivist' but is something beyond either ofthese positions. 
Academic professional judgment is constituted by the tension between macro and micro 
Vl 
contexts and between subjective and objective modes of knowledge. This alternative 
rationality is pragmatic, variable, context-dependent and value-based- a form of 
rationality which has been greatly undervalued, and yet it is essential to an understanding 
of assessment as an interpretive process and to professional judgment more generally. 
Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Focus of the study 
1 
Educational assessment plays an increasingly dominant role in contemporary 
society. Over the past two decades assessment has come to be perceived by governments 
and other authorities as a powerful technology for both educational reform and quality 
control. The former refers to assessment as an instrument for improving the quality of 
teaching and learning. The latter refers to assessment as a mechanism for assuring the 
quality of educational provision to those outside the university. Thus at the beginning of 
the 21 51 century assessment finds itself at the nexus of complex and highly contested 
expectations for social and political change. This is a matter of concern for scholars and 
practitioners alike who question the extent to which assessment can fulfil these multiple, 
and some would argue contradictory, agendas. Foundational to their concerns is doubt 
about whether assessment can be used to measure and categorize individuals and 
institutions for a variety of political, social and economic purposes. 
Out of these concerns arises a small but growing body of research which explores the 
social underbelly of educational assessment. It argues that assessment is best understood 
as a complex socia/1 practice. There are two themes which are central to this work. The 
first theme is that assessment practices can only be understood within the social, cultural, 
and economic contexts in which they occur. The second theme is that the experiences, 
beliefs and expectations of both the assessed and the assessor constitute the meanings of 
assessment outcomes. Researchers in this area argue that one of the challenges for this 
sociological approach to assessment is to develop both theories and methodologies for 
exploring this complexity. It is to this body of research that this study contributes- to a 
deeper understanding of assessment as a social practice. 
This study sets out to explore how academic assessors validate their interpretations of 
student performance2 on complex tasks3. Complex tasks refer to those which allow 
1 I use italics for emphasis. 
2 I use the term 'student performance' to refer to the actual product or multiple products which students 
submit for assessment purposes. 
3 I use the term 'task' or sometimes 'assessment task' to refer to what students are required to do, for 
2 
students substantial latitude in how they interpret and respond to the requirements. They 
require multiple skills and forms of knowledge, and the completed projects generally 
require expert judgment (Moss 1992). The premise of this study is that the assessment of 
complex tasks is an interpretive process. I use the term 'assessment' 4 to refer to the 
interpretation of student performance for the purposes of assigning some value to the 
performance. 'Validity' refers to the soundness ofthese interpretations (Nitko 2001). 
Since validity is not all or nothing but always a matter of degree (Messick 1989), 
establishing the validity of assessment interpretations is an on-going process. I use the 
term 'validation· to refer to the process of evaluating the soundness of interpretations. 
Communities of practice5 have a variety of mechanisms by which they evaluate the 
soundness of their interpretations, what I refer to as 'validation practices'. The bases 
upon which an interpretation is considered to be sound will depend on the notions of 
science which these communities value; in other words, different scientific traditions will 
have different criteria for the evaluation of their interpretations. A discussion of 
different approaches to the validation of assessment interpretations is the central task of 
Chapter 3. 
As assessment acquires an increasingly dominant profile within the societal 
landscape. validation is a matter of considerable consequence, not only for individual 
learners and educators, but for institutions and the wider society. I would argue that it is 
particularly relevant in the South African context given: 
• Increasing diversity within the student population. diversity of cultural capital as well 
as educational preparedness, which results in an increasing variety of student 
responses to assessment tasks 
• Anticipated diversity in staff composition which could have tbe effect of multiplying 
the potential number of interpretations of student performance 
example. an essay question. a project topic. 
~ In this thesis I use single quotation marks to signal terms or concepts which I wish to draw special 
attention to. I use double quotation marks for quotations. The exception is the use of single quotes for a 
quotation within a quotation. 
5 ·community of practice' is a term used by Wenger ( 1998) to refer to communities of people involved in 
the sustained pursuit of a common social project. I use the term specifically to refer to all the people, 
materials. technology and procedures which are involved in the assessment of final year projects. 
• Major curriculum restructuring initiatives where fundamental notions about the 
purpose of undergraduate education are being reviewed and recast 
• Increasing national and institutional pressure for accountability in relation to 
educational outcomes through, for example, quality audits 
• Major resource cut-backs and increasingly large classes which might create an ethos 
of general disaffection among academic staff who may be tempted to resort to 
minimalist approaches 
1.2 Context for the study 
3 
In order to pursue this interest I focus specifically on the assessment of final year 
projects within the context oftwo disciplinary communities of practice, one in the 
Humanities faculty and the other in the Engineering faculty of a South African university 
(henceforth referred to as SAU). SAU is a medium-sized, contact university, located in 
one of South Africa's large urban areas. It is one of South Africa's historically white, 
English-speaking institutions6. 
It is a fairly prevalent practice in undergraduate programmes around the globe to 
require students to conduct a major project as a final culmination of their undergraduate 
learning experience. These are sometimes referred to as 'capstone' or 'senior' projects. I 
will use the term 'final year projects'. The management and assessment of these projects 
vary tremendously across contexts, and I will not attempt to summarize the differences. 
focus instead on the particular institutional context of SAU and the two faculties where 
my case studies are located. 
In these contexts project topics are proposed by academic members of staff. In the 
Humanities context these topics are often no more than an issue within a broad area of 
study, or they may take the form of an open-ended problem or question. In the 
Engineering context the topics take the form of a brief description (usually about a 
6 
·Historically white' universities refers to universities which under apartheid were designed to provide 
higher education to South Africa's white population. These universities were further differentiated by 
language as English-speaking or Afrikaans-speaking. 
paragraph in length) where staff members give relevant background information on the 
problem to be researched and the research objectives. They may also note particular 
courses which students should have had as prerequisites7• In addition to these brief 
descriptions, students in both contexts are given general guidelines on the final structure 
of their project reports. 
4 
These projects require the collection, analysis and synthesis of data from multiple 
sources, for example, literature, fieldwork, and laboratory. Students generally have 
several months to complete them. Depending on departmental practices and individual 
supervisor preferences, students may be required to work in groups or individually. The 
projects require a whole range of conceptual, theoretical and practical skills. The final 
products take the form of a written research report, but students may also be required to 
make an oral and visual presentation. They are typically assessed by a supervisor or a 
member of staff who has been involved in the research process to some degree. They are 
generally high-stakes since many academic programmes require a pass in the project for 
graduation. The primary purpose ofthe final year project is to assess individual students' 
achievements in relation to an undergraduate curriculum of study in order to determine 
whether they are competent to graduate. An additional purpose which is gaining 
momentum is the use of final year projects as a measure of accountability to state, 
institutional and professional bodies8. Thus final year projects are an example of high-
stakes, non-standardized, complex assessment tasks. 
Given these features, final year projects pose a particular set of challenges in terms of 
validity, that is, the degree to which assessment interpretations are sound and appropriate 
to their uses (Nitka 2001 ). I shall now elaborate briefly on some of these challenges as 
7 
In order to protect the anonymity of the departments involved in the study I cannot offer specific 
examples of project topics. 
8 
For example, for the interim registration of qualifications on the National Qualifications Framework (see 
5.2.1 for more on NQFs), academic programmes were required to stipulate what forms of 'integrative 
assessment' they had in place. Another example: in 2000 the Engineering Council of South Africa's audit 
of SAU's Engineering Faculty required academic programmes to specify whether their assessment 
··verified whether each student satisfies the specified outcome" (Engineering Council of South Africa, 
Standards and Procedures System, Document PE-75, 18 January 2000, p. 2). 
they manifest themselves in the communities of practice which are ·the focus of this 
study. 
Firstly, there is generally a low degree of standardization of the topics which 
students are given. Project topics are set out by the supervisors. Thus the final year 
project topics which students select, or which they are assigned, are as diverse as the 
research interests of the academic staff who supervise them. This diversity of topics 
suggests that the range of conceptual, theoretical and practical skills which the projects 
require will vary across students. In addition there are a range of logistical issues (e.g. 
access to people and organizations, availability of materials and technology) which 
impact on the final shape of the project and what it requires of students. 
5 
Secondly, the actual skills or competences which final year projects are purported to 
assess are seldom explicitly specified. Academic staff who set the projects would have 
more or less cogent explanations for what they perceive the projects to be assessing, but 
there is seldom any systematic investigation by the department into the extent to which 
the projects are aligned against a specific content and skill domain. In South Africa recent 
calls for accountability from institutional, national, and professional quarters have 
stressed the importance of more explicit learning outcomes and clearer articulation of 
assessment methods and criteria. However, academic programmes have been slow to 
respond to these calls for explicitness. and in some cases have openly resisted them (I 
\\ill return to this in Chapter 5). 
Thirdly, a further challenge is that final year projects comprise multiple instances of 
performance which assessors can and do take into account, often unconsciously, in 
assessing students' abilities. Some are inferred from the research process, for example, 
the degree of effort that the student is perceived to be investing in the research process, 
the capacity of the student to overcome particular unanticipated dilemmas, the degree of 
independence that the student displays, and the extent to which feedback is considered 
and incorporated. Other abilities are inferred from the student's performance product, for 
example, the fluency of an oral or written presentation, the technical sophistication of 
design, adherence to layout guidelines, and thoroughness of a literature review. 
6 
Fourthly, there is seldom a standardized scoring memorandum, that is, a set of 
criteria and weightings which all assessors apply in a consistent way. This is not to 
suggest that there are no criteria. It is more a case that they are implicit throughout the 
process of setting, supervising and assessing the projects, for example, in the kinds of 
topics that are set, in the feedback students receive, and in the debates which arise among 
assessors. Some would argue that given the great diversity in topics (noted above) it may 
be difficult to arrive at a uniform set of criteria and weightings which are appropriate to 
all projects. 
Fifthly, the assessors are involved in the research process, sometimes in significant 
ways. Their supervision styles vary greatly. But even those who take a hands-off 
approach are involved in the design of the topic, the supervision of the research process, 
and crucially, they are involved in interpreting the performance in order to allocate some 
kind of mark. As members of the same community of practice they are likely to share 
some common understanding of what constitutes 'good' research. On the other hand, 
there are also likely to be personal and professional differences which lead to diverging 
interpretations. 
Despite all these challenges the assessment of undergraduates continues year after 
year. and on the basis of these assessments decisions are made which significantly affect 
students' lives: decisions about who graduates, who is admitted to graduate studies, and 
who is employable. These decisions also affect, less directly but no less significantly, 
staff reputations and institutional resource allocations. 
1.3 The central problem and research questions 
The central problem which this study seeks to explore is how academic assessors 
validate their interpretations of student performance on complex tasks such as final year 
projects. The focus of the study is thus on academic validation practices, a term which, as 
7 
I noted earlier, refers to all the mechanisms which a community of practice puts into 
place to ensure the soundness of their interpretations of student performance. I explore 
this problem within the context of final year undergraduate projects in two different 
communities of practice, one in the Humanities faculty and the other in the Engineering 
faculty of SAU. With respect to these validation practices my initial point of interest was 
how academics reach consensus on what value to assign a particular instance of student 
performance. I was also interested in explanations for the phenomenon of multiple 
interpretations of the same performance and the difficulty which academics often face in 
reaching consensus about its value. These initial points of interest evolved into a series of 
premises and a set of questions which guided my case studies analysis: 
• Firstly, academic communities of practice, by definition, share some common 
ground. What is the basis of this common ground? What explains the manner in 
which academic assessors, with minimal co-ordination or explicit articulation of 
criteria, are able to get on with the numerous classificatory acts which are 
required of them as members of a particular disciplinary field? 
• Secondly, I was specifically interested in the phenomenon of multiple 
interpretations of the same instance of student performance. What explanation is 
there for these differences in interpretation? What can dissensus within a 
community of interpreters expose about the complexities of assessment as an 
interpretive process? 
• Thirdly, reaching consensus between assessors about what value to assign an 
instance of student performance is often difficult. The negotiation of interpretive 
differences can be a site of struggle, and this struggle implies that there are certain 
stakes in the resolution. Thus I inquired, in the context of collegial dialogue, what 
is at stake in the resolution of differences? 
• Finally I asked, if consensus is not a given, how then are differences resolved? 
Specifically, how is power exercised in the resolution of these differences? 
8 
1.3 Overview of the thesis 
I now provide an overview of the remaining chapters. 
Chapter 2: The problem 
The second chapter articulates in more detail the problem which this study explores. 
I review some of the literature on assessment from socio-cultural and interpretivist 
approaches. These approaches to the study of assessment serve to problematize some of 
the central assumptions which undergird the foundations of psychometric assessment. In 
addition they call for alternative perspectives on assessment, perspectives which privilege 
assessment as a social practice. I argue that what is needed in particular are studies of 
assessment practices which illumine the role of context, difference and power in the 
interpretations of student performance. 
Chapter 3: Theory 
The central task of the third chapter is to construct a theoretical perspective for 
assessment as an interpretive process. In justifying my own perspective, I explore three 
different approaches to validity inquiry9: the psychometric, the interpretivist and the 
social theoretical. Drawing on Bourdieu's theory of social practice, I argue for the 
particular ways in which a social theoretical approach will illumine academic validation 
practices. 
Chapter .:/: Methodology 
The fourth chapter accounts for the methodological approach I have taken to the 
gathering and analysis of data. My approach can be characterized as critical discourse 
analysis with the incorporation of some ethnographic methods. This approach draws 
substantially on the work of Norman Fairclough, but also takes account of some of the 
methodological weaknesses for which his work has been criticized. 
"The term ·validity inquiry' refers to the systematic investigation of validity issues in order to theorize the 
concept. 
9 
Chapter 5: Analysis 
The fifth chapter has three parts. In part one, I sketch in broad strokes some of the 
social conditions of constraint and possibility which ensure the on-going production and 
re-production of academic validating practices. In Bourdieu's terms this is the analysis of 
the 'field'. The goal of this analysis is to sketch some of the contours of the field, to 
identify its forms of 'capital', and to expose the principles which inform academic 
classificatory acts. In parts two and three, I explore how individuals take up the positions 
constituted for them by the field. Each case begins with a description of the actual 
community with a particular focus on the final year projects and the procedures, events, 
rules, roles and technologies which enable members of these communities to implement 
final year projects from year to year. I then turn to a closer scrutiny of actual assessment 
discourse to explore the particular interpretive matrices which assessors bring to bear on 
the assessment of student performance. 
Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion 
The sixth chapter discusses the findings to the questions which guided the study. I 
conclude with the ways in which this study has contributed to a deeper understanding of 
assessment as a social practice. The first contribution is a theoretical and methodological 
approach to the study of assessment practices. The second contribution of this study is an 
illumination of the multiple contexts which constitute academics' judgments. This in 
turn sheds light on patterns of rationality which underlie academic professional judgment 
- a rationality which I argue is neither objectivist or subjectivist. 
Chapter 7: Implications for practice 
In the final chapter I argue that the nature of academic professional judgment and its 
underlying forms of rationality are not simply theoretical issues; they have implications 
for how we conduct our task as an academic community of interpreters. Thus I discuss 
four major implications of the insights gained from this study for the construction of 
validation practices. 
10 
Chapter 2: The Problem 
Henceforth my dear philosophers, let us be on guard against the dangerous old conceptual fiction that 
posited a "pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject"; let us guard against the snares of such 
contradictory concepts as "pure reason", "absolute spirituality", "knowledge in itself': these always 
demand that we should think of an eye that is completely unimaginable, an eye turned in no particular 
direction, in which the active and interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing 
something, are supposed to be lacking; these always demand of the eye an absurdity and a nonsense. 
There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective "knowing"; and the more affects we allow to 
speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we use to observe one thing, the more complete 
will our "concept" of this thing, our "objectivity", be. 
(Nietzsche cited in Bourdieu 1990, p. 28) 
2.1 A problem in practice 
Some years ago I had a conversation with a tutor (I give her the name Fatima) 
which intrigued me. I use this conversation as a starting point for teasing out some of the 
strands which comprise the knot of the problem which this study seeks to untangle and 
explore. She was very upset about a decision taken by the convener of a course in which 
she was a tutor. It was standard practice in this undergraduate course, as in many 
Humanities undergraduate courses, for tutors to mark their own students' essays, that is, 
those in their tutorial group. However, in breach of this tradition, a decision was taken 
that the final essays would be exchanged among the tutors, marked 'blind' by another 
tutor on the course. Fatima was extremely upset by this decision. She explained that it 
had been justified on the basis that exchange of essays would result in more objective 
marks. She challenged this assumption, however, arguing that this practice was 
potentially very "unfair" to students since their essays were being marked by someone 
who did not have a "history" with them. She had just that morning had a meeting with 
one of her students, one of her "really hard-working students", who had been given a 
failing mark on her essay. The student was "very angry" and wanted Fatima to justify the 
mark. From Fatima's perspective the convener's decision had created a "huge problem" 
(field notes, 15110/1997). 
It is not my intention to judge whether the course convener's decision to exchange 
essays was appropriate, or whether Fatima's anger was justified. I offer the story rather 
as an opportunity to tease out in a very preliminary fashion some of the assumptions 
which underlie the convener's decision and Fatima's response to it, and to speculate 
about the common sense notions of knowledge which are brought to bear in the 
11 
assessment of student performance. One way of typifying these notions of knowledge 
often heard in assessment discussions is to label them either 'objective' or 'subjective', 
the former referring to the perspective of one who is distant, outside, and uninvolved, and 
the latter to one who is close, inside, partial or biased. One of the issues at stake in the 
cited scenario is the form of knowledge which can legitimately be brought to bear in the 
assessment of student performance. The implication of the course convener's decision is 
that a tutor's involvement with the student may result in marks which are not the truest 
reflection ofthe student's performance. Implied in Fatima's, and perhaps the student's, 
angry response is that it is the tutor wh:) has a history with the student who can best 
assess the performance. 
The intrigue sparked by this story was heightened by my experiences as an 
educational developer working with staff who were responsible for the assessment of 
student performance. It was common practice to organize a marking workshop where 
samples of student performance were discussed in order for staff to come to agreement on 
the marking criteria, as well as the actual marks. Staff members were encouraged to 
make their marking criteria explicit by designing marking memoranda which were 
applied to the samples of writing and debated in the context of the marking workshop. 
As \\ orkshop participants our assumption was that such criteria would increase 
consistency between assessors' marks. We found. however. that consistency was the 
exception rather than the norm, and consensus among markers not always easy to forge. 
I \vas interested in this phenomenon. in particular the dissensus and what explanations lie 
beneath it. 
These instances of assessment practice illustrate the problem this study explores. 
Tangled up in this problem are issues about: assessors as interpreters of student 
performance, the kinds of evidence that can be drawn on to support interpretations of 
student performance, the status of these different kinds of evidence, how different kinds 
of evidence can lead to different interpretations, how differences of interpretation are 
arbitrated and how power is effected in these arbitration processes. In a nutshell, the 
problem which this study explores is the validation of the assessment of complex 
performances, that is, the on-going process of evaluating the soundness of assessment 
interpretations. As assessment acquires an increasingly dominant profile within the 
societal landscape, this process is a matter of considerable consequence, not only for 
individua11eamers and educators but for institutions and the wider society. 
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In part one of this chapter I briefly sketch the shape of this growing profile, the 
increasing use of assessment as a technology for reform and control. In part two, on the 
basis of a small but growing area of research, I call attention to three features of 
assessment as social practice- difference, context and power- which have not been 
given sufficient attention in dominant approaches to assessment rooted in psychometrics1• 
I conclude by arguing for the need to develop theoretical and methodological approaches 
which illumine these features as crucial to an understanding of assessment as a complex 
social practice. 
2.2 Educational assessment: multiple agendas 
Educational assessment plays an increasingly dominant role in contemporary 
society. Broadfoot (2000) notes that from its modest beginnings in the universities of the 
eighteenth century to the school systems of the nineteenth and twentieth century, 
education assessment has become ''the unquestioned arbitrator of value" with respect to 
student achievement, institutional quality and national educational competitiveness (p. 
ix). The growth of interest in assessment is fuelled by two educational and profoundly 
political agendas: educational reform and quality assurance. Although these agendas are 
closely linked. the impetus of reform is inward, that is, the improvement or 
transformation of teaching and learning. In quality assurance the impetus is outward, that 
is. accounting for the quality of teaching and learning to those outside the university. 
Assessment is increasingly understood as an essential technology for the 
achievement of both agendas. Assessment is perceived as central to educational reform, 
firstly as an instrument for documenting the need for change, and secondly as a catalyst 
for change (Linn 1993). During the 1990s a great deal of research provided powerful 
1 Psychometrics is the science of psychological and educational measurement. 
1 
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evidence for the influence of assessment on what is taught and how it is taught, and what 
and how students learn. As Resnick and Resnick ( 1992) put it, "you get what you assess" 
(p. 59). On the basis of this founding premise, assessment literature has been dominated 
by advocacy for assessment's capacity to transform education. For example, Resnick and 
Resnick argue for assessment as an "essential tool" in educational reform (p. 72). Brown 
and Knight (1994) argue that given that assessment "shapes" the curriculum and 
"embodies" the purposes of higher education, then "assessment reform is the most urgent 
priority confronting undergraduate education" (pp. 11-12). Biggs ( 1996 citing Elton and 
Laurillard) argues, "the quickest way to change student learning is to change the 
assessment system" (p. 5). 
With reference to the quality assurance agenda, assessment has become one of the 
primary instruments in the service of a growing preoccupation with 'performativity' 
(Broadfoot 1999). Assessment is perceived to be a powerful way of 'accounting' for the 
quality of teaching, and ultimately the quality ofthe graduate, to a variety of 
'stakeholders', both internal- the students, staff, managers- and the external- tax-
payers, employers, and the state. Thus assessment is perceived not only as an instrument 
of reform, but as one of the primary technologies of reporting on that change (Broadfoot 
1996, 1999). This has raised a great deal of optimism among both educators and policy-
makers. In the United Kingdom Brown and Knight (1994) argue that assessment is 
"'central" to meeting the pressure upon higher education institutions to demonstrate 
"'exactly'' what the state ··gets" for its ··enormous investment" (p. 12). The 1990s saw the 
rise of numerous national qualification frameworks (NQFs) in the United Kingdom, 
Australia. and South Africa which assume that assessment (specifically learning-
outcomes based assessment) can provide a systematic means of "gathering evidence and 
making judgments about an individual's performance in relation to registered national 
standards and qualifications" (South African Qualifications Authority, 2001, p. 16). 
While there are those who see educational assessment as an imperfect but powerful 
tool for change, there are others who have grave concerns about the extent to which 
assessment can fulfil these multiple agendas (Broadfoot 1999, Davis 1998). Foundational 
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to these concerns is doubt as to whether and to what extent assessment is 'science'; 
whether, as natural science advocates (Flyvbjerg 2001), accurate and reliable 
measurements can be taken, which form the basis of context-independent generalizations; 
whether these generalizations can in tum produce explanatory theories of human 
behavior; whether on the basis of such theories (e.g. of educational achievement) 
individuals and institutions can be measured and categorized for a variety of political, 
social and economic purposes. Some of these voices of concern would argue that what is 
needed is a "new science of assessment" (Berlack 1992, p. 1 ), or a "paradigm shift" 
(Gipps 1995, p. 4). implying that the existing scientific paradigm (which they argue is 
rooted in psychometrics) is flawed, riddled with "conceptual mythologies" (Davis 1998, 
p.1) and thus inadequate for dealing with contemporary educational and political 
problems. Others such as Moss ( 1996) are less intent on a paradigm overthrow but would 
argue that the foundations of educational assessment need to be extended, the dialogue 
needs to be enlarged to include new perspectives on assessment which challenge the 
dominant discourse. What notion of science will most usefully inform our assessment 
practices is the central theme of the next chapter. 
2.3 Assessment as social practice 
I now tum to the work of authors who are approaching educational assessment from 
different theoretical perspectives. One such area of work is what has been referred to as 
socio-cultural studies of assessment (Filer 2000). This encompasses the work of authors 
such as Broadfoot. Gipps. Filer and Berlack. Their work stresses that assessment is an 
activity or practice which can only be understood within the social, culturaL economic 
and political contexts in which it occurs (Gipps 1999). The other area of work is that 
which approaches assessment from an interpretivist or hermeneutical approach. In 
addition to Moss· seminal work, I include the work of composition theorists, such as 
Broad and Huot. who explicitly adopt this interpretivist labeL and others, such as Barritt 
eta!. Hatch, Phelps, and Schwegler. whose work is broadly sympathetic to this approach 
but who do not label it as such. The interpretive approach focuses on how both the 
assessed and the assessors' experiences, beliefs, and expectations constitute meaning in 
the assessmel).t event (Gipps 1999). What is common to both these areas of work is, 
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firstly, a problematization of some of the central assumptions which currently undergird 
assessment, assumptions which emerge from assessment's foundation in psychometrics, 
and secondly, proposals for alternative perspectives which privilege assessment as a 
social practice. 
Berlack's work (1992, 2000) critiques the use oflarge-scale, mandated, standardized 
tests2 in the United States as one of the chief instruments of school reform. Berlack 
(2000) argues that despite decades of criticism from both public and professional sources, 
this movement is at the height of its power. One of his chief concerns is how the use of 
these tests privileges the authority of those outside the school and classroom over that of 
teachers and principals and learners. This power is legitimated, in part, on the basis of 
tests as instruments of science authorizing those who govern to create "standards" to 
measure the "commodity" of "educational productivity" and make "objective" and 
"unbiased" statements about how little or much individuals, schools, states have in 
comparison with others (p. 190). This standardization means that, for example, a given 
score on a reading test achieved by a student in a school serving a solidly white middle 
and upper-middle class community is more or less equivalent in terms of what it aims to 
measure as the same score achieved by a student in an urban, lower-middle class area. 
The premise of standardization is that scores can somehow stand outside of history, 
outside of everyday social conditions. Berlack argues that this is untenable. "Test scores 
cannot transcend context ... they are only meaningful in the context in which they were 
generated'' (p. 193). In contrast to the psychometric paradigm, Berlack (1992) advocates 
what he calls the contextual paradigm of educational assessment. Counter to the view 
that there can be a single consensual meaning about what standardized tests claim to 
measure. a contextual paradigm takes plurality of perspectives and differences in values 
and beliefs as givens, and treats these differences as assets. The challenge however, is 
how to mediate these differences, how to search for common ground within these 
differences, how to give voice to all the participants in this dialogue. 
2 The term 'standardized' or 'norm-referenced' tests refer to tests which are constructed in a way that 
allows a standard score, grade equivalency, or percentile to be computed, which permits comparison of an 
individual's score, percentile or group mean to those of another individual or group (Berlack 1992). 
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Broadfoot's work ( 1996, 1999, Broadfoot and Pollard 2000) explores the social role 
of assessment in historical and contemporary society, how changes in the socio-economic 
context are reflected in changing assessment practices. In her more recent work 
(Broadfoot 1999, Broadfoot and Pollard 2000) she traces how the concerns of the British 
government (e.g. rising unemployment, declining budgets, lowering standards, rising 
international competition) have turned for resolution to the creation of more 
"accountable" education systems, ushering in a "new hegemony of performativity" 
(1999, p. 4). As noted earlier, large-scale, mandated, standardized tests are perceived to 
be the prime technology for this accountability regime. Broadfoot ( 1999) argues that 
underlying more than a decade of British educational policies is the notion of assessment 
as a measurement device, the results of which are intended to goad students, teachers, 
institutions, and the nation to try harder or face the threat of failure, resource cuts, and 
closure. Underlying this near "pathological belief' (p. 3) in assessment are numerous 
assumptions, including the belief that standards of quality can be objectively measured 
and that assessment is a neutral measuring instrument. Like Berlack, Broadfoot contests 
these notions of scientific objectivity. She argues, "At all stages the assessment process is 
a social one: no matter how technically sophisticated the techniques employed, it is 
human beings who design the test, human beings who take it and human beings who use 
the results" (p. 13). 
In its aim of envisioning assessment as social practice, the work of authors 
mentioned above introduces a new assessment discourse, a sociological discourse (Filer 
2000 ). Crucial features of this discourse are concerns for the context of assessment, the 
inevitability of difference in assessment interpretations, as well as the equally inevitable 
effects of power. It is not that these features themselves are new to assessment discourse 
(and I will return in the next chapter to a more in-depth discussion of these features from 
the perspective of psychometrics), but rather that from a social-cultural perspective they 
are profiled as significant; they are privileged as central to the task of validation. In other 
words. the task of justifying the soundness of assessment interpretations cannot be 
undertaken without considerations of context, difference and power. 
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In order to illustrate this privileging - its discourse, the kinds of questions it poses, 
the tensions which are thrown up, the compromises it chooses to live with - I turn to a 
long-standing debate in the United States between the two communities of assessment 
scholars and practitioners. On the one hand, the standardized testing community, 
comprising professional test-developers and researchers, is responsible for providing the 
educational system with reliable, informative and efficient data to inform, for example, 
decisions about who should be admitted to university and into what level of writing 
programme they should be placed. On the other hand, the composition community, 
comprising administrators and teachers, is responsible to provide sound writing courses, 
at the appropriate level which adequately serve the needs of the students in their future 
undergraduate career. Within this debate I focus in particular on the phenomenon of 
multiple interpretations of the same performance and the implications for validity, a 
matter which has greatly preoccupied the composition community (Yancey and Huot 
1996). This debate also serves to locate the problem which my study explores closer to 
the site of interest, that is, higher education. 
Up until the late 1970s the American educational testing profession had been using 
standardized, large-scale, indirect tests for the assessment of writing for purposes of 
selection and placement into the tertiary education system. 'Indirect' measures of writing 
refers to the notion that students' writing ability is assessed not through actual writing but 
through. for example, multiple choice, short-answer, true-false type questions. Given the 
nature of these items, these tests produced highly reliable data, but as critics noted, at the 
cost of validity. In other words, consistency of scores was privileged over concerns about 
what the scores actually meant in relation to the constructs3 being assessed. 
Not surprisingly, the American composition community was among the harshest 
critiques of these indirect tests. Consistency among markers is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for validity, they argued. The only way to assess students' writing is 
by assessing actual writing. The challenge however was to score 'direct' tests of writing 
3 "Construct" in testing discourse refers to the psychological trait that the test is presumed to be measuring. 
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with the same degree of reliability4 achieved by indirect measures. Achieving 
consistency across markers in the case of complex tasks (such as essays) is difficult as 
illustrated by Diederich et al' s classic study (1961, cited in Huot 1990a). Diederich et al 
analyzed 300 papers on two topics by first-year students across four American colleges. 
The 300 papers were scored on a 9-point scale by 53 readers. Ninety-four percent of the 
papers received at least 7 different scores, and no paper received less than 5 separate 
scores. Interrater reliability was .31, far below acceptable levels. 5 
The outcome of this dilemma for the composition community has been an obsession 
with the elimination of differences, with devising the technology of reliability, for 
example, the design of rubrics, multiple markings, training sessions, and a variety of 
statistical procedures to calculate interrater reliability (Broad 2000, Huot 1996). To a 
degree this technology has been successful, by psychometrics' terms. Huot (1996) argues 
that only at the point at which reliability could be guaranteed at statistically acceptable 
levels did the direct assessment of writing become psychometrically viable. Direct tests 
of writing are now standard practice for large-scale, standardized testing, including the 
growing use of portfolio assessment. 
Far from the debate being resolved however, voices from within the composition 
community have critiqued this obsession with reliability (Huot 1996). They argue that it 
is a mistake to assume that a well-oiled reliability machine will necessarily satisfy the 
conditions for validity. The argument is for a different approach to the problem of 
difference, an approach which recognizes differences of interpretation as an inevitable 
part of the interpretive/hermeneutical task of assessing. Studies from this interpretivist 
perspective have sought rather to understand what these differences are about and how 
4 "'Reliability" refers to the consistency of assessment results (Nitko 200 I) which in psychometrics is 
measured as a correlation coefficient with a range of 0 to I where 0 is a completely unreliable set of results 
and I is a perfectly reliable set of results. Interrater reliability refers to consistency of results between 
markers. 
5 There have been two recent studies conducted in South Africa exploring variation across markers of the 
same task in the context of higher education. Miller ( 1996) argues that the results of his study challenge 
the assumption held by academics that there is broad agreement between them about what constitutes 
different levels of performance. Sutherland ( 1999) documents the challenges of achieving consensus where 
staff are involved collectively in moderation. 
these differences can enhance our understanding of what assessment is (Broad 2000, 
Yancey and Huot 1996). 
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Huot ( 1990a) reviews a number of studies arising out of the field of composition 
studies in the United States which explore the influences on "raters' judgment" of writing 
quality (p. 237). He concludes that the common theme which emerges from these studies 
is what he calls "rater expectation" (p. 255); what a marker expects to find in the student 
writing, expectations shaped by both personal and professional experience, has a 
powerful influence on the scores allocated. Phelps (1989), in a very insightful study, 
identifies four different "attitudes" about the text that readers bring to the assessment of 
student writing. These attitudes range from reading the text as "closed" (p. 49), where the 
reader treats the text as self-contained, to reading the text as "evolving" (p. 51) where the 
text acquires historicity and is only a sample excerpted from a stream of previous and 
subsequent texts. Phelps argues that these different attitudes powerfully influence 
readers' evaluations. Other studies show that in spite of pre-established criteria, readers 
of student essays will bring their own knowledge, values and interpretive strategies to the 
assessment task (Barritt et al 1986, Schwegler 1991 ). Hatch et al (1993) argue that 
readers of student texts infer different writer personalities from texts and that these 
impressions have consequences on assessment decisions. 
Broad (2000) explores differences through an in-depth qualitative study of one 
American university's writing programme, a programme which he describes as 
experiencing a ''crisis of standardization" (p. 213 ). Broad describes the crisis in this 
evaluative community as the outcome oftwo competing sets of values held by the staff 
on the programme: on one hand, the values of consistency and fairness, on the other, the 
values of diversity, complexity and context dependence. Compounding the crisis was the 
fact that the community lacked a language and a theoretical framework that would allow 
for the protection of both ideals. Broad suggests that this community's commitment to 
holding these two competing sets of values in tension was what enabled the emergence of 
a new paradigm for their approach to assessment, a hermeneutical one. The lack of 
scoring rubrics, limited central monitoring and context bound knowledge that were 
perceived as problems from a psychometric point of view became strengths from a 
hermeneutical point of view. 
I include two other studies in this review, neither of which comfortably fits in the 
socio-cultural studies or the interpretivist approach. However, they explore one of the 
central concerns of my study which is how assessment discourse constitutes and is 
constituted by relations of power. 
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Kvale (1993) explores assessment as a site of contesting value systems through a 
case study of an examination committee in a Humanities faculty at a Scandinavian 
university. He notes how, in spite of sustained criticism from both inside and outside the 
university, the examination system remains deeply-entrenched. He suggests that critiques 
of examinations as invalid might be based on an invalid understanding of what is actually 
being assessed through the examinations. He argues that examinations have a dual 
function. They play, what he refers to as, an evaluative role; examinations evaluate 
students in relation to some agreed frame of reference. However Kvale argues that the 
more significant role of examinations is, what he refers to as, their meta-evaluative role. 
their function in evaluating the disciplinary frame of reference itself. He argues that 
through their evaluative decisions examiners operationally define what is valid 
knowledge in a discipline (p. 220). In this meta-evaluative function assessment becomes 
the battle ground for disciplinary border disputes and students the .. sacrificial lambs·· tp. 
229). 
Starfield (200 1) also explores difference and the effects of power in the negotiation 
of these differences within disciplinary communities. specifically in the context of a 
Sociology marking workshop at a South African university. An analysis of marking 
\vorkshop discourse offers a "small window" onto "the complex contexts in which 
studentCs) texts are being produced and received" (p. 145). She contests the portrayal of 
disciplinary communities as homogenous and unconflictual, immune from the power 
plays of the wider social contexts in which they reside. Her analysis of the markers· 









with their varying amounts of academic capital (who) assess students' texts, not 
necessarily according to a pre-agreed upon formula" (ibid.). Her study exposes how " .. .in 
the process of talk, meaning is shaped and re-shaped", and how the outcome for students 
is powerfully constituted by "constantly shifting power relations" within the interpretive 
community (ibid.). 
2.4 Conclusion 
I now conclude by showing how these socio-cultural and interpretivist approaches 
have enlarged the assessment dialogue (Moss 1996); in other words, how the privileging 
of context, difference and power contributes to a deeper appreciation of the complexity of 
assessment as an interpretive process. 
One of the issues at stake in this debate is how to make sense of difference. From a 
psychometric perspective, differences between assessors' interpretations of the same task 
are a reliability problem; low reliability or inconsistency is due to error and undermines 
validity. "Without reliability, there can be no validity" (Cronbach cited in Moss 1992, p. 
6). In contrast, what socio-cultural and interpretivists studies of assessment are 
demonstrating, though in different ways, is that firstly, differences of interpretation are 
inevitable. This chapter began with a quote from Nietzsche who argues, "there is only a 
perspective seeing, only a perspective 'knowing"' (cited in Bourdieu 1990, p.28) (italics 
in original). Secondly, a point which composition theorists have vigorously argued is 
that eliminating difference is costly. It is a violation of what the interpretive process is all 
about (Barritt et al 1986). Thirdly, difference is a resource, an asset to assessment 
practice. Once again to quote from Nietzsche, "The more eyes, different eyes, we use to 
observe one thing, the more complete will our "concept" of this thing, our "objectivity", 
be" (cited in Bourdieu 1990, p. 28) (italics in the original). 
Returning to Fatima's dilemma, a socio-cultural or interpretivist approach suggests 
that the differences that emerge between her and the other tutor in how they assess the 
student's essay, as well as the differences which emerge between marking workshop 
participants, are significant. As Broad (2000) discovered in exploring the crisis in his 
evaluative community, such differences may be signposts for underlying value 
22 
contestations. Broadfoot (1996) notes that assessment practices reflect the often 
conflicting values embodied in education systems. These conflicting values may, 
however. only become visible through crisis or paradigmatic change (Kvale 1993). One 
of the contributions of interpretivist and socio-cultural approaches to assessment is to 
show how, rather than being a threat to validity, differences of interpretation can be an 
asset. They provide an opportunity not only for an account of what we value but also, as 
importantly, for an account of our preconceptions and prejudices, those which are 
destructive as well as those which are productive ofknowledge (Bernstein 1983, Broad 
2000). 
The second issue is that of context. One ofBerlack's critiques of the use of 
standardized test scores in the United States (and similar critiques are made by Broadfoot 
and Gipps about their use in Britain) is the underlying assumption that these scores can 
have meaning outside of the contexts which produced them. Socio-cultural and 
interpretivist studies argue that assessment cannot rise above context. From the macro 
socio-political and economic contexts which Broadfoot ( 1996) explores to the micro 
contexts of the classroom (Filer 2000) context is built into the very fabric of 
interpretations. As Berlack (2000) argues, "context matters" (p. 193). Arguably one of 
the most important contextual features is the assessor him/herself. In a review of the field 
of educational assessment, Gipps (1995) argues, "Our mistake, with hindsight, has been 
to believe that learning can be assessed accurately and reliably ... Not only do we know 
that performance is context bound, affected by motivation and the assessment task, but 
more importantly (because it is hidden) performance is construed according to the 
perspectives and values of the assessor. .. " (p.l2). 
In describing her dilemma, Fatima astutely notes that a tutor's history of a student is 
valuable contextual knowledge which she alone can bring to the interpretation of her 
student's performance. But she fails to recognize that other assessors are not context-
less. She is correct to challenge the status accorded to the 'objective' perspective at the 
cost of her own more 'subjective' view. There is no denying, however, that each tutor 
will bring different kinds of evidence, different kinds of knowledge to bear on the 
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process given the different contexts which they inhabit. The question is, how will these 
differences be resolved? Whose contexts will be privileged, and on what basis? 
This leads to the final issue of power. Some of the harshest critiques against the 
standardized testing enterprise focus on the manner in which power is shifted to the top, 
away from stakeholders at the local level (e.g. teachers, school administrators) towards 
the state, the nation (Berlack 1992, 2000, Broadfoot 1999). And yet, the psychometric 
field has been, until recently, generally silent about issues of power. While there is an 
increasing acknowledgement of the consequences of assessment interpretations, I contend 
that psychometrics is not equipped theoretically or methodologically to evaluate the 
effects of power on these assessment interpretations (an argument to which I return in the 
next chapter). Kvale's ( 1993) study speculates about how disciplinary power struggles 
find effect in assessment. Starfield' s (200 1) analysis points to the effects of race, gender 
and academic status in assessment discourse. Though these studies and others have 
contributed to a greater realization of 'power effects' in assessment, there is still much 
that we have to learn about how power constitutes the interpretive process, in particular, 
the negotiation and resolution of difference. 
2.5 A problem in search of theory 
In giving shape to the problem which this study explores, I started offby briefly 
sketching how educational assessment finds itself at the nexus of complex and highly 
contested expectations for social and political change. In response, socio-cultural and 
interpretivist studies of assessment practice call for a critical scepticism of assessment as 
a technology for reform and controL and there is an increasing acknowledgment by 
researchers and practitioners that the assessment of student learning is "enormously 
complex, politically and conceptually" (Berlack 1992, p. 201 ). At the same time there is a 
recognition that the theory and methodology for exploring this complexity is 
undeveloped. Broadfoot ( 1999) argues that there is an urgent need for research from a 
more socio-cultural perspective which explores assessment as both social process and 
social product. At the end of her article "Enlarging the Dialogue in Educational 
Measurement". Moss ( 1996) calls for research within interpretive traditions to inform 
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assessment theory and practice by "providing theory, illustrations, and methodologies 
that illumine a complex social reality, thus enabling us to better understand the ways that 
assessment works within the local context" (p. 27). 
I would add that what is needed in particular are studies of assessment practices 
which illumine difference, context and power in the interpretations of student 
performance. In the next two chapters I turn to the task of constructing a theoretical and 
methodological framework which will not only accommodate but be hospitable to these 
crucial features. 
Chapter 3: Theory 
Of all the oppositions that artificially divide social science, the most fundamental, and the most 
ruinous, is the one that is set up between subjectivism and objectivism. The very fact that this 
division constantly reappears in virtually the same form would suffice to indicate that the modes of 
knowledge which it distinguishes are equally indispensable to a science of the social world. 
(Bourdieu 1990, p. 25) 
3.1 Introduction 
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The central problem which this study seeks to explore is how academic assessors 
validate their interpretations of student performance on complex tasks. Specifically I am 
interested in the phenomenon of multiple interpretations ofthe same performance. In the 
last chapter I explored in a preliminary way some aspects of this interpretive process 
from the perspective of different traditions. Implied in these alternative approaches is an 
intellectual tussle between different ways of approaching assessment with psychometrics 
on the one side and more socio-cultural and interpretivist approaches on the other. I 
pointed to some of the issues which might be at stake in this tussle: differences in the 
goals of inquiry, modes ofknowledge, forms of evidence, and emphases in discourse. 
Some of the authors, in fact, seem to be suggesting that what are at stake are different 
understandings of science. 
In this chapter I explore this intellectual tussle or contestation in more depth. I start 
(3.2) by briefly characterizing what Bernstein (1983) argues is the primary cultural and 
intellectual conflict of contemporary life -the opposition between objectivism and 
relativism. This opposition provides a basis from which to better understand the tussle 
between different approaches to assessment discussed in the previous chapter, and serves 
as well to foreshadow some of the themes which emerge from the case study analysis. I 
then turn to explore (3.3) two different approaches to validation, two ways of evaluating 
the soundness of assessment-based interpretations: psychometrics and interpretivism. 
With respect to these approaches I am interested in the following questions: From the 
perspective ofthese different traditions of scientific inquiry, what does validation mean? 
What are its goals of inquiry? What understanding of rationality does it assume? I offer a 
brief overview of these approaches. 
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In 3.3.1 I turn to validation within the psychometric tradition. Drawing principally 
on the seminal work of Samuel Messick and Lee Cronbach, I highlight some of the 
significant developments in the evolution of the concept of validity from its objectivist 
roots to its grounding in what Messick ( 1989) refers to as constructive-realism. My 
central argument is that although validity inquiry within that tradition has moved 
"beyond"1 objectivism, it has not moved far enough beyond. It remains a social science 
aspiring to the ideals of the natural sciences where the goal of interpretation is the 
construction of generalizations which contribute to theory. While the study of regularities 
is an important and necessary task, there is a tendency in psychometrics (and Bernstein 
argues in all mainstream social science) towards reification, that is, taking its reality as 
given rather than investigating it as a historical and social artefact (Bernstein 1976, Moss 
et al 2002). Thus while the contributions of psychometrics to validity inquiry have been 
significant, an enriched understanding of assessment as an interpretive process will need 
to come from theoretical perspectives beyond those which have informed psychometrics. 
I turn in 3.3.2 to validity inquiry from an interpretivist perspective. Moss (1996) 
challenges the psychometric community to enlarge the dialogue by exploring validity 
from the perspective of the interpretive tradition of science. In contrast to mainstream 
social science, out of which psychometrics has developed, interpretive science argues that 
there are intrinsic differences between the study of natural life and social life. In contrast 
to the objects ofnatural science (i.e. physical objects), the ·objects' of social life are 
reflexive: humans beings are constantly reflecting on what they do as part of what they 
do. Secondly. their meanings are intersubjective: they are not the property of individuals 
but the common property of a particular group. Thirdly, their meanings are discursive; 
they are constituted in and by language. I draw on Moss' ( 1998b, Moss et a! 1998) two 
approaches to assessment, the aggregative and the integrative, to illustrate the 
implications of these different epistemological perspectives for the evaluation of 
interpretations. Ultimately Moss ( 1996) is not arguing for one perspective over the other, 
the psychometric or the interpretive, but for a dialectic perspective which "can provide a 





























more textured and productive view of the social phenomenon we seek to understand" (p. 
22). 
In 3.4 I argue that such a dialectic perspective can be found in Bourdieu's theory of 
social practice, and I construct a social theoretical perspective which I believe is best 
equipped to illuminate the way in which context, difference and power are constitutive of 
assessment as an interpretive act2. Firstly, it gives insight into assessment as a socially 
situated practice, meaning that validation practices only make sense within the logic of 
the 'field' in which they are located. Secondly, members of a community of practice, to 
the extent that they have been subjected to the same social conditions imposed by the 
'field', share a 'class habitus', or a 'professional vision' (Goodwin 1994) which informs 
their classificatory acts. Thirdly, a social theoretical approach to assessment illumines the 
complexity of contingencies which influence assessment-based interpretations, 
contingencies which may result in an adjustment and even a divergence from tacitly 
agreed-upon points of reference. And finally a social theoretical perspective illuminates 
how language plays a crucial role in all these meaning-making, position-taking, power-
effecting acts. I argue that all of these insights are important to a richer understanding of 
assessment as a social practice. 
3.2 The search for foundations 
Bernstein (1983) argues that there is an uneasiness which has spread through 
intellectual and cultural life which affects not only every discipline but every aspect of 
our lives. This malaise raises not only intellectual concerns, but the issue of some of the 
most perplexing questions concerning human beings: what we are, what we can know, 
what norms ought to bind us, and what are the grounds of our hope. This uneasiness is 
expressed by the opposition between objectivism and relativism, although there are other 
oppositions which point to the same underlying anxiety: rationality versus irrationality, 
objectivity versus subjectivity, realism versus antirealism. Bernstein's thesis is that these 
oppositions are not the only viable alternatives, and that there is now an urgent call to 
2 I am greatly indebted to Pamela Moss who, from within the psychometric community, initiated and 
continues throughout her work to sustain a dialogue between psychometric, hermeneutical and social 
theoretical approaches to validity inquiry. 
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move beyond them. One of the central projects in this move is a re-examination of the 
very nature of human rationality. Although Bernstein's work was published 20 years ago, 
I believe that his arguments are still central to on-going debates in the philosophy of the 
social sciences, debates about what social science is and how it contributes to social life 
(see Bohman 1991, Flyvbjerg 2001). I now tum to a clarification of what Bernstein 
means by this opposition. 
By 'objectivism' Bernstein (1983) means "the basic conviction that there is or must 
be some permanent, a-historical matrix or framework to which we can ultimately appeal 
in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness or rightness" 
(p. 8). Objectivi"sts claim that there is or must be such a matrix and that the primary task 
of the philosopher is to discover what it is. Thus objectivists are in search of foundations, 
for some "fixed, permanent constraints" to which they can appeal, "which are secure and 
stable" (p. 19). In contrast, relativists not only deny the existence of such foundations, 
but argue that whatever philosophers take to be most fundamental - whether it is the 
concept of rationality, truth, reality, right, the good, or norms - must be understood as 
relative to a specific theoretical framework, paradigm, society, or culture. "For the 
relativist", Bernstein argues, "there is no substantive overarching framework or single 
metalanguage by which we can rationally adjudicate or univocally evaluate competing 
claims of alternative paradigms" (p. 8). 
Therefore with reference to the issues of criteria or standards, objectivists make it 
their life quest to find the standards of rationality, standards which are universal, 
independent of history and society. On the other hand, relativists deny the existence of 
standards of rationality which are universal, that are not subject to historical or temporal 
change. We cannot escape, they argue, from the predicament of speaking of"our" 
standards and "their" standards of rationality, standards that may be "radically 
incommensurable" (Winch cited in Bernstein 1983, p. 27). 
How do we account for the tenacious hold of this dichotomy on intellectual thought? 
Bernstein's explanation lies in what he refers to as the Cartesian anxiety. He traces the 
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roots of this opposition back to Descartes who, Bernstein argues, bequeathed to modem 
philosophy a set of problems, questions and metaphors which have been at the centre of 
philosophy ever since. This is the quest for some "fixed point, some stable rock upon 
which we can secure our lives against the vicissitudes that constantly threaten us" 
(Bernstein 1983, p. 18). The alternative to this "fixed point" is not just "radical 
epistemological scepticism but the dread of madness and chaos where nothing is fixed, 
where we can neither touch bottom nor support ourselves on the surface" (ibid.). The 
crux of the anxiety, Bernstein argues, is the manner in which Descartes leads us to the 
"grand and seductive either/or" (ibid.). "Either there is some support for our being, a 
fixed foundation for our knowledge, or we cannot escape the forces of darkness that 
envelop us with madness, with intellectual and moral chaos" (ibid.) (italics in original). 
It is this anxiety, Bernstein argues, which is the primary cultural conflict of contemporary 
life, contributing to a growing intellectual crisis. 
Thus Bernstein's task is to exorcize the Cartesian anxiety, and to move beyond these 
"misleading and distortive" (p. 19) dichotomies. He shows how postempiricist 
philosophies of science, notably the work of Thomas Kuhn, have called into question this 
whole framework of oppositional thinking, arguing instead for another alternative, a new 
image of science, a new concept of rationality. 
I now tum to a discussion of validity inquiry from two different theoretical 
perspectives. each of which I argue is an attempt to move beyond objectivism. 
3.3 Beyond objectivism and relativism 
3.3.1 Validity inquiry from a psychometric perspective 
As the cornerstone of psychological and educational measurement, validity has been 
the subject of sustained theorization since the mid-1950s when Cronbach and Mehl 
formulated the initial concept of construct validation (Cronbach and Mehl cited in 
Cronbach 1989). It is not my intention to review this volume of work3. My goal is to 
highlight some of the significant developments in the evolution of validity inquiry from 





the psychometric perspective. I draw principally on the work of Samuel Messick and Lee 
Cronbach, both leading contributors to the development of validity theory within 
psychometrics, whose work in reformulating validity emerged at a time when "storybook 
images of science" (Mitroff cited in Mishler 1990, p. 417) were being called into 
question. I close by arguing that, while these conceptual shifts have been significant, 
there are features of assessment as an interpretive process which the psychometric 
approach is not equipped to illuminate. 
Berstein ( 1983) argues that one of the significant contributions of postempiricist 
philosophy and history of science is "the recovery of the hermeneutical dimension of 
science in both the natural and the social science" (p. 171). Consistent with this recovery, 
the concept of validity has shifted from being understood as a technical procedure to an 
understanding of validity as an interpretive process (Angoff 1988, Cronbach 1989, 
Messick 1989). Validity shifts from being a suite of types of validity (content validity, 
criterion validity, construct validity4) to a unified concept of validity, with content 
validity and criterion validity subsumed under construct validity5. All validation is 
construct validation (Cronbach cited in Messick 1989, p. 19), that is, all validation is 
about substantiating the meaning of scores in relation to the constructs the assessment 
purports to assess. Thus validity inquiry shifts from being largely a technical, 
quantitative operation (usually measured through correlations) to an on-going process of 
researching the strength of relationship between the test scores and the theory underlying 
the construct, a process which requires many lines of evidence, not all of them 
quantitative (Angoff 1988). 
~ Content validity refers to the measure of alignment between the content which the test is assessing and the 
broader domain of content which it purports to represent. This 'measure' of validity requires some form of 
professional judgment. Criterion validity refers to the extent to which the test scores correlate with other 
independent measures of what the test is designed to assess and predict. This measure of validity usually 
takes the form of a correlation. In psychometrics, 'construct' refers to the psychological trait that the test is 
presumed to be measuring. Construct validity thus refers to the strength of the relationship between the 
interpretations of the test scores and the ·construct' it purports to be testing. 
5 This unified concept of construct validity is only officially accepted in the I 985 version of the Standards 
for Educational and Psychological Testing (American Psychological Association, American Educational 
Research Association and National Council on Measurement in Education). 
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So while the term 'hermeneutical' itself is not used, validity (or increasingly the 
preferred term 'validation') is characterized as an interpretive process (see also Mishler 
1990). "Validation ... is evaluation" (Cronbach 1988, p. 4). Messick (1989) defines 
validity as, "an integrated evaluative judgment of the degree to which empirical evidence 
and theoretical rationales support the adequacy and appropriateness of inferences and 
actions based on test scores or other modes of assessment" (p. 13) (italics in original). 
He elaborates, "What is to be validated is not the test ... but the inferences derived from 
the test scores ... inferences about score meaning or interpretation and about the 
implications for action that the interpretation entails" (ibid.). It follows then that, 
"validity is a matter of degree, not all or none ... validity is an evolving property and 
validation is a continuing process ... because evidence is always incomplete, validation is 
essentially a matter ofmaking the most reasonable case ... " (ibid.). 
Another significant development in the evolution of validity inquiry within 
psychometrics is the growing acknowledgment of the central role that values play in the 
interpretation of meaning, that there can be no permanent division between observation 
and theory (Bernstein 1983 ). In his seminal piece Messick ( 1989) grounds validity 
inquiry philosophically beyond objectivism and relativism in what he refers to as a 
constructivist-realist approach. It is realist, he argues, "because it assumes that traits and 
other causal entities exist outside the theorist's mind; it is constructive-realist because it 
assumes that these entities cannot be comprehended directly but must be viewed through 
constructions of that mind" (p. 29) (italics added). By acknowledging that constructs 
represent '·our best, albeit imperfect and fallible" constructions of the mind (Messick 
1998, p.35), Messick is highlighting the role that values and ideologies play in shaping 
those constructions. He argues, for example, that even construct labels are value-laden 
(e.g. the difference between the construct label 'stress' and the label 'challenge'). He 
cites theories of intelligence as an example of the ways in which theories and models are 
also value-laden. Thus in grounding validity inquiry philosophically, Messick's (1989) 
appeal to realism echoes the objectivist quest for a fixed point, something which "exists 
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independent of the theorist's mind" (p. 29)6; the appeal to constructivism is a recognition 
of the need to "embrace" some of relativism's basic points, namely, that "all observation 
and meaning is theory-laden and that all theory is value-laden" (p. 24). 
Thus, validity inquiry, as Messick presents it, is a move beyond objectivism, 
founded on a "new realism"7 ( p. 26). But how far beyond? Messick notes that 
"validation is scientific inquiry" (p. 14) but what kind of scientific inquiry? What are the 
goals of this inquiry? What scientific ideals drive this kind of validation work? What 
kinds of evidence are privileged? What are its greatest threats? 
Moss ( 1996) argues that psychometric notions of validity have evolved out of 
mainstream or naturalist conceptions of social science8. While mainstream social 
scientists do not comprise a homogeneous group, in general they argue that the 
disciplines of social science differ in degree, not in kind from the well-established natural 
sciences (Bernstein 1976). Their success as scientists will be found in "emulating, 
modifying and adapting techniques that have proven successful in our scientific 
understanding of nature" (p. xv). The aim of the social sciences, from this naturalist 
perspective. is thus the same as that of natural sciences although even the most fervent 
belie\'ers are acutely aware of the challenges this poses· for social science: collecting and 
refining data. discovering correlations. formulating testable empirical generalizations, 
hypotheses. and models, and most importantly contributing to the growth of testable and 
well-confirmed theories which explain phenomena and are derived from theoretical 
assumptions (Bernstein 1976). 
6 From a ·constructivist-realist' stance Messick ( 1989, 1998) would argue that some constructs have real 
referents while others do not. "Just as on the realist side there may be traits operant in behaviour for which 
no construct had yet been formulated, on the constructive side there are useful constructs which have no 
counterpart in reality" (Messick 1998, p. 35). 
~ Messick is here drawing on the work of Bhaskar ( 1979) and the philosophical tradition of critical realism. 
8 Moss ( 1996) argues that the naturalist/interpretivist distinction serves a "useful purpose" in terms of 
highlighting some aspects of educational measurement, but she expresses caution about its over-emphasis . 
.. Though the naturalist/interpretive cut foregrounds a particular set of issues- a particular set of 
commonalities within and differences across traditions- a different category scheme would rearrange 
allegiances among traditions" (p. 21 ). 
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Consistent with mainstream social science, Messick (1989) notes that the major goal 
of validity inquiry is the construction of generalizations: 
"The major concern ofvalidity, as of science more generally, is not to explain any 
single isolated event, behavior, or item response, because these almost certainly 
reflect a confounding of multiple determinants. Rather, the intent is to account for 
consistency in behaviors or item responses, which frequently reflects distinguishable 
determinants ... We thus move from the level of discrete behaviors or isolated 
observations to the level of measurement. This is not to say that scores for 
individual items or discrete behaviors are not often of interest but, rather, that their 
meaning and dependability are fragile compared with response consistencies across 
items or replications" (p. 14) (italics in original). 
One of the fundamental challenges to generalizability is the impact of context on 
score meaning. Messick (1989) notes, "Test responses are a function not only of the 
items, tasks, or stimulus conditions but of the persons responding and the context of 
measurement ... a context which includes factors in the environmental background as well 
as the assessment setting (p. 14) (italics in the original). Thus a central validation concern 
is to establish whether the meaning of a measure is context-specific or whether it 
generalizes across contexts. Messick notes that although the impact of contextualization 
can be compelling, there are methods of "investigating or monitoring" the role of context 
through "multiple task formats" along with the "standardization of testing conditions'' all 
of which will contribute to the goal of "convergent interpretations and comparability of 
scores across respondents and settings" (pp. 14-15). 
Again consistent with a mainstream approach to social science, Messick ( 1989) 
argues that "although there are many ways of accumulating evidence to support a 
particular inference, these ways are essentially the methods of science" (p. 14). He 
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proposes a list of criteria, what he calls 'aspects' of validity or sources of evidence which 
need to be brought to bear on the validation of score meaning and uses9. They are: 
• Content aspect of construct validity - This is evidence that the assessment tasks 
are relevant and representative with respect to a particular theory of the construct 
domain. This evidence usually takes the form of consensual professional 
judgment. 
• Substantive aspect of construct validity- This is evidence that the assessment 
tasks are requiring the requisite thinking skills and processes specified by the 
theory of the construct domain. This evidence moves beyond professional 
judgment of content (as in the content aspect above) to evidence from actual 
responses that the skills being assessed are the ones specified by the domain. 
• Structural aspect - This is evidence that the internal aspects of the assessment, for 
example, the structure of the test and the scoring rubric, are consistent with the 
theory of the construct domain. 
• Generalizability aspect - This is evidence that the score interpretations are not 
limited to the sample of assessed tasks but generalizable across groups, settings, 
and tasks. This evidence is usually derived through factorial analyses. 
• External aspect - This is evidence that the assessment interpretations are 
consistent with interpretations of other (independent) assessments of the same 
constructs. This evidence is usually derived through correlational analyses. 
• Consequential aspect -This is evidence that there are no unanticipated negative 
side effects as a result of the assessment results' interpretation and use. 
Messick ( 1995) argues that "These six aspects of construct validity apply to all 
educational and psychological measurement, including performance assessments. Taken 
together, they provide a way of addressing the multiple and interrelated validity questions 
that need to be answered in justifying score interpretation and use" (p. 8). Again I suggest 
that this list of evidence types or criteria for validity, productive as they may be, echo the 
objectivist quest for explicit standards of rationality (Bernstein 1983). 
9 I have drawn on Nitko's (2001) adaption of Messick's aspects of validity in order to translate Messick's 
highly technical language into something more accessible to a non-measurement audience. 
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Thus for Messick at the heart of validity inquiry is a clearly specified theory of the 
construct domain. Validation is hypothesis testing, that is, evaluating interpretations 
against a theory of the construct domain. This requires the collection of particular kinds 
of evidence to support assessment-based interpretations or offer alternative 
interpretations. The kind of evidence privileged is that which supports or challenges the 
consistency of the interpretations. The move is from the particular to the general with a · 
careful "monitoring" for the "intrusion of context" (Messick 1989, p. 15). This is 
essential if interpretations are to have any meaning outside the immediate contexts in 
which they are generated. Ultimately on the basis of these .regularities, social scientists 
offer explanations which are empirically and theoretically sound. This, for Messick, is 
rationality. Interestingly, Cronbach ( 1989) appears somewhat less optimistic about the 
role of construct validation in relation to theory building. He argues that an "idealized 
strong (validation) program is most appropriate to a scientific perspective that reaches 
centuries into the future" 10 (p. 163). He argues that "test interpretation almost never has a 
consolidated theory as its armature; mostly, we rely on crude theory-sketches. The loose 
assembly of concepts and implications used in typical test interpretations I shall call 'a 
construction' rather than 'a theory"' (p. 152). Later, he adds, "Acceptance of 
constructions is inherently a community process" (p. 164), a process which he concedes 
is as much social as it is rational. 
To summarize, my main goal has been to demonstrate the contribution of 
psychometric theory to validity inquiry, namely, its evolution from a largely pragmatic 
and empirical concept (Angoff 1988) to a concept more consistent with postempiricist 
notions of scientific inquiry. This is the recognition that validation, as are all forms of 
scientific inquiry, is an interpretive process in which the divide between fact and value is 
difficult to delineate. Nonetheless validity inquiry within this tradition remains 
committed to the aspirations of the natural sciences where the goal of interpretation is the 
construction of generalizations which support theory, although I noted that even within 
1
u This seems to reflect a mainstream view of social science as not yet 'mature' natural science. 
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psychometrics there is some scepticism about the role of construct validation in relation 
to theory development. 
Bernstein (1976) argues that in the final analysis the issue is not the use of empirical 
and quantitative techniques to establish regularities and correlations. Social practices do 
exhibit regularities and correlations, and these must be understood. The question is, how 
do we understand their significance? He argues that the problem with mainstream social 
science is the tendency towards reification, "toward mistaking historically conditioned 
social and political patterns for an unchangeable brute reality which is simply 'out there' 
to be confronted" (p. 1 06). While this is a danger that both Messick and Cronbach are 
attuned to, Moss et al (2002) argue that psychometrics as a scientific discipline does run 
the risk, as do all scientific communities, of reifying its own perspectives; "It comes to 
see that part of reality which its methods are best adapted to study as the entire picture of 
the way things are" (p. 5). This reification may lead to blind spots. Some aspects of the 
interpretive process are illuminated while others remain backgrounded. The quest for the 
general potentially overlooks the richness to be found in the particular. The need for 
context-independent meanings may result in distortions of those very meanings. The 
privileging of consistency may obscure what underlies inconsistency in interpretations. 
Thus while there is no denying the significant contribution of psychometrics to the 
validity dialogue, a richer understanding of the interpretive process will need to come 
from theoretical perspectives other than those which have informed psychometrics. 
3.3.2 Validity inquiry from an interpretive perspective 
Moss' main strategy for exposing some of psychometrics' blind spots is to hold up 
an alternative perspective of science, that of the interpretive (or hermeneutical) tradition. 
With respect to the naturalist debate, the interpretive tradition rejects the notion that 
social life can be or should be studied in the same way as natural life. Their contribution 
to the debate has been to emphasize the intrinsic differences between the study of social 
life and the study of natural life, differences which, interpretivists would argue, make the 
scientific investigation of social life impossible ('scientific' as understood by the natural 
sciences). The interpretive tradition argues that the idea of a social science conceived of 
as a natural science is based on conceptual confusion. But more importantly, Bernstein 
(1976) argues, interpretivists have shown that "the obsession with transforming social 
studies into natural science obscures, distorts, and suppresses the legitimacy of issues 
vital for theorizing about political and social life" (p. 59). This obsession distorts the 
ways in which social science can and does matter (Flyvbjerg 2001). 
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What are the differences between the study of 'objects' in social science and the 
'objects' of the natural science? I turn to a discussion of three distinctive dimensions of 
social life and their implications for how we evaluate interpretations. 
One of the distinctive dimensions of the study of social life is reflexivity, that is, that 
humans are self-interpreting beings; they are constantly reflecting on what they do as part 
of what they do. These self-reflections are of two types (what Giddens cited in Flyvbjerg 
2001 refers to as the 'double hermeneutic'). Firstly, there are the self-reflections of the 
people being researched. In contrast, the objects of natural science are not self-
interpreting, in other words, they do not talk back (Flyvbjerg 2001). Secondly, there are 
the self-reflections of the researcher. These self-reflections, that is, beliefs that people 
have about themselves and others, are not, Bernstein (1976) argues, "simply subjective 
states in their minds; they are ... constitutive of the actions, practices, and institutions that 
make up social and political life" (p. 61) (italics in original). In other words, the 
researched and the researchers' self-reflections (the 'subjective') do not exist in a 
vacuum. They are in mutually constitutive relationship with the actions, practices and 
institutions (the 'objective'). Context both determines and is determined by these self-
understandings (Flyvbjerg 2001). 
A significant implication of the reflexive dimension is that there is no disengaged 
observer. Bernstein (1976) argues that there are few mainstream social scientists who 
would deny the hold of subjective issues, such as beliefs, values and ideology, on 
interpretation. As noted above, given the developments in the philosophy of science, 
Messick ( 1989) accepts and even "embraces" the notion that all observation is value-
laden (p. 24 ). But there are other implications which are more subtle and more profound. 
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The issue is the deeply entrenched perception of the subjective and the objective as 
dichotomies, a perception which Bernstein argues misrepresents human action. "Human 
action ... is internally related to the interpretations that are intrinsically constitutive of it" 
(1976, p. 62). The bottom line for social inquiry is, as Flyvbjerg (2001) puts it, "context 
counts" (p. 38). Thus this reflexive dimension of social life raises a scepticism about the 
quest for explanatory theories of social life based on context-independent generalizations. 
It calls to question an evaluative process which sees context as an intrusion or threat to 
validation. I return in the final section (3.4) to a more in-depth exploration of the 
constitutive relationship between the objective and the subjective, as this is one of the 
major themes of Bourdieu' s theory of social practice. 
A second distinctive dimension for the study of social life is what interpretivists 
refer to as 'intersubjectivity'. Intersubjectivity takes us to an even deeper appreciation of 
the importance of context for the evaluation of interpretations. As noted above, subjective 
and objective meanings are mutually constitutive of action. Taylor (1987), however, 
challenges the notion of 'subjectivity'. He argues that there are a "range of meanings 
open" to an interpretive community (p. 56), but these are not subjective meanings. In 
other words, "They are not the property of one or some individuals, but rather they are 
intersubjective meanings, which are constitutive of the ·social matrix in which individuals 
find themselves and act" (p. 57). Intersubjectivity consists of 'interpretive schemes' 
(Bernstein 1976) which are not private, but social; not subjective but intersubjective. 
They serve as a common point of reference for an interpretive community. However, 
Taylor (1987) argues, this common point of reference is not the same as consensus. 
Indeed it is because of intersubjective meaning that there can be and often is 
disagreement (or what Bernstein 1992 refers to as 'dissensus'). Intersubjectivity is only a 
condition for consensus, or put another way, consensus and dissensus are only possible 
where there is intersubjective meaning. This notion foreshadows Bourdieu's concept of 
·habitus·, and I return to it in the final section (3 .4 ), and its implications for the 
evaluation of interpretations. 
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The third distinction between the study of social and natural life is that, unlike 
natural objects, social objects are constituted in language (Rabinow and Sullivan 1987). 
The significance of language in understanding social practice heralded the 'linguistic 
turn' in the social sciences, the recognition of the dialectic relationship between language 
and social life; language is not simply a reflection of social reality but constitutes and is 
constituted by it. Taylor (1987) notes how it is possible for the natural scientist to 
distinguish between, for example, the 'heavens' and discourse or theories about the 
'heavens'. But it is not so simple for the social scientist to distinguish between, for 
example, 'voting practices' and the discourse used to describe these practices. The very 
choices of language by both voters and the researcher of voting practices constitutes the 
nature of the practice. Taylor ( 1987) concludes, "There is no simple one-way 
dependence here. We can speak of mutual dependence if we like, but really what this 
poir~ts up is the artificiality of the distinction between social reality and the language of 
description of that social reality. The language is constitutive of the reality, is essential to 
its being the kind of reality it is" (p. 54). 
I return to this discursive dimension of social life in the next chapter. Consistent 
with critical discourse theory I argue that the analysis of discourse serves as one of the 
crucial points of access to social life. Suffice to say at this point that this argument has 
crucial implications for the evaluation of interpretations. Language is not simply a neutral 
container into which speakers pour their meaning. Critical discourse theory argues that 
the very choices of language are crucial to the construction of the interpretations 
themselves. Language is involved in "building tasks" (Gee 1999, p. 85): building belief 
systems, personal identities and interpersonal relations. While psychometrics gives 
central place to validation as an interpretive act, the role of language itself in constituting 
meaning-making acts is taken for granted. 
The reflexive, intersubjective, and discursive dimensions of social life raise a 
number of implications for how we evaluate interpretations. Moss ( 1998b, Moss et al 
1998) concretizes these differences by applying two different approaches to a practical 
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·assessment problem (the assessment of portfolios for teacher certification11 ). She refers 
to these approaches as the 'aggregative' and 'integrative'. While acknowledging the 
advances made by the psychometric community in the assessment and validation of 
complex performances, she critiques the conventional model for portfolio assessment. 
Typically the procedure consists of a panel of assessors who work independently, scoring 
one exercise at a time, blind to the candidate's performances on other exercises. In order 
to reach a decision, scores assigned by individual readers are then algorithmically 
combined and compared to a pre-determined cut-score. Moss ( 1998b) argues that while 
this is "sound and thoughtful" practice within the psychometric community, it is 
instructive to question the quality of this information and its consequences from another 
perspective (p. 1 ~0). 
Moss (1998b, Moss et al 1998) uses the interpretive notion of the 'hermeneutical 
circle' to argue for an integrative and dialogic approach to assessment. Drawing on 
Gadamer ( 1987 cited in Moss 1998b, Moss et al 1998) she characterizes the circle as 
representing a dual dialectic: one between parts of the text and the whole, and one 
between the text and the reader's foreknowledge, preconceptions or "enabling" 
prejudices (Moss et al 1998, p. 141 ). Drawing on Bernstein (1983 cited in Moss, 1998b, 
Moss et al, 1998) she makes a crucial distinction between "blind" prejudices and 
··enabling" prejudices (Moss et al 1998, p. 142). Thus the interpretive task is not to 
remove preconceptions - this is not possible - but to "test them critically in the course of 
inquiry" (Bernstein cited in Moss et al1998, p. 141). Moss (1994) argues, "A 
hermeneutic (or interpretive) approach to assessment would involve holistic, integrative 
interpretations of collected performances that seek to understand the whole in light of its 
parts, that privilege readers who are most knowledgeable about the context in which the 
assessment occurs, and that ground those interpretations not only in the textual and 
contextual evidence available, but also in a rational debate among the community of 
interpreters" (p. 7). 
11 The context of this work is the Interstate New Teacher Assessment and Support Consortium (INT AS C) 
which is developing portfolio assessment to assist participating states in the US to make decisions about 
teacher licensure. 
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The quality of the interpretations which arise from this kind ofassessment will be 
evaluated on the basis of a different set of criteria to those which the psychometric 
community privileges. (Recall Messick's 'aspects of validity' and the particular privilege 
afforded to reliability and generalizability discussed in 3.3 .1 ). Some of the criteria which 
Moss (1994) mentions are: the assessor's extensive knowledge of the learning context; 
multiple and varied sources of evidence; an ethic of disciplined, collaborative inquiry that 
encourages challenge and revision to initial interpretations; and the transparency of the 
trail of evidence leading to the interpretations, which allows users to evaluate the 
conclusions for themselves. From an interpretivist perspective, the community of 
interpreters in critical dialogue is a crucial criterion for validation. If we accept critical 
dialogue as a criterion for validation, then Moss (1994) argues "the question is who 
participates in the dialogue and this is an issue of power" (p. 9). Within the psychometric 
paradigm assessment decisions are often made in which the voices of those "most 
knowledgeable about the context and most affected by the results" have been silenced (p. 
1 0). 
Moss (1998a) also argues that an interpretive approach to assessment requires a 
different kind of research agenda. She challenges the educational measurement 
community to broaden the set of evidence it draws on to include the "actual discourse 
that surrounds the products and practices of testing" (p. 7). Particularly generative is the 
interpretive perspective on dissensus (Moss and Schutz 2001), occasions when assessors 
fail to reach consensus. Rather than a problem to overcome, dissensus becomes another 
epistemic tool for greater insight into the validation process. 
In summary, I return to my initial set of questions: From the perspective of these 
different traditions, psychometrics and interpretive: What is validation? What are its 
primary goals? What forms ofrationality underlie it? 
With respect to validation there appears to be general consensus concerning the 
central role of interpretation. Flyvbjerg (200 1) argues that even the natural sciences have 
had to accept ''the universality of hermeneutics" (p. 28), that even in the natural sciences 
f. 
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what constitutes facts, methods and theories is determined on the basis of a common 
interpretation of what constitutes scientific work. With respect to the primary goals of the 
interpretive process, again there seems to be some degree of convergence between the 
two traditions in that both seek to offer explanations for social life. There are, however, 
important differences between these traditions concerning what constitutes a legitimate 
explanation, in other words the basis upon which interpretations are evaluated. Consistent 
with mainstream social science, psychometrics prizes generalizability and reliability. The 
goal of interpretation in psychometrics is generalizability. These generalizations are 
based on the convergence of multiple sources of evidence; evidence which diverges or is 
inconsistent is a challenge to the validation process. By definition, generalizations are 
only meaningful to the extent that they are valid across individuals, settings and tasks; 
they must be context-independent. An interpretive approach to assessment, as proposed 
by Moss, does not deny the importance of generalizability and reliability but would 
challenge that they are necessary conditions for the validation process. The aim of 
interpretation, from the interpretive tradition is "not to uncover universals or laws" but to 
·'explicate context" (Rabinow and Sullivan 1987, p. 14 ), an explication which takes full 
cognizance of the reflexive, intersubjective and discursive dimensions of social life. One 
of the crucial criteria for validation from this perspective is critical dialogue, a dialogue 
which acknowledges that context, difference and power are central to the formulation of 
assessment-based interpretations. 
And regarding my final question. What forms of rationality characterize these two 
approaches? Flyvbjerg (200 1) argues that underlying these two approaches are 
contrasting forms of rationality as ideal types. Underlying mainstream social science is a 
form of rationality prized by the natural sciences, one which privileges forms of inquiry 
which strive to be value-free as opposed to value-based, analytical as opposed to 
intuitive. instrumental as opposed to dialogical. Alternative forms of rationality (those 
characterized in opposition) have often been labelled 'irrational'. Flyvbjerg's central 




comprehending the total spectrum of human activity12• He calls for the explicit 
integration of properties which characterize high levels of expertise: context, judgment, 
practice, trial and error, experience, common sense, intuition and bodily sensation. I will 
return to this issue in Chapter 5 where I argue that this alternative rationality is crucial for 
an understanding of academic professional judgment. 
While some theorists have argued that the notions of science which inform these two 
different types of rationality are incommensurable, others suggest that they need to be 
held together. Flyvbjerg (200 1) notes that while these dualisms (general vs. particular, 
context-independent vs. context-dependent) "may facilitate thinking and writing, they 
inhibit understanding by implying a certain neatness that is rarely found in lived life ... 
rather than the 'either-or,' we should develop a non-dualistic and pluralistic 'both-and"' 
(p. 49). Neither is Moss (1996) calling for one perspective over the other. She argues, "It 
is in the dialectic between the contextualized understanding of local meanings and the 
distancing analysis of regularities that the effects of symbolic power become most highly 
visible and open to critique" (p.22). Thus it is a dialectic perspective that "can provide a 
more textured and productive view of the social phenomena we seek to understand" 
(ibid.). 
3.4 A social theoretical perspective 
3.4.1 The double reality of social life 
Such a dialectic perspective can be found in Bourdieu's theory of social practice. In 
the introduction to The Logic of Practice (1990), Bourdieu notes, "Of all the oppositions 
that artificially divide social science, the most fundamental, and the most ruinous, is the 
one that is set up between subjectivism and objectivism. The very fact that this division 
constantly reappears in virtually the same form would suffice to indicate that the modes 
of knowledge which it distinguishes are equally indispensable to a science of the social 
world ... " (p. 25). The goal, for Bourdieu, is to move beyond the antagonism between 
these two "modes of knowledge" while preserving the "epistemic virtues" from each of 
12 In constructing his argument Flyvbjerg is drawing heavily on the work of Dreyfus and Dreyfus ( 1986) 
who have developed a model of human learning processes which characterizes the kinds of rationality 
which distinguish between novices, competent perfom1ers and experts. 
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them (Wacquant in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 7) 13 . In this final section, I turn to 
the task of constructing a social theoretical approach to validation inquiry which I argue 
will best illumine the questions of context, difference and power. 
The social theoretical terrain is marked by heated debates between those who 
emphasize and give primacy to the search for underlying explanatory norms and rules 
and view action as a mere realization of these underlying structures (e.g. realists, 
structuralists), and those who focus on experiences and the local construction of 
individual or interpersonal events (e.g. constructivists, post-structuralists) (Wenger 1998). 
Muller (2000) characterizes this debate as the "dance of straw men" since neither position 
is tenable (p. 163). Constructivists cannot eliminate realism without being unresolvably 
self-contradictory. Realists, on the other hand, cannot eliminate constructivism without 
resorting to a form of argument that leads straight back to positivism. 
Thus much of the contemporary preoccupation of social theory of the mid to late 
1900s has been the search for a middle ground, the search for moorings in the aftermath 
of postmodernism. A common feature of this social theoretical terrain is the call for a 
·double view' of social life which keeps not only structure and agency in view but their 
mutually constitutive relationship. It is this dual condition of social practice that is the 
very interest point for social science. For it is the resiliency, the permanency of structure 
that provides clues to patterns, to rules, to conditions which in part explain why we do 
what we do. But it is the relativeness. the perturbability. the contingency of agency that 
points to the possibility of change, to new ways of being and seeing which have not been 
considered before, to the very complexity of life in its unpredictability. Through this 
·double view' lens, the focus of contemporary social theory is on 'practice', or more 
specifically social practice (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999). The focus is not on 
individuals, though the role of individuals within practice is crucial. Nor is it on society, 
though the macro social conditions which enable practice are relevant. The focus of 
13 While both Bernstein and Bourdieu are critiquing similar sets of antinomies which they argue distort 
social scientific inquiry, their critiques are contributing to different debates. Bernstein ( 1976) defines 
·objectivism· as a doctrine of foundational ism and his critique is aimed at empirical theory on the one hand, 
and postmoderni5m on the other. Bourdieu's (1996) definition of 'objectivism' appears similar to 
Bernstein's but his critique is directed at structuralism and post-structuralism. 






social theory is on relationships: relationships between the acts of agents within practices 
and relationships between networks of practice and broader social conditions which 
constitute these networks, with a particular interest in their co-determination. 
One of the fundamental goals ofBourdieu's work, as noted above, is to straddle 
some of the "deep-seated antinomies" which have held social science inquiry captive, 
antinomies between subject and object, structure and agency, subjectivist and objectivist 
notions ofknowledge (Wacquant in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 3). The double 
reality of social life, Bourdieu would argue, requires a "double reading" (p. 7). The first 
reading (from the "objectivist point of view") perceives society as a social physics, that 
is, an objective structure which can be "grasped from the outside, whose articulation can 
be materially observed, measured and mapped independently of the representations of 
those who live in it" (p. 8). The role of the researcher as "external observer" is to 
"ascertain the objective regularities (that agents) obey" (ibid.). The chief danger of this 
point of view is that "lacking a principle of generation of those regularities" (ibid.), the 
regularity slips from model to reality (what Bernstein 1976 refers to a reification as noted 
in 3.3.1). Bourdieu (1996) characterizes this distinction as one of rule as 'fit' (i.e. a rule 
that fits the observed regularities in a purely descriptive way) and rule as 'guide' (i.e. a 
rule that governs. directs and orients behaviour). "Pushed to its limits, objectivism 
cannot but produce an ersatz subject, and portray individuals or groups as the passive 
supports of forces that mechanically· work out their independent logic" (Wacquant in 
Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 8). 
The second reading (the "subjectivist point of view") perceives society as social 
phenomenology, that is, "Society appears as the emergent product of the decisions, 
actions, and cognitions of conscious, alert individuals to whom the world is given as 
immediately familiar and meaningful" (p. 9). From this perspective, pride of place is 
given to agency and subjective meaning. The danger of this perspective is that it "cannot 
go beyond a description of what specifically characterizes 'lived' experience of the social 
world, that is, apprehension of the world as self-evident, as 'taken for granted'. This is 
because it excludes any inquiry as to its own conditions of possibility" (Bourdieu 1990, p. 
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25). With specific reference to academic forms of evaluation as an example, Bourdieu 
( 1996) notes, "While we should bear in mind, in opposition to a certain mechanistic view 
of action, that social agents construct social reality, both individually and collectively, we 
must take care not to forget ... that they have not constructed the categories that they 
implement in this construction" (p. 29). 
Thus Bourdieu argues that in order to understand social life we need to transcend the 
false antinomies of objectivism and subjectivism; we need to apply a double reading to 
social life, one that "capitalizes on the epistemic virtues of each reading while skirting 
the vices of both" (Wacquant in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 7). 
3.4.2 Field and Habitus 
For Bourdieu social practice is best accounted for in the mutually formative 
relationship between structure and agency. "The stuff of social reality, of action, no less 
than structure ... lies in relations" (Wacquant in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 15). 
'Field', as Bourdieu uses the concept, is a "network or configuration of objective 
relations between positions" (Bourdieu in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 97). He 
( 1996) likens a social field to heavenly bodies within the same gravitational field which 
produce effects on each other from afar, where the boundary of the field is the limit of the 
effect. The distribution of capital, in other words social, economic and cultural resources. 
constitutes ·positions' within the field. But a field is not simply a set of "'empty 
places· ... but a space of play which exists as such only to the extent that players enter into 
it who believe in it and actively pursue the prizes it offers" (Wacquant in Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992, p. 19) (italics in original). This "space of play" is always in a state of 
tension as fields are sites of struggle, both power struggles within the field and struggles 
O\'er power to define the field (Postone et al 1993). 
If field is constituted by positions, habitus is 'disposition'. Habitus consists of a set 
of objective relations (constituted by the field) 'deposited' within individual bodies, 
·dispositions· which "function at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations 
and actions and make possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks" (Bourdieu 
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cited in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 18). Habitus is a "structuring mechanism" 
operating within individuals, though it is not "strictly individual", granting individuals 
"practical mastery" within the field which they inhabit (Wacquant in Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992, p. 18). The relationship between field and habitus is precisely the means 
by which Bourdieu's theory of practice transcends the traditional antinomies of the 
objective and the subjective, of structure and agency. For habitus is the embodiment of 
field within individuals, the "internalization of externality" (Bourdieu 1996, p. 29); it is . 
"socialized subjectivity" (Bourdieu in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 126). 
Given the homologous relationship between field and habitus, habitus only generates 
dispositions which are compatible with the field. In other words, habitus tends to 
generate "reasonable", "common sense" behaviour; it excludes "extravagances" and all 
that has been negatively sanctioned because it is incompatible with the field (Bourdieu 
1990, p. 56). Habitus explains the 'practical sense' which individuals have as members 
of a particular field. Bourdieu, borrowing from the world of sport, refers to this practical 
sense as a 'feel for the game'. "Because native membership in a field implies a feel for 
the game ... everything that takes place in it seems sensible: full of sense and objectively 
directed in a judicious direction" (p. 66) (italics in original). Thus without explicit rules, 
codes or criteria. armed with this practical sense, individuals know how to get on with the 
myriad of classificatory tasks required of them as members of a particular field. Bourdieu 
relates this practical sense or practical knowledge to Aristotle's concept ofphronesis, 
sometimes translated as wisdom, a form of judgment which is pragmatic, variable, 
context-dependent based on practical value-rationality (Flyvbjerg 2001 ). This practical 
sense or ·feel for the game' explains how an individual does what he or she "has to do" 
without '·posing it explicitly as a goal, below the level of calculation and even 
consciousness, beneath discourse and representation" (Bourdieu in Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992, p. 128). 
Bourdieu's concept of habitus accounts not only for the particular classificatory 
scheme which an individual adopts as a member of a particular field, but extends to an 
account of a ""unity of style" (Bourdieu 1998) which characterizes a group of individuals. 
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It accounts for a collective 'feel' or 'taste' positively sanctioned by individuals who are 
products of the same objective conditions of the field. Bourdieu (1990) refers to this class 
habitus as a "subjective but non-individual system of internalized structures, common 
schemes of perception, conception and action" (p. 60) (italics mine). It is class habitus 
that enables practices to be "harmonized" without any "conscious reference to a norm", 
without any "direct interaction", without any "explicit co-ordination" (p. 58). "The 
corrections and adjustments (that) agents themselves consciously carry out presuppose 
mastery of a common code" (p. 59). 
I turn briefly to look at some ofBourdieu's (1988, 1996) empirical work which 
focuses on the class habitus of homo academicus, in particular the classificatory schemata 
which underlie professorial judgments. Consistent with all sociology, the goal of 
Bourdieu' s work is to "uncover the most deeply buried structures" (1996, p. 1) of the 
social world, that is, the conditions for the production and reproduction of practice. In 
terms of academic assessment practices, Bourdieu' s interest is to illuminate the 
"principles of vision and division" (p. 265) which lie behind academic forms of 
classification. What lies behind categories of professorial judgment of student 
performance? What are the organizing principles? 
Bourdieu explores 'professorial judgment' within the context of the elitist French 
tertiary system in the late 1960's. He finds a strong correlation between professors' 
judgments (measured by clusters of adjectives used to evaluate student performance, e.g. 
·fine·. ·intelligent' at one end ofthe spectrum vs. 'servile', 'vulgar'), the marks which 
students receive (measured by average mark for the year) and the students' social origin 
(measured by professional origin of the father). What he finds is that the higher the 
student is in the social hierarchy, the higher are their marks, and the higher the frequency 
of commendatory judgments. Thus the most culturally rich students escape the most 
negative comments and average the highest marks. The least culturally rich escape the 
most insulting comments, although they receive the lowest average marks. The prime 
targets of negative judgment are the middle class, although they average middle range 
marks. Bourdieu's (1996) study exposes professorial judgment as a "socially constituted 
/ 
preference system" (p. 2); academic classifications are, he argues, a guise for social 
classification. "Working as ideology in a state of practice, producing logical effects 
which are inseparable from political effects, the academic taxonomy entails an implicit 
definition of excellence which, by constituting as excellent the qualities possessed by 
those who are socially dominant, consecrates their manner of being and their lifestyle" 
(Bourdieu 1988, p. 204). 
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Bourdieu's (1996) study shows how academic systems of classification are 
constituted both objectively by social structures and subjectively by mental structures; 
they are the "internalization of externality" (p. 29). Crucial to their effect is that they are 
never explicitly codified. They are subconscious, acquired through practical mastery. 
"As objective structures which have become mental structures through a process of 
apprenticeship ... academic taxonomies classify according to the logic of the structures 
whose product they are" (Bourdieu 1988, p. 207). Ultimately these systems of 
classification serve the interests of the field, that is, they serve to produce and re-produce 
the "space of possibilities" (Bourdieu 1988, p. 220) within the field. Bourdieu' s study 
challenges academic classifiers' "perception of the norm" and the "propensity to assess 
performances in a dehistoricized and dehistoricizing language that is nevertheless laden 
with social connotations and assumptions, and therefore tailor-made for converting them 
into essences" (Bourdieu 1996, p. 11 )14. 
14 
Bourdieu's studies have been critiqued on the basis oftheir geographical and historical specificity. His 
critics have argued that his findings are based on a very particular and unusual higher education system, 
and that these data are outdated . Bourdieu counters these critiques (Bourdieu in Wacquant and Bourdieu 
1992, p. 75-78). In terms of its geographical specificity, Bourdieu argues that the opposition between the 
general and the particular is a false antinomy; the goal of analysis is to "grasp the particularity within the 
generality and generality within the particularity" (p. 75). "The deepest logic of the social world can be 
grasped only if one plunges into the particularity of an empirical reality, historically located and dated ... " 
( 1998, p. 2). It is the uniqueness, he argues, of the French system that "makes it a highly propitious terrain 
for uncovering some of the universal laws that tendentially regulate the functioning of all fields" (Bourdieu 
in Wacquant and Bourdieu 1992, p. 75). In terms ofhistorical specificity, Bourdieu argues that one of the 
goals of analysis is to uncover "trans-historical invariants or sets of relations between structures that persist 
within a clearly circumscribed but relatively long historical period" (p. 78). Proof that his work has to 
some extent achieved this goal can be found, Bourdieu argues, in the numerous studies which have been 
conducted more recently in a variety of contexts (e.g. the United States, Sweden and Japan) which suggest 
that the mechanisms of class production which Bourdieu identifies are still powerfully in operation. 
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To summarize thus far: the task of this chapter is to construct a theoretical 
perspective that will illuminate assessment as an interpretive act, with a particular interest 
in the role of difference, context and power. I argued that the first move, that of 
psychometrics, has not gone far enough beyond its objectivist roots, committed as it 
remains to the ideals of natural science. The second move, the interpretive tradition, 
offers a significant contribution to social inquiry with its particular emphasis on the 
reflexive, intersubjective and discursive dimensions of social life. The third move, a 
social theoretical perspective as theorized by Bourdieu, sets the interpretive act within the 
context of practice. I now tum to the task of clarifying the implications of Bourdieu' s 
theory of social practice for my approach to the exploration of academic validation 
practices. 
3.4.3 Validity inquiry from a social theoretical perspective 
I propose four ways in which a social theoretical approach will illumine validity 
mqmry: 
Firstly, consistent with the socio-cultural and interpretivist approaches to assessment 
reviewed in Chapter 2, as well as Moss' work reviewed in this chapter, a social 
theoretical perspective on assessment firmly endorses that 'context matters'. Academic 
assessment and validating practices only make sense within the logic of the field, within 
the logic of the academic profession and its disciplinary sub-fields. For it is the 
institutional and professional field that determines the epistemic 'principles of vision and 
division' which shape and inform the legitimacy of assessment-based interpretations: 
what is perceived to be legitimate knowledge, the legitimate criteria for assessing this 
knowledge, the legitimate assessors of this knowledge and the legitimate validators of 
these assessments. That there is contestation over these principles is a result of different 
positions within the field, positions which are defined by the uneven distribution of 
capital across institutions and individuals. Thus different kinds of knowledge are valid in 
different kinds of higher education institutions, and who can legitimately set criteria and 
assess knowledge will vary across institutions depending on their position in the field. 
Thus locating validation practices within the field requires an analysis of the forms of 
capital which matter in this field, the position of the institution in relation to these forms 
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of capital, and finally the epistemic rules which determine legitimacy and make sense of 
this 'game'. 
While much ofBourdieu's interest lies with the analysis of macro-fields (e.g. the 
fields of education, art and economics), other social theorists have been more interested 
in local actions and interactions which serve to reproduce and transform structures 
(Wenger 1998, Engestrom 1999). Acknowledging the importance ofthe field, their focus 
is more local; it is on 'communities of practice'. Communities of practice are not simply 
any social configuration but social groupings which, Wenger (1998) argues, cohere 
because members of these communities are mutually engaged in action, negotiating a 
joint enterprise and developing a shared repertoire. These communities of practice are 
themselves part of constellations of interconnected practices within broader institutions. 
The concept of community of practice serves as a useful analytical tool for the 
analysis of academic validating practices; it emphasizes the importance of conducting 
validity inquiry, cognizant of how these validating practices are profoundly shaped by, 
not only the field but the particular communities (in this case disciplinary or specialist 
communities) within which they are located. While the academic field determines the 
broad epistemic rules which shape academic validating practices, the specialist 
communities of practice profoundly shape the particular epistemological orientation 
which academics adopt in their validation work. From the perspective of communities 
of practice we also get a close-up view of how capital is distributed unevenly among 
individuals and the effects of this on personal and professional identities, as well as 
interpersonal relations. Thus a social theoretical perspective illumines not only that 
·context matters' but how 'power effects'. 
Secondly, Bourdieu's concept of habitus, and specifically class habitus, suggests that 
by definition communities of practice to a large extent share a common set of "principles 
of vision and division" (Bourdieu 1996, p. 265), a common classificatory framework. 
This means that as members of the same field academics share a practical sense, a 'feel 
for the game'. With very few explicit codes, rules or criteria, they know how to get on 
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with the myriad of classificatory tasks required of them as members of the field. In 
reference to this practical sense Goodwin ( 1994) uses the term 'professional vision' to 
encapsulate the "socially organized ways of seeing and understanding ... that are 
answerable to the distinctive interests of a particular social group" (p. 606). Members of a 
community, to the extent that they have been subjected to the same social conditions 
imposed by the field, share a relatively common "perceptual framework" (p. 616). Thus 
the ability of academics to interpret student performance as meaningful, is not a 
"transparent, psychological process but instead a socially situated activity" (p. 606). This 
vision is "lodged not in the individual mind but instead within a community of competent 
practitioners" (ibid.). Out ofthis collective, on-going practice of producing andre-
producing these interpretations emerges structure, that is, the conditions or constraints 
which become internalized again into new acts of construction. This professional vision 
or what Taylor ( 1987) refers to as intersubjectivity (see also Goodwin 1994) is not 
synonymous with consensus; it is merely a condition for consensus. Only those with 
common points of reference can hold one another accountable for, as well as contest, the 
legitimacy of these reference points (Taylor 1987). Thus an exploration of academic 
validating practices from a social theoretical perspective will privilege an understanding 
of academic professional vision as central to the validation process. 
Thirdly, I have argued that Bourdieu' s concept of habitus is useful for explaining the 
common frame of reference which constitutes the assessment and validation practices of 
academic communities. At the same time the notion of positions within the field defined 
by differential access to capital is crucial for understanding contestation, that is, the 
reality that members of the same community can and do disagree; that different 
perspectives are as much a feature of communities of practice as consensus is. Thus I can 
speculate that while two members of a particular academic community of practice might 
share a common professional vision of what constitutes research in their field, different 
epistemological stances within that disciplinary field might result in different 
interpretations, and the effects of power might result in some interpretations being 
marginalized and others privileged. However, differentiation of capital may not be the 
only explanation for why differences of interpretation emerge. Each interpretive act 
involves a whole complexity of contingencies which influence the firial outcome, for 
example, the particular role the interpreter (assessor) is playing, the functions of the 
interpretation (assessment), and the object of interpretation (what the assessor has in 
view). I refer to this complexity of contingencies as an 'interpretive matrix' where 
'matrix' is understood as a "context or environment" or "womb" (Oxford Dictionary), 
"something within which something else originates or develops" (Webster Dictionary). 
Thus a crucial part of understanding academics' validation practices comes from 
exploring how the local exigencies of an interpretive act may result in an adjustment or 
even a divergence from tacitly agreed-upon points of reference or criteria. 
Fourthly, a social theoretical perspective illuminates how language plays a crucial 
role in all these meaning-making, position-taking, power-effecting acts. 
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Though Bourdieu's empirical work focuses on language and he refers to the "magical 
power" ( 1988, p. 208) of language in the production of social practice, critical discourse 
analysis (CDA) is best placed to offer a theory of the relationship between social practice 
and language. CDA calls our attention to the discursive constitution of social practice: 
social practice is not merely expressed or reflected in language, but language actually 
constitutes social practice -more specifically, the constitution of belief systems, 
identities and interpersonal relations. Thus from a critical discourse perspective, actual 
assessment discourse becomes a powerful point of access into assessment as social 
practice. Discourse analysis as a means of access to social practice becomes the central 
theme of the next chapter to which I now turn. 
Chapter 4: Methodology 
What counts, in reality, is the rigour of the construction of the object. 
(Bourdieu in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 220) 
4. 1 Introduction 
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In the last chapter I argued that social theory calls for a 'double view' of social life, 
that is, a view that keeps not only both structure and agency in view but their mutually 
constitutive relationship. Thus the focus of the analytical gaze is not on individuals, nor 
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on society, but on social practice; for practice is the point of connection between 
"objective relations and structures" on the one hand, and the "practical dispositions of 
subjects" on the other (Chouliariki and Fairclough 1999, p. 30). I also noted in the last 
chapter that one of the distinctive features of the study of social life, in contrast to the 
study of natural life, is that it is in part discursive. "Language is constitutive of reality, is 
essential to its being the kind ofreality it is" (Taylor 1987, p. 54). I concluded the 
chapter by arguing that, given this constitutive relationship between language and social 
life, the analysis of discourse may be a particularly powerful point of access into 
assessment as social practice. Even though discourse is only one element of social life, 
most interaction substantively and centrally involves discourse; it makes sense, therefore, 
to focus on discourse to gain insight into social interaction (Chouliariki and Fairclough 
1999). While Bourdieu acknowledges the constitutive role of language, it is to critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) that I turn for a more fully theorized relationship between 
language and social practice. 
The titles which demarcate the content of this chapter and the previous one would 
suggest that there is a clear-cut distinction between 'theory' and 'methodology'. 
However, this is a distinction which Bourdieu considers to be artificial. He argues that 
methodological decisions cannot be disentangled from our theoretical premises (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992). Consistent with Bourdieu, Chouliariki and Fairclough (1999) 
argue that CDA is both theory and method: a method for analyzing social practices which 
make practical the theoretical constructions of discourse in social life. This analysis in 
turn contributes to the development and elaboration of these theoretical constructions. 
Given the acknowledged artificiality of the distinction between theory and methodology, 
I have chosen to address the theoretical underpinnings of CDA in this chapter as a 
prelude to my discussion of its centrality in my methodological approach. 
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Wacquant (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) argues that one ofBourdieu's primary 
contributions to the task of social science is not theory per se, but a sociological method, 
a set of tools and procedures for the "construction of the object" (p. 5). "What counts, in 
reality", argues Bourdieu, "is the rigour of the construction of the object" (Bourdieu in 
Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 221). Thus my task in this chapter is to account for 
how I have constructed my object. I start (4.2) with the unfinished business of Chapter 3, 
that is theorizing the relationship between discourse and social life, and for this I draw on 
CDA, in particular the work of Norman Fairclough. I then turn ( 4.3) to describe my own 
methodological approach which I argue is a slight adaptation of Fairclough's. And 
finally, in the last section ( 4.4), I report on my exploratory study and the research design 
of the main study. 
4.2 Critical discourse analysis 
4.2.1 A rationale for CDA 
Discourse analysis is a tool used by a variety of disciplines, for a variety of purposes 
(Titscher et al 2000). Gee (forthcoming) makes some useful distinctions between the 
tasks of critical and non-critical approaches to discourse analysis. All discourse analysis, 
he argues, performstwo tasks: the form-function task and the language-context task. The 
form-function task is the analysis of how specific forms in a language are used as tools to 
carry out certain functions, to express certain meanings; for example, in English the 
dependent clause functions to express information that is often taken-for-granted or 
assumed. The language-context task is the analysis of how particular language forms 
take on particular 'situated meanings' in specific contexts 1. Gee argues that most 
contemporary approaches to discourse analysis assume a reflexive view of the 
relationship between language and context, that is, that an utterance influences what we 
1 For Gee (forthcoming) context refers to "an ever-widening set of factors that accompany language in use. 
These include the material setting. the people present (what they know and believe), the language that 
comes before and after a given utterance, the social relationships of the people involved, and their ethnic, 
gendered and sexual identities, as well as cultural, historical and institutional factors". 
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take the context to be and context influences what we take the utterance to mean. These 
two tasks, the form-function and language-context, are fundamental to any form of 
discourse analysis, but they do not make discourse analysis 'critical'. This requires an 
additional task. 
Some forms of discourse analysis add a third task: they explain how form-function 
correlations (task 1) and language-context interactions (task 2) are associated with social 
practices (task 3). 'Non-critical' approaches to discourse analysis part with 'critical' 
ones in that the former would treat social practices solely in terms of patterns of social 
interaction, for example, how people use language to 'pull off a job interview. Critical 
discourse analysis goes further and sees social practices in terms of their implications for 
things like status, solidarity, social goods and power (in Bourdieu's terms, the 
distribution of capital and its effect on power relations). For example, in relation to a job 
interview, a critical approach would be interested in how language functions in a job 
interview as a gate-keeping device allowing access to some people and denying access to 
others. A critical approach would understand that social practices are inherently and 
inextricably political, in the sense that they involve social relationships where social 
goods such as status and solidarity are at stake. Since language is part and parcel of 
social practice, it follows that language is itself inherently and inextricably political (Gee, 
forthcoming). 
Thus critical discourse analysts share a common theory about the relationship 
between language and social practice, and a common set of theoretical assumptions about 
the inherently political nature of language. Given its political nature, they would also 
agree that one of the goals of discourse analysis is to critique and challenge dominant 
institutional practices. Indeed they would understand discourse analysis to be a political 
act in itself, "an intervention in the apparently natural flow of talk and text in institutional 
life that attempts to 'interrupt' everyday common sense" (Silverman and Torode cited in 
Luke 1995-96, p. 12). 
57 
4.2.2. Fairclough's CDA 
While critical discourse analysts might share a common set of theoretical 
assumptions, there is no homogeneous method of CDA (Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000, 
Titscher et al 2000, van Dijk 1993). Branches of CDA tend to be identified with 
individual scholars in the field who have adopted different methodological approaches. 
Norman Fairclough is one ofCDA's leading figures; his Language and Power (1989) is 
considered to be the landmark publication for the "start" of CDA (Blommaert and 
Bulcaen 2000, p. 454), and a substantial volume of work has followed. One of 
Fairclough's particular accomplislunents has been to make CDA a platform for on-going 
dialogue between social theory and language theory (Slembrouck 2001 ). Indeed 
Chouliariki and Fairclough (1999) would argue that CDA, rather than providing a single 
theory or blueprint for analysis, is a shifting synthesis of other theories2• This dialogue 
between social theory and discourse theory is particularly generative for my project. 
I start by defining Fairclough's use ofthe term 'discourse' (4.2.2.1). Secondly, I 
present his three-dimensional theory of discourse ( 4.2.2.2), and finally explain how this 
theory of discourse becomes operationalized into a methodological framework for the 
analysis of discourse ( 4.2.2.3). 
4.2.2.1. Definition of Discourse 
The term 'discourse' has a variety of meanings. The term is used in its more narrow 
linguistic sense, in a more sociological - what Penny cook ( 1994) refers to as a 
· F oucaultian' - sense, or some sense which lies in between (as I will argue Fairclough's 
does). 
In its more narrow linguistic sense, discourse refers to samples of naturally occurring 
spoken or written language where the unit of analysis is above the sentence level, for 
example, a conversation or an interview. Discourse analysis in this tradition (referred to 
2 Though one of the criticisms of Fairclough's work (Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000) is that it is only in 
dialogue with certain linguistic theories, namely, systemic functional linguistics, and has failed to take 
cognizance of critical developments in other language-oriented sub-disciplines (e.g. linguistic 
anthropology). 
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earlier as non-critical) is typically interested in language use, that is, the relationship 
between language and the contexts in which it is used. For example, discourse might 
refer to particular kinds of language used in different settings, such as classroom 
discourse, medical discourse. The analysis would be interested in how these various 
contexts affect the use of language but as Pennycook ( 1994) points out the notion of 
context is limited, referring to immediate surroundings, speakers' intentions, background 
knowledge, or conversational rules. 
More social theoretical understandings of discourse are credited to Foucault. 
Foucault's understanding of discourse does not refer to language or uses of language but 
to ways of organizing meaning, that are often, though not exclusively realized through 
language (Pennycook 1994). For Foucault, discourse analysis is not equated with 
linguistic analysis, or discourse with language. Discourse analysis is concerned rather 
with specifying socio-historically variable discursive formations, that is, systems of rules 
which make it possible for certain statements to be made and others not, at particular 
times and within particular institutional locations (Fairclough 1992). For example, in 
contrast to its narrow linguistic sense, for Foucault medical discourse refers to the 
dominant ways of thinking (i.e. systems of power/knowledge) in the medical profession 
and how these constitute "objects of knowledge, social subjects and forms of 'self, 
social relationships, and conceptual frameworks" (Fairclough 1992, p. 39). Given 
Foucault's pervasive influence on social theory, the term 'discourse' is often used loosely 
and interchangeably with the notion of practice. 
While Pennycook ( 1994) argues that these different understandings of discourse are 
incommensurable3, critical discourse analysis draws from both of these distinctive but 
related meanings of discourse. For example, Gee (1996, 1999) distinguishes between 
'Discourse' and 'discourse' where 'Discourse' (big D) refers to the more Foucaultian 
understanding of social practice and 'discourse' (small d) refers to its more linguistic 
' Pennycook ( 1994) argues that these various understandings of discourse (the traditional linguistic 
understanding, the CDA understanding, the Foucauldian understanding) are incommensurable on 
epistemological grounds. For example, fundamentally different notions of ideology and its relationship to 
inequality underlie these different notions of discourse. 
meaning of language use. Gee (1999) argues that these two senses are "melded 
integrally" together (p. 7). Fairclough's (1992) 'discourse' refers to "language use as a 
form of social practice" (p. 63). Like Gee, his use of discourse is clearly rooted in the 
linguistic notion of discourse as 'language use', but his addition of "as a form of social 
practice" signals a departure from its narrow linguistic sense to a notion of discourse as 
practice. Discourse is "not just a way of representing the world, but of signifying the 
world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning" (p. 64). 
4.2.2.2 Theory of Discourse 
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I now turn to Fairclough's (1992) theoretical elaboration of discourse as "language as 
social practice" (p. 63). By bringing together the more linguistic notions of discourse 
with the more social-theoretical notions of discourse, the outcome for Fairclough is a 
three-dimensional concept of discourse and a corresponding framework for discourse 
analysis. He makes the distinction between discourse-as-text (i.e. product), discourse-as-
discursive-practice (i.e. processes of text production and interpretation), and discourse in 
its more F oucaultian sense of discourse-as-social practice. Discourse encompasses all 
three dimensions so that "any discursive event is ... simultaneously a piece of text an 
instance of discursive practice and an instance of social practice" (p. 4 ). This three-
dimensional understanding of discourse is theoretically consistent with the notion of the 
interconnectedness of language and social life (Fairclough 1989, 1992). 
I now turn to a discussion of each of these different theoretical dimensions of 
discourse. 
Discourse-as-text 
As illustrated by his diagram (see diagram 1 ), text is central to Fairclough's theory 
of discourse. Fairclough draws on a Hallidayan understanding of 'text', that is, language 
doing something (Halliday and Hasan 1985). Although Halliday argues that text has both 
product and process dimensions, Fairclough ( 1989) uses text to refer specifically to the 
product of the process of text production. A text is analyzed for "traces" of its production 





Diagram 1: Fairclough's (1992) three-dimensional conception of discourse 
Consistent with a functional theory of language (Halliday 1994), an analysis of 
discourse-as-text begins with the recognition of function as the fundamental principle of 
language. This is not simply to say that language is used for a variety of different 
purposes. but more significantly that function is built into language; it is a "fundamental 
property of language itself' (Halliday and Hasan 1985, p. 17). Drawing on Halliday, 
Fairclough ( 1992. 1993) specifies three functions of language or three ways in which 
language is constitutive; it is constitutive of social identity. social relations, and systems 
of knowledge and belief. The identity function refers to the way in which social 
identities are set up in discourse. The relational function refers to how social relations 
between discourse participants are enacted and negotiated. The ideational function refers 
to the ways in which texts signify the world and its processes, entities and relations. As 
Gee (forthcoming) puts it, the ideational function is the way in which texts constitute 
what we take the world to be and the way we take things in the world to be related to 
each other. Thus the aim of analysis of discourse-as-text is to understand how 
speakers' /writers' language choices amount to "choices about how to signify (and 
construct) social identities, social relationships and knowledge and belief' (Fairclough 
1992, p. 76). 
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Analysis of these language choices pays close attention to the formal features of 
texts. Fairclough ( 1992) organizes these formal features under four broad categories: 
vocabulary, grammar, cohesion and text structure. Vocabulary deals mainly with 
individual words, grammar deals with words combined into clauses and sentences, 
cohesion deals with how clauses and sentences link together and text structure deals with 
large-scale organizational properties of texts. Thus, for example, textual analysis would 
explore the ways a particular exchange structure (i.e. the pattern of conversational 
interaction) constitutes particular 'subject positions', and how these positions may 
privilege a particular perspective and marginalize others. As another example, textual 
analysis would attempt to expose how the modality of a particular utterance (i.e. the 
degree of certainty with which something is said) signals ways in which speakers are 
negotiating relations with other speakers. 
Discourse-as-discursive-practice 
The second dimension of Fairclough's theory of discourse is 'discourse-as-
discursive-practice'. By this Fairclough (1992) means the processes by which texts are 
produced, distributed and consumed, processes which vary significantly depending on the 
type of text and its social context. The complexity of discursive practice is compounded 
by the multitude of positions which producers and interpreters occupy which influence 
the text product and how it is interpreted. Part of this positionality has to do with what 
Fairclough (1989) refers to as, 'members' resources', that is, "what people have in their 
heads and draw upon, including their knowledge of language, representations of the 
natural and social worlds they inhabit, values, beliefs and assumptions" (p. 24). These 
resources constitute in effect a 'mental map' of the social order. This mental map enables 
a reading of a situation which foregrounds certain elements and backgrounds others; it 
relates elements to each other in certain ways. In addition to members' resources, 
positions are also constituted or constrained by the social practice that the textual 
processes are a part of, since these practices determine what elements of members' 
resources are drawn upon, and how they are drawn upon, whether in conservative or 
transformative ways. Thus the aim of analysis of discourse-as-discursive-practice is to 
understand how processes of text production and interpretation are constrained by 
members' resources, as well as by the broader social conditions of practice (Fairclough 
1992). 
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While this discourse-as-discursive practice dimension is a central feature of 
Fairclough's theory, the extent to which CDA is able to access these processes of text 
production/distribution/consumption has come under critique. Blommaert and Bulcaen 
(2000) argue that the treatment of context is arguably the biggest methodological 
weaknesses ofCDA. One ofthe particular methodological problems is the ''framing of 
discourse in particular selections of contexts, the relevance of which is established by the 
researcher but is not made into an object of investigation" (Blommaert 2001, p. 15) 
(italics in original) 4 . To some extent this is unavoidable; analysts will always be bringing 
particular presuppositions and assumptions about what is relevant to their analysis. But 
Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000) argue that this is a particularly pressing problem in CDA 
where analysts project their own political biases and prejudices onto their data and 
analyze them accordingly. 
In relation to the analysis of textual processes, another critique directed at CDA is 
the extent to which language users' own interpretations are taken into account. As 
Slembrouck (200 1) argues, "CDA has been mostly text-based and at best speculative in 
its claims about how actual participants are likely to interpret texts, exchanges and moves 
within talk'' (p. 43). The problem with CDA is that it relies solely on extrapolation from 
text: there are no other explicit methods for getting access to the producers' and 
consumers' interpretations of their own texts5• Language users' own interpretations are 
assigned to them by proxy (Widdowson 1998). The resulting risk is that CDA theorizes 
the language-user out of sight (Slembrouck 2001). Thus, despite claims to the contrary, 
4 This is a criticism also raised by Verschueren 2001 and Widdowson 1998, 2000. 
5 This is a point that Fairclough (1992) acknowledges: "How people interpret texts in various social 
circumstances is a question requiring separate investigation" (p. 86). 
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Blommaert (2001) argues that CDA's ultimate ambition still lies in the interpretation of 
text, rather than the interpretation of social practice through text. 
Acknowledging these critiques ofCDA's methodological weaknesses, I would argue 
that in Fairclough's later work (Chouliariki and Fairclough 1999) there is an 
acknowledgement of these limitations, as well as some attempt to address them. 
Chouliariki and Fairclough (1999) argue that critical discourse analysis should be seen as 
only one aspect of research into social practices working together with other social 
scientific methods. They specifically mention ethnography as a method which can 
"establish precisely the sort of knowledge that CDA often extrapolates from text" (p. 62). 
There are also some subtle methodological shifts in what they refer to as, a "new version" 
(p. 59) of their analytical framework which I believe begin to address some of the 
problems identified with CDA and context. These concerns, namely, the methodological 
limitations of CDA and in particular its failure to incorporate into its analysis language 
users' own understandings, are central to the rationale for my own methodological 
approach which I discuss in 4.3. 
Discourse-as-social-practice 
Fairclough (1989, 1992) argues that no account of discourse is complete without an 
account of how the processes of production and interpretation (the focus of the second 
dimension) are socially determined. Thus Fairclough's third dimension, discourse-as-
social-practice, emphasizes the social conditions of production and interpretation, that is. 
the way in which discursive practices are constrained and made possible by 'social 
order'. Social order for Fairclough relates to three levels of social organization: the 
immediate social environment in which the discourse happens, the level of the social 
institution, and the level of society as a whole. To the extent that much of social life is 
discursive, this social order is, at least in part, a discursive order or an order of discourse. 
Fairclough uses the term 'orders of discourse'(which he borrows from Foucault) to refer 
to the totality of discursive practices within an institution or society and the relationships 
between them. This social or discursive ordering shapes members' resources, that is, the 
mental map which people bring to the text production and interpretation, which in turn 
shapes the way in which texts are produced and interpreted. Thus consistent with 
Bourdieu's analysis of the field, the aim of analysis of discourse-as-social-practice is to 
expose the social conditions of production and interpretation which constitute social 
practice. 
4.2.2.3 Fairclough's framework for analysis 
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Chouliariki and Fairclough (1999) set themselves the task of strengthening the 
theoretical grounds of CDA, with a particular interest in the social theoretical 
underpinnings ofCDA. The outcome is that, while Fairclough's three-dimensional theory 
of discourse remains consistent, they offer a new version of the analytical framework. 
They argue that the rationale for this revised framework is a reflection of CDA as a 
method which evolves to accommodate new theorizations of the relationship between 
social life and language. Of particular interest are the three stages of analysis which they 
propose need to be conducted- the analysis of the conjuncture, the analysis of the 
particular practice or practices, and the analysis of the "discourse proper" (p. 63). (I 
elaborate on these stages below.) These stages serve as the basis of my own 
methodological approach with some adaptations. I now turn to a description of my 
approach. 
4.3 My methodological approach 
Consistent with Chouliariki and Fairclough's framework, my own approach 
acknowledges the analysis of ''discourse proper" (ibid.) as a crucial stage of analysis for 
exposing the ideational and relational fabric of social practice, as well as identifying 
traces and cues to the processes of interpretation and production. However, I argue that 
explanations of social life are constructed on the basis of different kinds of texts. There 
are what I refer to as the focal texts; in my study this is the actual dialogue between 
colleagues in the moderation meetings. In addition to these focal texts, there are other 
texts. There are the participants' own interpretations of those focal texts, and there are the 
participants' interpretations of the researcher's analysis. All of these texts shape the 
researcher's explanations. The limitation of CDA, as noted earlier, is that it privileges the 
analysis of the focal texts and neglects the others. Thus while it theoretically accounts for 
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the processes of interpretations and production, it is methodologically limited in its 
access to these processes. These require the use of other kinds of analysis and other 
methods of data collection. Thus in my approach I have firstly de-centred the analysis of 
focal texts as privileged by CD A. Instead I conceptualize social practice as my 'object' 
of interpretation. Secondly, I argue that the interpretation of social practice requires a 
variety of methods, including discourse analysis. As noted above, Chouliariki and 
Faircough (1999) concede that CDA should be seen as only one aspect of research into 
social practice "working together with other social scientific methods, particularly 
ethnography" (p. 61 ). My own methodological approach is thus best characterized as 
critical discourse analysis with the incorporation of some ethnographic methods. 
My approach to the "construction of the object" (Bourdieu in Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992, p.220) is the identification of four constitutive elements of social 
practice which were foreshadowed in Chapter 3. I argued that social practice is 
constituted by social structure, that is, particular macro-social conditions of constraint 
and possibility. It is also constituted by more micro-level networks of practices within 
which it is located, what Chouliariki and Fairclough (1999) refer to as conjuncture. 
Social practice is also constituted by a particular instance of practice or a particular event 
or occasion. And finally. social practice is constituted by text; the very choices of 
language that are made by speakers (consciously and unconsciously) serve to constitute 
and are constituted themselves by social practice. 
These multiple constitutive elements of social practice - social structure, 
conjuncture, event, text- operationalize into a methodological approach, a series of 
stages of analysis, each stage exposing different aspects of the social practice of interest, 
in my case academic validation practices. In order to illumine these constitutive 
elements, I draw on a set of 'tools' which expose not only the constitutive elements of 
social practice but the relations between them. Bourdieu notes that his theoretical tools 
(e.g. field. habitus) are "pense-bete" (i.e. memory-joggers) which remind the analyst to 
··think relationally" (Wacquant in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 16). Thus, the 
concept of field 'works' when it exposes the constituting macro-social conditions of 
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practice. The concept of community of practice 'works' when it exposes the more 
immediate social networks which constitute academics' social and professional identities. 
Genre6, as an analytical tool, 'works' when it exposes the way particular social 
conventions privilege certain perspectives over others. Facework7, as an analytical tool, 
'works' when it exposes the way in which the text functions ideationally and relationally 
in the maintenance or transformation of relations and practices. Drawing on both 
Bourdieu and Fairclough, I briefly re-cap these constitutive elements of social practice. I· 
note in particular what aspects of practice are exposed, what analytical tools enable this 
exposure, and the key questions which will be used to interrogate the practice. I will 
describe the specific methods of data collection in the discussion of the research design 
(4.4). 
4.3.1 The analysis of social structure 
The analysis of social structure seeks to account for the conditions which both 
constrain and make possible the social practice, conditions which ensure its on-going 
production and re-production. In Fairclough's terms this requires a description of the 
social order, the immediate, institutional and societal contexts within which the social 
practice is located, as well as the orders of discourse which constitute this social order. In 
Bourdieu · s terms this requires a description of the field, a network of positions in social 
space defined by the distribution of capital. 
Drawing on secondary data, I seek to explore how academic validation practices are 
constituted by a particular institutional identity, that is, how universities give rise to 
particular conditions of constraint and possibility for academic professional judgment, 
and how these conditions shape the kinds of validation systems which are considered 
legitimate within such institutions. 
" Genre refers to .. a relatively stable set of conventions that is associated with, and partly enacts, a socially 
ratified type of activity" (Fairclough 1992, p. 126). 
• Facework refers to the various strategies which people use in dialogue to manage and minimize the threat 
to their own face and that of others. 
Some of the key questions that I use to interrogate academic validating practices 
include: 
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• What are the forms of capital which define institutional and individual positioning 
within the field of higher education? 
• Given these forms of capital, what are the "principles of vision and division" 
(Bourdieu 1996, p. 265) which legitimate academic validation practices? 
• In what ways do struggles within and on the boundaries of the field challenge the 
legitimacy of these principles, and hence practices? 
I now turn to the analysis of conjuncture. Chouliariki and Fairclough ( 1999) note 
that there is no·clear cut-off point between social structure and conjuncture. The task of 
these two types of analysis is to specify the overall frame within which the practice is 
located. 
4.3.2 The analysis of conjuncture 
The analysis of social practice as a conjuncture of events seeks to understand 
academics' validation practices, not as an isolated act or event, but rather as a chain of 
events within a network of practices. Chouliariki and Fairclough ( 1999) define 
conjunctures as "relatively durable assemblies of people, materials, technologies and 
therefore practices around specific social projects" (p. 22). Within this "relatively 
durable" network of practices which constitute the field, a conjuncture represents a 
particular •·path" (p. 61) or chain of events associated with the social practice of 
analytical interest. The aim of analyzing conjuncture is thus to account for the series of 
events which comprise the practice, as well as the people, materials, procedures and 
rules. The focus is on the habitual nature of the practice, for example, the annual routines 
which comprise the assessment of final year projects in any given department. The 
particular vantage point of conjuncture is that it allows the analyst to "trace through time 
not just individual events but conjuncturally linked series of events in both sustaining and 
transforming (re-articulating) practices" (p. 22). 
68 
For the analysis of conjuncture I draw on Wenger's (1998) concept of community of 
practice but retain the particular emphasis of conjuncture, that is, a community of people 
engaged in a specific social project over a designated period of time. I use the term 
'community of practice' to refer to all the people, materials, technologies and procedures 
which are involved in the assessment of the final year projects. The membership of the 
communities of practice which are the focus of my study include staff members who are 
involved in the assessment of the final year project, as well as individuals outside of 
institutional boundaries, for example, the external examiners. It excludes students from 
its membership, since in the cases which I am studying students are not involved in the 
assessment of their own projects. 
Thus the analysis of conjuncture seeks to describe the community in terms of its 
members and their roles, status, and seniority within the community. Then I search for 
explanatory connections between the community's 'ways of seeing' and its validation 
practices. 
Some of the key questions in the analysis ofthe conjuncture include: 
• Who are the members of these communities of practice? What are their roles, 
status, and seniority within the community of practice? 
• What events, technologies and procedures make up the final year project process? 
How have these evolved over time? 
• What global, national, and institutional events do members of this community 
note as significant in shaping their practices? How do they themselves interpret 
the significance of these events? 
• What are some ofthe features of members' 'interpretive matrices' 8 which they 
bring to bear on the interpretation of student performance? 
8 As I noted in 3.4.3. this refers to the interpretive context or environment which assessors bring to bear on 
their assessment of student performance. This concept is developed in 5.3.2.2 and 5.4.2. 
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4.3.3 The analysis of event 
The analysis of social practice as constituted by a particular event or occasion shifts 
the gaze away from the more structural perspective on social practice (the analytical 
focus of social structure and conjuncture) and zooms in on social interaction. Chouliariki 
and Fairclough (1999) stress the importance of both the structural dimension of social 
practice and its interactional dimension. They note, 
It is easy for a critical social science oriented to the abstract structures and social 
relations ... to miss the richness and complexity of social interaction. And yet it is of 
crucial importance for any dialectically conceived critical theory to grasp the 
complex qualities of social interaction. For not only is any social structure 
dependent upon its ongoing instantiation in social interaction, and not only is it in 
social interaction that structures are problematized and contested, but social 
interaction is also the nursery for new social forms and themes of all sorts 
(Volosinov cited in Chouliariki and Fairclough 1999, p. 38). 
The particular instance of social interaction through which I choose to view 
academic validating practices is a moderation event. This is the occasion when staff 
come together to discuss the marks which have been allocated to student performance. I 
perceive these events to be particularly generative sites for exploring academic validation 
practices as academics have to (to some extent) make explicit to other colleagues their 
inferences and justifications for these inferences. 
I draw on the analytical tool of genre for the analysis of event. Genre, a term 
borrowed from literary theory, is a "relatively stable set of conventions that is associated 
with, and partly enacts, a socially ratified type of activity" (Fairclough 1992, p. 126). I 
would argue that marking workshops and departmental examination meetings are genres 
of academic social practice. Though genres are characterized by a particular thematic 
content, a particular style, a particular compositional structure (Bakhtin cited in 
Chouliariki and Fairclough 1999, p. 49), they serve to delimit a range of options rather 
than specifying a single rigid pattern. The analytical value of genre is in exposing the way 
that conventional aspects position participants within the social interaction. Kress ( 1989) 
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argues that genres construct positions or roles which the participants in the genres 
occupy. Through genre, the position "encodes and presents (the participant with) a set of 
possibilities ... of being a certain kind of social agent with all that entails" (p. 40). Of 
course participants do not have to comply with the demands of the position constructed; 
they can resist. How individuals actually take up these positions is what the analyst seeks 
to explore through the analysis of text, that is, the analysis of actual interaction/dialogue 
(which I discuss in 4.3.4). 
Some ofthe key questions that I draw on for the analysis of the event include: 
• What is going on in this event? What is the meeting about? What has preceded it? 
What follows? How did it come about? Who is attending it? Why are they 
attending? Where is it happening? What materials are available? 
• What is the dominant discourse of the meeting and how does this serve to 
foreground particular agendas and background others? 
• What is the exchange structure of the meeting and how does this position 
participants in particular ways? 
• What common prior experiences are participants drawing on and what effect do 
these have on how individuals are positioned? 
• How does the presence of a researcher and tape-recorder position participants? 
4.3.4 The analysis of text 
To analyze social practice as text is to zoom in even closer to the analysis of social 
interaction, and I specifically focus on the analysis of what I refer to as validating 
arguments, that is, the actual discourse which academic staff use to interpret student 
performance and justify their interpretations, whether to students, colleagues or the 
researcher. I am interested in the ideational and relational functions of the text9. With 
respect to the ideational function I am interested in the kinds of evidence which 
participants privilege in their justifications, and what this suggests about the interpretive 
matrices (defined in 3.4.3) which they bring to bear on the student performance. With 
Y I combine Fairclough's social identity and interpersonal functions into one function which I refer to a 
relational. This is consistent with Halliday's original meta-functions. 
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respect to the relational function I am interested in 'facework'. Linguists defme 'face' as 
the public self-image that every person wants to claim for him/herself. There are two 
related aspects of face. Negative face is people's general wish for freedom from 
intrusion and imposition. Positive face is people's general wish to be well-thought of 
(Brown and Levinson 1987). "All linguistic action involves face-threat of some kind" 
(Green cited in Kasper 1997, p. 378) and thus facework refers to the various strategies 
which people use in dialogue to manage and minimize the threat to their own face and 
that of others (Ting-Toomey 1994). 
I explore this ideational and relational functioning through two types of analysis: 
analysis of the topic and analysis of modality. Topic analysis attempts to get at what 
speakers are talking about. Fairclough (1992) argues that the way people chain topics 
together can offer insight into the "common sense structuring of their lifeworld" (p. 155). 
The aim of the analysis is to determine the overt topic of the dialogue, which is identified 
by the noun phrase in prominent position and all the referents to it. Of greater 
significance, however, are the topic shifts, and what underlying ideational work these 
shifts point to. Thus an analysis of the topic chain exposes the ideational functioning of 
the text; it exposes the kinds of evidence which assessors value and the contestation over 
these values. 
The analysis of modality identifies of variety of textual features which signal the 
degree of commitment or certainty that a speaker has for their utterance, features such as 
modal auxiliary verbs (e.g. must, might, can, should), modal adverbs (e.g. probably, 
definitely), hedges (e.g. sort of, like), and intonation patterns. Fairclough (1992) notes, 
however, that it is often difficult to disentangle the commitment that speakers have for 
their utterances from the commitment or solidarity they have with other interactants. 
Thus an utterance expressed with low modality could signal a lack of commitment for the 
utterance, or it might be a softening of what might otherwise be considered a face 
threatening act (Bloor and Bloor 1995; Brown and Levinson 1987). For example, a staff 
member may have a strong opinion about a particular instance of student performance, 
but will express that opinion in such a way as to not offend another colleague. An 
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analysis of modality exposes the manner in which the ideational and.relational functions 
of texts "are woven together" (Halliday and Hassan 1985, p. 23), and work 
simultaneously in the construction of meaning. 
Some of the key questions that I draw on for my analysis of text include: 
• How do the assessors in their different roles (e.g. whether supervisor, second 
marker, external examiner) constitute a particular validating argument, based on 
what kinds of evidence? 
• What do speakers' utterances reveal about the degree of certainty they feel for 
their interpretations? 
• What do speakers' utterances reveal about the ways in which they seek to 
preserve or challenge collegial relations? 
In closing I note some general points about this methodological approach. Firstly, 
the stages of analysis do not proceed in any particular order, but rather they are iterative. 
Each stage of analysis will illumine aspects of social practice which from the perspective 
of another constitutive element are obscured. For example, the analysis of text will point 
to traces of structural conditions, and the analysis of social structure will point to 
potentially salient features for text analysis. Secondly, each stage combines both 
description and explanatory analysis. For example, the analysis of social structure at one 
level is a description of the immediate, institutional and societal context. But the analysis 
must move beyond description to explanations for the connections between the macro-
level conditions and the more micro-level practices, for example, institutional identity 
and the validation practices within the institution. Thirdly, while all stages of analysis are 
important to an explanation of the social practice, the analyst may prioritize some stages 
over others. In my own analysis I have privileged the analysis of conjuncture, event and 
text over the analysis of structure because I feel that there has been very little research of 
assessment practices at the micro, interactional level. 
Fourthly. I note some of the criteria for the validation of my own study. I noted 
earlier the multiple texts that contribute to my explanations of the social practice, namely, 
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my interpretations of the focal texts, the research participants' interpretations of those 
texts, and their interpretations of my analysis in progress. Implicit in these multiple layers 
of interpretation are three principles which contribute to the validation of my 
interpretations. These principles are adapted from Gee ( 1999). They are linguistic detail, 
coverage, and convergence. With respect to linguistic detail, Gee ( 1999) argues that the 
validity of discourse analysis rests on the extent to which the communicative functions 
being uncovered in the analysis are linked to grammatical devices that "manifestly can 
and do serve these functions, according to the judgments of 'native speakers' of the social 
languages involved and the analyses of linguists" (p. 95). Thus part of the validity of my 
story rests on the strength of my argument for the particular links between the features of 
text (e.g. modality) and the social function this modality serves (e.g. solidarity). With 
respect to coverage, my approach attempts to explore the social practice using multiple 
stages of analysis and multiple methods of data collection. With respect to convergence, 
my approach has built-in feedback loops which provide opportunities for interpretations 
to be challenged (mine as well as those of the research participants). While convergence 
of interpretations is important for validation, divergences do not necessarily falsify those 
interpretations; they may rather signal the need for deeper analysis. For example, in the 
Engineering case a discrepancy between what people said in interview and what emerged 
from the analysis of the validating arguments led me to e~plore more deeply the ways in 
which the genre of the meeting itself was constituting particular outcomes. 
4.4. Research Design 
As noted earlier, my research interest arose out of the context of my own practice as 
an educational developer working with groups of staff responsible for the assessment of 
student performance. My particular interest was why assessors, in the context of marking 
workshops, disagreed. It made sense to me therefore to return to these sites of practice to 
explore them. This return as a researcher (as opposed to an educational developer) had 
two implications for me. Firstly, I needed throughout the process of the research to 
consciously 'objectify' my position as researcher. What were my own interests in this 
project? In what ways would my identity (as a young, white, American woman; an 
academic of relatively junior rank compared to my interviewees; my institutional position 
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within the Academic Development Programme10) influence my inquiry? In what ways 
would my very presence (whether as participant or observer) influence the data? I 
address these specific issues in the report on my exploratory study. Secondly, I needed to 
make a break with common sense. As an educational developer my goal had been to 
assist staff to reach consensus about what they value in student performance. 
Disagreement was perceived as a problem to be fixed, and common sense educational 
practice dictated that explicit assessment criteria were part of the solution to this problem. 
As a researcher however I needed to shift from an understanding of disagreement as a 
problem to be 'fixed' to an understanding of disagreement as a problem that needed to be 
understood and explained. These understandings and explanations could then serve as the 
basis of discussion between me and others invested in these practices. Did the problem 
require changes in existing practices, and if so, what might some of the challenges be in 
bringing about those changes? 
I thus decided to return to the site of practice in an exploratory study which I 
conducted in 1997. The insights gained in this exploratory study then informed my main 
study conducted at SAU. The main study consisted of two case studies, the first 
conducted in 1998-1999 and the second case study conducted in 2000-200 I. In 4.4.1 I 
report on the exploratory study, and the rest of the chapter (4.4.2-4.4.3) describes the 
design of the main study. 
4.4.1 Exploratory study 
4.4.1.1 Research design and rationale 
I went into my exploratory study with some initial hunches about why assessors did 
not always come to consensus about what marks to award students' performance in the 
context of marking workshops. I speculated that causes for these differences might in 
part be explained by assessors looking for different qualities in student writing. I also 
speculated that even when assessors did have explicit criteria (in the form of a marking 
memorandum) they might be applying the criteria differently, and that in addition to the 
10 The Academic Development Programme is a department which offers a wide range of services to 
students from educationally disadvantaged backgrounds and works closely with faculties and other support 
services in areas such as curriculum design, teaching methodology, assessment of student performance and 
course evaluation. 
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explicit criteria there might be other implicit criteria which assessors use to assess. Thus 
at this exploratory stage I was interested in what can marking workshops reveal to us 
about: 
• The particular qualities which academics are looking for in student writing 
• How the explicit criteria are used to assess student performance 
• Additional implicit criteria (or other factors) which influence the assessment 
In 1997 I conducted an exploratory study in the context of two undergraduate 
courses in my own institution, a first year Humanities course and a second year Science 
course. There were a number of factors that made these courses appropriate sites for an 
exploratory study. Firstly, they both had a tradition of marking workshops. Secondly, 
the courses were situated in different disciplines, the one considered a 'hard' science and 
the other a 'soft' one. I felt it was important to explore the commonly-held perception 
that in contrast to the social sciences, the assessment of writing in the 'hard' sciences is 
more 'objective', that is, given that the range of appropriate responses is more narrow in 
scientific writing, the assessment is less likely to be influenced by assessors' biases. 
Thirdly, my selection was motivated by the fact that I was already involved in these 
courses as an educational developer, though to a lesser extent in the Humanities course 
than in the Science course. Given the sensitivities around assessment issues, I felt that it 
was important at this stage to explore in sites where I had already to some degree 
established a relationship of trust with the staff involved in these courses. 
These last factors foreshadow two important methodological issues which I explore 
in the next section. Firstly, how the relationship between researcher and the researched 
influences access to what kinds of data, and secondly, the role of the researcher as 
perceived by the researched. Pertinent to my situation was the potentially conflicting role 
between researcher and educational developer. 
4.4.1.2 Data-collection and methods of analysis 
Although I had a good working relationship with the course convenor of the 
Humanities course, I had only had one previous formal encounter with the rest of the staff 
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involved in the course. In conversation with the course convenor he mentioned that they 
had conducted a marking workshop the previous year and had found it a useful exercise 
which he intended to repeat. When I asked if I could attend the workshop he insisted that 
I convene the marking workshop; he argued that this would "lend credibility to the 
exercise" (field notes, 14/5/97). However, when I requested permission to tape-record 
the workshop, he denied my request. He noted that there were sensitivities in the group 
and that some of the participants might feel "policed" (field-notes, 14/5/97). He 
suggested that once I was better known to the group, tape-recording would be acceptable. 
I therefore requested that a colleague attend the workshop with me in order to take 
detailed notes of the discussion. In addition to the written record of the workshop, I also 
collected all workshop documentation, the assessment task and the writing samples. The 
convenor's denying my request to tape-record is an example of the kind of sensitivities 
which surround assessment practices and thus supports my argument for the influence of 
my presence on the proceedings of these moderation meetings, and thus on the data. 
In contrast to the Humanities course, I had worked closely with the Science course 
staff for a period of three years 11 . I had been involved in facilitating a number of similar 
marking workshops and the tradition of such workshops was part of their established 
moderation process. This particular workshop was convened by two of the members of 
the course staff. and I was given permission to attend the workshop as an observer and to 
tape record the discussion. In addition to the audio-recording, I also collected all 
workshop documentation. In both sites, but particularly in the Science course, I also had 
access to contextual information due to my previous involvement in these departments 
(e.g. information about who the participants were and what roles they played within the 
course). 
The aim of the exploration at this stage was less about finding answers to my 
questions than to confirm whether the questions were worth asking. It also served as an 
opportunity to explore theory that would help me make sense of the complexity which 
was emerging. as well as to assist me in developing a methodological approach. The 
11 I was involved in assisting this course to develop a writing project within their undergraduate curriculum. 
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analysis was informed by my early wrestling with critical discourse analysis as both a 
theory and a method for exploring social practice, with a particular interest on how genre 
analysis and the analysis of intertextuality 12 might expose other factors which were 
influencing assessors' interpretations of student performance. 
4.4.1.3 Analysis 
Both marking workshops took place in May 1997 within the same week. Though 
the genre of writing required of the students differed in each course- the Humanities' 
course required students to write an essay and the Science course required a report - both 
types of writing could be described as instances of complex tasks, in other words, tasks 
that permit students substantial latitude of interpretation and response; tasks which reflect 
the integration of multiple skills and knowledge; tasks which require expert judgment for 
assessment (Moss 1992). 
The broad aims of each of the workshops were similar. In each case the stated aim 
of the workshop was to provide an opportunity for markers to build consensus around the 
marking criteria and their application to samples of student performance prior to the 
marking of their own reports/essays. The manner in which the workshop was organized 
was also similar. In each case two essays/reports were selected to illustrate different 
levels of performance (i.e. relatively 'good' and 'poor'). All forms of student identity 
were removed from the samples of writing. Workshop participants were requested . 
(either in the workshop as in the case of Science, or prior to the workshop as in the case 
of Humanities) to allocate marks to the samples and be prepared to justify their marks to 
other workshop participants. 
Both workshops used explicit assessment criteria although they took different forms. 
In the Science marking workshop a marking memorandum had been prepared beforehand 
by the writing project co-ordinator and staff was asked to use the memorandum in 
assessing the samples of writing. The assessment criteria (listed in the memorandum) had 
12 'Intertextuality.' is the property texts have of being full of snatches of other texts, which may be explicitly 
or implicitly demarcated (Fairclough I 992). 
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been given to the students when the topics were handed out and thus· were not negotiable 
for the staff. In contrast, in the Humanities workshop the assessors marked the samples of 
writing without a commonly agreed upon marking memorandum. During the preparation 
for the Humanities workshop, the course convener informed me that the course did not 
have any standard set of criteria and he was reluctant to propose any in advance of the 
workshop. He thus started the workshop by proposing some criteria which were written 
on the board and discussed by the rest of the workshop participants. 
In terms of the workshop participants, the Science marking workshop involved five 
members of staff (plus me); all were full-time members of the academic staff from the 
department, though at different levels of seniority. The senior professor was the course 
convener and did some teaching on the course. One of the other more junior members of 
staff was the writing project coordinator and had primary responsibility for 
conceptualizing and administering the writing assignment. In consultation with the 
others, she had designed the topic and drawn up the marking criteria. Two of the others 
also contributed to teaching on the course. One was not involved in the course at all 13 . 
They were all specialists in the broad disciplinary area which the topic was assessing, but 
two of the participants were not familiar with the specialization which was being 
assessed. None of the workshop participants, except the writing project coordinator who 
had selected the samples, knew the students who had produced the reports under 
discussion. 
The Humanities marking workshop involved eight members of staff (plus me and 
another colleague). The course convener was a full-time member of the academic staff, 
as was one other participant, and they both taught on the course. The course convener 
was also responsible for designing the essay topic. All other participants were tutors, that 
is. postgraduate students responsible for running tutorials14. Though all the participants 
1
' This department had a policy of sharing the marking load ofthis writing intensive course across the 
department so that staff was recr1ited to mark who had no other involvement in the course. 
1 ~ In the South African higher education system, ·academic' typically refers to full-time, permanent 
members of staff, whereas 'tutors' refers to post-graduate students who have part-time, temporary 
appointments. Typically the academic staff is responsible for the lectures and the tutors are responsible for 
the tutorials. 
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were involved in the course, the academic staff had less direct contact with the students 
except in large lecture mode teaching, and typically they did not mark. The tutors, 
however, had direct contact with their own tutorial group/s, and as a general rule assessed 
their own students' essays. 
Consistent with my experience of other marking workshops, both workshops 
produced a range of marks for each instance of student performance. In the Science 
marking workshop the ranges of marks for the two projects were 49%-76% and 83%-
90%. The range of marks for the first project is noteworthy given the perception that 
science writing is more 'objective' and therefore less likely to produce a range of 
different responses from markers. In the Humanities workshop, the ranges of marks for 
the two essays were a 'fail' to a low 60 and a 'fail' to a high 6015. Despite the wide range 
of marks for the first essay, the assessors in the Science workshop were able to eventually 
come to an agreed-upon mark. In the Humanities workshop the assessors could only 
agree to pass both of the essays but no resolution was reached in relation to whether the 
essays should be awarded a high or low 50. 
4.4.1.4 Discussion 
The goal of this study was to explore what marking workshops might reveal about: 
• The particular qualities which academics are looking for in student writing 
• How the explicit criteria are used to assess students' performance 
• Additiona1 implicit criteria (or other factors) which influence the assessment 
In terms of the particular qualities academics look for in student writing, both 
workshops were characterized by very little contestation over the qualities or criteria for 
·good' writing. One interpretation might be that there is broad agreement, for example, 
in the Science workshop, that conceptual understanding (i.e. understanding of the key 
concepts being assessed) was the most valued quality. Or that in the Humanities 
workshop there was general agreement that analysis or analytical ability was most 
important (i.e. the ability to perform the comparative analysis that was required by the 
15 Assessors were not required to assign precise marks. 
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task). This interpretation needs to be treated with caution. For a variety of reasons 
workshop participants may have felt that to dispute the criteria was pointless, since, for 
example, in the Science workshop, the marking criteria had been set ahead of time. Thus 
while there was no contestation about the criteria, this lack of contestation cannot 
necessarily be read as agreement. A more valid picture of the criteria which academics 
value would need to be constructed from a wider data set: interviews with markers, 
observation of their interactions with students and their writing, and markers' written 
feedback. 
In terms of how the criteria were being used to assess student performance, what was 
clear from both of the workshops is that despite the explicit criteria, there was variation in 
how they were interpreted and applied. For example, in the Science workshop there was 
quite a bit of debate about what conceptual understanding means and what constitutes 
evidence for conceptual understanding. In the Humanities workshop there was a similar 
discussion about what an explanation might mean and the course convener was asked to 
clarify. 
In the Science workshop an interesting issue emerged which shed some light on the 
use of the explicit marking criteria. Having assessed the sample of writing using the 
marking memorandum, two of the markers admitted that they felt uncomfortable with the 
mark that had resulted. It was too high. They had therefore adjusted their marks 
downward to fit their overall impression or 'gut-feel' about the report. This would 
suggest that in addition to or instead of the explicit marking criteria, these markers bring 
intuitive judgments to the assessment of student performance, intuitions constituted by, 
among other things, years of experience as professionals in a particular field of study. 
With respect to what additional implicit criteria (or other factors) are influencing the 
assessment, a number of factors came up in the discussion which appeared to be 
influencing the markers' assessments. In both workshops markers made inferences about 
the degree of '"effort" which the students had put into the writing. One marker in the 
Humanities workshop argued that, despite the fact that the essay "missed the point", she 
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would not fail it because the student had "worked too hard" (field notes, 2115/97). Since 
the samples were anonymous these were inferences from the text and not inferences 
based on direct observations of the student performance. Another factor which came up 
in both workshops is how markers draw on information from the assessment context to 
influence their assessment. For example, one of the markers argued that he would be less 
generous in his mark allocation on the basis of his perception that the students had 
received assistance with the reports in the form of feedback on drafts. Yet another factor 
which emerged as an influence was students' performances relative to each other. One 
marker in the Humanities workshop argued that he found it very difficult to assess these 
two samples in isolation from other writing samples. 
The exploratory study also suggests that markers' assessments are influenced by 
different interpretive matrices which markers hold. These matrices seem to be in part 
constituted by different resources which assessors have access to, including different 
kinds of knowledge, for example, expertise in the area of specialization, direct experience 
of the learning and teaching context, and involvement with the students. 
In the Humanities workshop, the course convener was responsible for designing the 
topic which was in his area of specialization. In contrast to the tutors (one of whom 
admitted that she had never read in this area), he had published extensively in this 
subject. He was granted authority by the tutors to clarify what 'explanation' meant in the 
context of this topic, and to provide general guidelines about what tutors could expect 
from a 'good' explanation. In contrast to the tutors however, he had had little direct 
contact with the students and the immediate learning environment of the tutorial, nor had 
he marked any of the essays. Thus when it came to assigning a mark, it was the tutors, 
not the course convener, who haggled with conviction about what could actually be 
expected from the students in relation to the difficulty of the topic, the challenge of the 
readings, and the level of assistance the students had received. There was a similar 
dynamic in the Science workshop, where again the course convener had designed the 
topic around his area of specialization. He argued vociferously for a particular 
interpretation of the key concepts which students had to tackle. However, two of the 
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other workshop participants had· consulted with about half the students on drafts. Thus to 
their interpretation of the criteria and application to the samples, they brought knowledge 
of the kinds of problems which students were experiencing with the reports. It seemed in 
both workshops that underlying assessors' different interpretations was access to different 
kinds of knowledge. These different forms of knowledge seemed to both empower and 
disempower individuals within the context of the marking workshop: some assessors 
were silent, while others argued with conviction. 
4.4.1.5 Questions for further exploration 
This study revealed a number of areas for further exploration. These include a 
multitude offactors which shape assessors' 'interpretive matrices': 
• The relationship of the marker to the assigned task - Has the marker been 
involved in designing the task? What is the relationship between the disciplinary 
expertise of the marker and that covered by the task? 
• The marker's relationship to the student being assessed- Does the marker know 
the student whose writing is being assessed? How invested is the marker in the 
student's performance? 
• Interpersonal relations between the markers - Who are the markers? What 
individual resources do they bring to the marking exercise? What are the power 
relations between them? 
• The degree of shared understanding between the markers- Do the markers hold 
similar views about learning, teaching and the role of assessment? Are there deep 
ideological differences between markers in relation to their discipline/s? 
• Departmental differences - How are power and authority distributed within 
different departmental roles? 
• Disciplinary differences - How do epistemological approaches within a discipline 
impact on markers' approaches to assessment? 
• Institutional culture- How do the norms, values and interests of the institution 
impact on markers' assessment judgments? 
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4.4.1.6 Methodological insights from exploratory study 
This preliminary study gave me the opportunity to grapple with some of the 
methodological complexities of researching academic validation practices. Although the 
marking workshop discourse revealed traces of other texts which influence markers' 
assessment, they remained only traces and could not be substantiated on the basis of the 
marking workshop data alone. There were also inevitably silences, for example, common 
experiences and prevailing beliefs that these collegial communities drew on which were 
not apparent to me. I concluded that an interpretation of 'text in context' would 
necessitate a far more ethnographic style of research. An analysis of a marking workshop, 
while affording me a view of the contestation, did not give me insight into the 
motivations and interests which were informing the various markers' individual 
assessments. For a deeper analysis of this contested terrain, I needed to extend my inquiry 
beyond just the marking workshop to include the broader context in which this event was 
situated, for example, the community of practice, the networks of practices and the field. 
This would necessitate also expanding my methods of data collection to include a range 
of qualitative methods that would enable me to more fully develop the context: more 
participant observation, interviews with not only those who participated in the 
moderation events but others invested in the assessment practices, and observation of 
other sites of assessment practice outside the marking workshop. 
As a result of this exploratory study I become less interested in the criteria, either 
explicit or implicit, which academic assessors brought to bear on their interpretations of 
student performance; instead I became interested in assessors' interpretive matrices, that 
is, the whole complex of contingencies which influence their interpretations. My study 
shifted from the search for criteria to an exploration of the environment or matrix out of 
which interpretations emerge. 
4.4.2 Main study 
4.4.2.1 Institutional profile 
SAU, the university where my main study was located, can be characterized as a 
medium-sized, contact university. It is a historically white, English-speaking institution, 
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located in one of South Africa's large urban areas (more about SAU in 5.2). It is one of 
South Africa's leading universities in terms of both the quality of teaching and learning 
and its research output. Within this institution my case studies focus on two courses: a 
Humanities final year undergraduate research methodology course (henceforth referred to 
as Hum300) and an Engineering final year thesis course (henceforth referred to as 
Eng400). I now turn to a description of these case studies. 
4.4.2.2 Humanities Case study 
4.4.2.2.1 Rationale for the case selection 
There were several reasons for my selection of the Hum300 site for further 
exploration of the issues which arose from the preliminary study. Firstly, I felt that the 
study of final year undergraduate projects was an important assessment site. As a final 
culminating performance for the undergraduate qualification, this particular assessment 
opportunity seemed most likely to generate dialogue about the kinds of graduate 
performances valued by this community. The stakes are relatively high as decisions are 
being made which affect students' prospects for graduation, as well as their admission to 
postgraduate studies. In addition students are conducting research projects in which the 
members of staff have, to varying degrees, vested interests. 
Secondly, the assessment of the final year projects involves most of the members of 
the department. This is crucial since I was interested not only in individuals' validation 
practices. but also individuals as members of a community. Thirdly, in addition to 
diversity in terms of academic rank, race, gender and ethnicity, this particular community 
also reflected an interesting diversity in terms of experience. In the year of my study there 
were two new, young members of staff. I felt that new staff as apprentices to academic 
life are likely to be catalysts for dialogue, raising issues which have become naturalized 
and fossilized forms of practice for more experienced members of staff. Fourthly, I 
discovered once I commenced the research that two years prior to my study the 
department had gone through a painful and protracted inquiry into accusations of racism 
which were directly related to assessment issues. From a researcher's point of view, this 
event served as a 'moment of crisis' (Fairclough 1992), an event which serves to disrupt 
and de-naturalize practices. Finally, there was an openness and interest to my study by 
both the head of department (HOD) and the course convenor. When I approached the 
HOD about the study he acknowledged that, "the course had been running a long time 
and could benefit from some reflexivity" (field notes, 13/2/98). 
4.4.2.2.2 Data Collection 
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While the staff was supportive, the HOD did however express some wariness about 
my study. He noted that it would likely "open a psychological can of worms" and 
suggested jokingly that it might be necessary to place an "embargo" on my thesis as far 
as students were concerned (field notes, 13/2/98). Despite these sensitivities he did not 
feel it was necessary for my project to be approved at the level of the Faculty Ethics 
committee 16 since I was not "using" students (field notes, 13/2/98). He requested that I 
get permission from the Hum300 team to conduct the research; once permission was 
granted individual members of staff could choose whether or not they wanted to 
participate. He also warned me that staff would be under great pressure during the 
assessment period and this might make it difficult for me to collect the kind data I 
wanted. I took this as a concern on his part that busy academics might not appreciate 
extra demands at highly pressured times of the year. This same issue came up when I 
negotiated access to the Engineering site. I was thus, throughout my study, extremely 
sensitive to methods of data collection which might be perceived by staff as intrusive or a 
waste of their time. 
My methodological approach (discussed above) required various stages of analysis, 
that is, the analysis of social structure, conjuncture, event and text, each of which entailed 
different methods of data collection. For the analysis of social structure I relied 
extensively on secondary sources, for example, the work of Burton Clark, a leading 
higher education researcher. For the analysis of conjuncture, I relied on participant 
16 During the entire time of my study I struggled to establish what the procedure was for having the ethics 
of one's research approved at SAU. When I started my research, SAU's ethics committees were faculty-
based; they were then centralized as a university-wide committee, and then again de-centralized to faculty 
level. The procedure was never clear to me even by the date of my last inquiry (11101). Thus, with the 
guidance of my supervisors, I followed a procedure whereby I got permission from the HOD of each 
department, agreed in each case to protect the anonymity of my participants to the extent that I could, and 
to make available to all participants in the research a draft of the analysis for their feedback. 
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observation, interviews and documentation. For the analysis of the event and text I used 
a combination of interviews and textual analysis for the former and textual analysis for 
the later. I briefly touch on each of these methods in more detail. 
With respect to participant observation, in my first year of data collection it was 
important that I experience as much of the course as possible in order to understand the 
immediate context in which the assessment of final year projects took place. I attended 
all course staff meetings, all the main lectures, two small group sessions and the final 
departmental marks meeting; I observed and tape-recorded the marking workshop, and 
engaged in numerous informal discussions with members of this community. 
My interviews were semi-structured; I had a set of questions which I had prepared in 
advance but in the interview I allowed the conversation to flow in a guided but not too 
structured manner. Through experience I learned to relax and allow interviewees to go 
off on 'tangents' which often became some of the richest sources of data. 
Out of a total of eleven members of staff involved in the course across the two years 
of my study, I was able to interview eight of them, most of them twice. The course 
convener in 1998 became one of my key informants, and although he was not involved in 
the course in 1999 (due to sabbatical leave) he continued to play a valuable role in giving 
me feedback during the early stages of data analysis. In the first year of the study, I 
conducted interviews with the course convenor and the HOD- both of whom had been 
involved with Hum300 for over a decade- to gain general background information about 
the course, its purposes, and its role within the department, the faculty and the institution. 
My interviews with the option convenors 17 focused on general background issues (e.g. 
their career histories, their research specializations, how long they had been teaching on 
the course) and what their feedback revealed about the kinds of qualities they were 
looking for in student performance. I also interviewed a member of staff who had been at 
17 "Option conveners' refers to the academic staff who were responsible for groups of students. An 'option' 
was an area of interest which students selected for their research projects. 
the centre of the departmental inquiry into alleged racist assessment practices18• I was 
never able to interview the external examiners despite several attempts. 
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In the second year of the study ( 1999) I focused in the interviews on the kinds of 
processes that staff go through to derive their mark, and the kinds of decisions which they 
face in the actual assessment process. These interviews were conducted right after the 
staff had finished the marking of the research proposals. I asked them to bring to the 
interview a couple of proposals which had raised interesting assessment 
issues/questions/dilemmas for them. These 'stories' became the focus of the interview. I 
found 'stories' about particular assessment cases to be a particularly effective means of 
gaining insight into assessors' interpretive processes. 
The marking workshop comprised one of my central sites of data collection. Out of 
the total of nine staff involved in the course in 1998, seven attended the marking 
workshop (plus a visiting scholar and me). Although Hum300 did not have a tradition of 
marking workshops, staff members were familiar with them; many staff had participated 
in marking workshops at the junior undergraduate levels where tutors are involved in the 
assessing of essays. At my suggestion, the course convener agreed to organize such a 
workshop, although he admitted to me later that he had been hesitant because it would be 
··dangerous" as it would open up all kinds of "cans of worms" (Dan 99-1 ). 
With respect to documentation, I collected: 
• File of correspondence regarding the 1996 postgraduate dispute 
• Course handouts 
• Photocopies of a sample of research reports with markers' feedback to students 
• Course evaluations 
• Photocopies of examination papers and answers 
• Reports from external examiners on the examination 
• Spreadsheets of marks for final marks' meeting 
18 This case was fully investigated and the member of staff involved was completely cleared of the 
accusations. 
• Documents discussing the future of the course within a re-structured 
undergraduate programme 
4.4.2.2.3 Data analysis 
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My analysis of the interview data was on-going and iterative throughout the research 
process as I forced myself to write-up throughout the initial stages of data-collection. 
Once I had conducted the Engineering case study and had a clearer sense of what I was 
looking for, my analysis of the Humanities interviews became more systematic (I discuss 
this in 4.4.3.3). I used NVivo 19 for initial coding of the interviews for major issues. Out 
of these issues I looked for emerging patterns, and these emerging patterns become the 
major strands of my argument. For the analysis of the focal text (i.e. an excerpt from the 
marking workshop) I did a topic analysis on assessors' validating arguments. 
My analysis process had various feedback loops. In 1999 I gave the Humanities 
course convener an earlier version of the analysis. His main critique was that my 
'reading' ofthe marking workshop had missed some of the complexity of the social 
interaction. He was specifically concerned that my analysis of the marking workshop had 
failed to take account of the social dynamics ofthe meeting, in particular the issue of 
collegiality. While staff may profoundly disagree with another colleague's assessment, 
for a variety of different reasons it is not in their interest to publicly challenge their 
interpretations. This feedback sensitized me in a very real way to the dialectical 
relationship between discourse and interpersonal relations, and while these collegial 
relations per se were not the focus of my study, I could not ignore the effects of power 
and hope to do justice to interpreting the event. In 2002 I sent the HOD and the course 
convener a penultimate draft of the analysis. Once again their critical feedback served to 
validate and strengthen my argument. 
19 NVivo is a qualitative data analysis software which enables the researcher to link a set of documents (e.g. 
interview transcripts) with an index system. An index system is a set of hierarchically linked nodes (e.g. 
concepts/issues/key words). The software allows the researcher to electronically pull out data from the 
interviews which have been coded under the same node. 
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4.4.2.3 Engineering case study 
4.4.2.3.1 Rationale for the case selection 
Toward the end of the Humanities study, I felt that it would be really important to 
explore the issues which had emerged from this case in the context of another faculty in 
the same institution as my first case study. In my search for another case study, I was 
informed about some particular problems that an Engineering department had 
experienced during its end of year examination meeting, problems which echoed some of 
the issues which had arisen in the Humanities marking workshop. I decided to explore 
the possibility of this site for my second case study. I concluded on the basis of an 
exploratory conversation with a member of staff from this department that this would be 
an ideal second study. There were some important similarities and differences between 
the two cases. 
Like the Humanities department, the Engineering department also has a culminating 
research project in their final undergraduate year. The project is also high stakes; it is a 
requirement for graduation and thus the consequences of failure are serious. Again as in 
Humanities, the supervision and assessment of the final year project is the responsibility 
of the whole community, not simply a few individuals. This community also represented 
an interesting range of diversity in terms of academic status (from lecturer to professorial 
level), disciplinary specialisation, as well as nationality, race and gender. As in 
Humanities, several young members of staff had recently joined the department. 
In terms of their differences, as in the preliminary study, I felt it was important to 
conduct research in a contrasting 'hard' science discipline. This enabled me to explore 
how the different approaches to knowledge production influence assessment practices. 
Like Humanities, the Engineering community did not have a tradition of marking 
workshops, nor were they an established part of the Engineering departmental culture. 
Given the highly specialized nature of the research, academics within one area of 
specialization would consider it inappropriate to assess projects from another area. All 
members of the department did however come together to discuss student performance at 
a departmental examination meeting. At this event all members of the department came 
90 
together with the external examiners to discuss discrepancies between marks which had 
been allocated to the projects by a first, second and sometimes third marker. This seemed 
an appropriate event for the exploration of validation practices. 
4.4.2.3.2 Data collection 
I met with the HOD in early 2000 to request his permission to study the assessment 
of final year projects. He was very receptive to my study, but noted two conditions. Like 
the Humanities HOD, one major concern was that members of staff should not feel 
imposed upon; to prevent this he asked that I request for volunteers. Secondly, he 
stressed the importance of confidentiality so that no member of staffs reputation would 
be adversely affected by my study. I was able to ensure him that all information would 
be treated confidentially; we also discussed some of the difficulties of assuring complete 
anonymity. 
My data collection was divided into three stages in Engineering. The first stage was 
prior to the assessment of the final year project (August 2000 to mid-October 2000), the 
second stage was the actual final year project assessment process (mid-October 2000 to 
mid-November 2000), and the third stage was following the assessment (mid-November 
2000 to November 2001). 
During the first stage of data collection I conducted two rounds of interviews. The 
first round (with the course convener, the current HOD, and the ex-HOD who was 
responsible for setting up the final year project process) was primarily to establish the 
appropriateness of this site. In addition to getting background information about the 
course and its context, I was particularly concerned about the extent to which the 
department examination meeting would be the appropriate discursive event. Having 
determined that it would be, I conducted a second round of interviews with the wider 
staff. Initially I thought I would sample from the staff group in order to narrow down the 
number of interviews. Both the convener and the HOD advised me against this. The 
convener argued that it would be difficult to get a take on the department's practices in 
any representati\'e way since each person operated individually. Therefore I sent out an 
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interview request to all staff and ended up interviewing approximately three-quarters of 
them. In addition to general background information (e.g. career history, involvement 
with the course, disciplinary specialization, their own particular supervision and 
assessment process), I probed for their views concerning some of the contentious issues 
which had arisen in the previous year's departmental examination meeting. In particular I 
was interested in what they believed to be some of the reasons for the wide discrepancies 
which sometimes arose between first and second markers. 
During the second stage of analysis, I conducted the third round of interviews (with 
a slightly smaller group often) immediately after they had completed their marking of the 
projects and before the departmental examination meeting. It was important for me to 
capture their assessment processes while they were very much 'live' issues. As in the 
case of Humanities, I asked them to note projects which were particularly challenging or 
interesting. In the interview I probed those experiences, asking them to articulate their 
perspective as first marker, second marker, and the kinds of qualities they looked for and 
what the mark meant. I also observed all the major, formal assessment events which 
happened during that week: the Open Day Oral presentations, the consensus meetings, 
and the departmental examination meeting. (I describe these events in more detail in 
5.4.1). 
In the final stage of analysis, after the departmental examination meeting, I 
conducted follow-up interviews with the ex-HOD and the faculty's educational 
development officer, who had also attended the examination meeting. I was also able to 
interview one of the external examiners. I collected all the e-mail discussion in the 
aftermath of the examination meeting and attended a departmental staff meeting to 
discuss a proposal concerning the role of external examiners in the future. I then 
followed the progress of the committee set up to review the final year project assessment 
procedures through interviews with the educational development officer and the course 
convener. Finally I attended and tape recorded the 2001 departmental examination 
meeting in order to note consistencies or inconsistencies between the discursive patterns 
of the meetings. Unfortunately that recording was not successful for technical reasons. 
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4.4.2.3.3 Data analysis 
As with Humanities, the analysis of the data consisted of two major forms: an 
analysis of the major themes which emerged from the interviews and discourse analysis 
of excerpts of the departmental examination meeting. Again the process of collecting and 
analyzing was iterative. During the first round of interviews I probed interviewees' own 
theories or 'reasons' for why discrepancies arose between marks. These 'reasons' 
became my initial set of nodes (in NVivo) which I used to sift through my data. The 
'reasons' which appeared most consistently across interviews were the ones which I 
pursued in further interviews.One frequently noted 'reason' was the different 
'perspective' between the first marker (supervisor) and the second marker. This became 
a dominant theme which I pursued in a more focused way in the second round of 
interviews. I then created a 'tree of nodes' with 'assessor perspective' as the 'parent 
node' and 'supervisor', 'second marker', 'third marker', 'external examiner' as 'child 
nodes'. Through 'memos' I was able to keep a running commentary on assessors' 
perspectives, and how this impacted on their interpretations. These analyses-in-progress 
in their very early, raw forms were tested in follow-up interviews so that part of my 
interpretive task was to feed back to my interviewees their own interpretations. I was then 
able to take this analytical frame to the analysis of the Humanities data. 
The themes which arose from the content analysis served to focus my textual 
analysis. For example, I explored whether the validity arguments which arose in 
assessors' interview accounts were consistent or inconsistent with what the textual 
analysis revealed. In this way the content analysis and the textual analysis served as a 
form of triangulation for my findings. As in the Humanities analysis, I also explored 
academic validating arguments for the kinds of evidence which supported different 
interpretations. Since I was particularly interested in the facework of this meeting, this 
kind of analysis required a slightly more detailed transcription than the Humanities 




The task of this chapter has been to account for the 'construction of my object' 
which from Bourdieu's perspective is the most crucial research operation (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992). My methodological approach identifies four elements which constitute 
social practice - social structure, conjuncture, event and text. These constitutive elements 
operationalize into a series of analytical stages which expose different aspects of social 
practice. In order to illumine these constitutive elements, I proposed a set of theoretical 
tools which expose not only the elements but the relations between them. I argued that 
this methodology is broadly consistent with Fairclough's method ofCDA, with some 
adaptations which address some ofthe critiques which have been made of Fairclough's 
work. It draws on ethnographic methods to give access to other texts which are crucial to 
explanations of social practice, in particular language users' interpretations of their own 
texts. In the final section I reported on my exploratory study and then described the 
design of the main study. 
I now turn in the next chapter to the analysis of the case study data. 
Chapter 5: Analysis 
For judgments and arguments of magic to be valid, they must have a principle that eludes 
examination ... These principles, without which the judgments and arguments are not believed 
possible, are what philosophy calls categories. Constantly present in language, without 
necessarily being explicit, they exist rather in the form of guiding practices of consciousness, 
which are themselves unconscious. 
(Mauss cited in Bourdieu 1996, p. 7) 
5.1 Introduction 
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I noted in Chapter 4 that one of the initial questions which guided my preliminary 
study was: what particular qualities are academics looking for in student writing? I 
concluded that my preliminary study had not enabled me to explore this question in 
sufficient depth. While both marking workshops had explicit marking criteria (although 
the Humanities' workshop criteria emerged post hoc), it was difficult in the context of the 
marking workshops to pursue the extent to which there was broad agreement among the 
staff around these criteria. I also reported on two assessors in the Science marking 
workshop, who, after applying the explicit criteria, had adjusted the overall mark to fit 
their impression or 'gut-feel' about the report. I argued that this suggests that in addition 
to or instead of the explicit marking criteria, assessors bring intuitive judgments to the 
assessment of student performance, intuitions constituted by, among other things, years 
of experience as professionals in a particular field of study. 
Eliciting from academic staff the criteria which they bring to bear in the assessment 
of student performance proved to be one of the most challenging tasks I faced in the main 
study. I recall one particularly difficult interview near the beginning of my study. The 
Hum300 course convener and I sat with two exam scripts where essentially the same 
question (about research methodology) had been answered by students at two different 
levels; one was a final year undergraduate student and the other was a first year 
postgraduate student. The convener was clear that, even though the question was the 
same. he would be looking for "qualitatively different" kinds of responses from these two 
students. But during the course of the interview. I, who had hoped to get clear statements 
about these qualitative differences. was to be disappointed. The convener's responses 
defied neat statements of criteria. He finally admitted the difficulty he experienced in 
articulating what was for him essentially "the concept of a good scholar", which he 
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argued is highly "intuitive". He compared his task as an assessor to those who judge 
dance or sport. When they recognize talent or skill in the performers, he asked, "How do 
they know that? They know. They know when somebody's really skilful. There's no 
dispute." Pointing to his marks, he added, "I think that's what's going on here" (Dan 98-
2)1. 
What I discovered as I interviewed nearly thirty academic assessors from different 
ends of the disciplinary spectrum was that the appeal to intuition as the basis for 
academic judgment was not uncommon. From both the Humanities and the Engineering 
staff there seemed to be a great deal of ambivalence towards explicit marking criteria. In 
each of the communities of practice, there were members of staff who did use a marking 
memorandum very systematically, working through each of the criterion and allocating a 
certain percentage of points out of the total. They were the exceptions, however. Most of 
the staff expressed varying degrees of resistance towards explicit marking criteria. One 
member of staff in Humanities felt that criteria were important as signals to students of 
what was valued. He admitted, however, when it came to marking, ''I'm not going to tie 
myself to (these criterial I can't" (Jos 99-1). In Engineering where there was an official 
marking memorandum, some "disregarded it completely" (Car 00-1 ). One noted, "It 
means nothing to me'' (Joh 00-1 ). Another admitted that he had tried to use it but did not 
find it particularly helpful (Ric 00-1 ). Another objected to the false 
compartmentalization which marking memoranda imposed; ''I can't do it," he noted 
emphatically ... I don't have a mind that splits into seven bits" (Rob 00-2). While some of 
the resistance was towards the specific official marking memorandum, my sense was that 
much of the resistance was to the very notion that final year projects could be assessed by 
the allocation of points against a fixed set of criteria. 
1 References to interview data consist ofthe first three letters of the interviewee's pseudonym, the last two 
digits of the year of the interview and the number ofthe interview. Thus, 'Dan 98-2' refers to the second 
interview conducted with Dan in 1998. Other relevant information for each interviewee is provided in 
Appendix I for the Humanities case study and Appendix 3 for the Engineering case study. 
c Where I have added a word or phrase to clarify the meaning of a quotation from an interview, I have put 
these additions in parentheses. 
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A common theme that emerged from both communities of practice was that 
assessment was something more akin to 'taste' (Geo 00-2)3 . One member of staff noted, 
"A thesis is not something which you could judge quantitatively ... it is a qualitative 
judgment" (Ken 00-1). Another member of the Engineering staff commented, "I don't 
know if there is a recipe. I think in many ways it is your stamp of approval. It's more like 
(judging) the arts .. .I think there is a tendency to say, 'mmm, I really like this', whereas 
another marker ... because they are prejudiced against the argument, would mark it down 
a little bit" (Car 00-1 ). One member of staff assessing for the first time recalled, "The 
impression that we were given as new supervisors, is that, it's left to academic feeling, 
that you decide how you want to mark" (Kur 00-2). Another commented on the difficulty 
he had in using the marking memorandum, "I tried to use it (the memorandum) (but) 
what I do now is I mark in a more intuitive way. I am not sure if intuitive is the right 
word, but I read it and I decide". He noted that academics become "imbued" with a 
"form of thinking" that enables them to "put (theses) into categories" (Ric 00-1 ). 
Commenting on the difficulty of making such criteria explicit, a member of staff noted, 
"In time you find ways of assessing something that would take a lot of articulation to get 
it all out" (Joh 00-1). 
Thus it would appear that experienced academics operate with powerful intuitive 
categories, and the rules or criteria which define these categories resist explicit definition. 
Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) distinguishes between the rules or criteria of, 
for example, a game of soccer and the rules which inform classificatory acts of social life, 
for example, assessment. The former are explicit, the latter are not. He argues that the 
latter may not even be conscious. In State Nobility Bourdieu starts a chapter entitled 
"Academic forms of classification" by citing Mauss on categories: "Constantly present in 
language, without necessarily being explicit, they exist rather in the form of guiding 
practices of consciousness, which are themselves unconscious" (1996, p. 7). Therefore, 
early in my study, I concluded that if I was to understand the logic of academic validating 
practices, I needed to move beyond the search for 'rules', that is, the search for explicit or 
3 Piper's (1994) survey of university examiners' practice in the U.K. supports this same theme. He found 
"a heavy reliance on intuitive global judgments (or individually developed marking schemes) and a tacit 
understanding of marking standards" (p. 77). 
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even implicit criteria which inform academic judgment. With reference to these kinds of 
rules, Bourdieu (1990) notes, "(They) have a particularly small part to play in the 
determination of practice" (p. 145). Rather my task was to expose the "objectivity of the 
subjective" (p. 135), or as Postone et al (1993) explain it, "to capture the practical 
mastery that people have of their social situation, while grounding that mastery itself 
socially" (p. 4). 
The aim of the first part of my analysis ( 5 .2) is to develop, largely on the basis of 
secondary literature, some understanding of the social conditions of constraint and 
possibility which ensure the on-going production and re-production of academic 
validating practices. In Bourdieu' s terms this is an exploration of the 'game' (Bourdieu in 
Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 98) where the goal of the analysis is to sketch the 
contours of the field, to identify some of the stakes in the competition (i.e. the various 
forms of capital), and to expose some of the rules of fair or legitimate play which inform 
academics' classificatory acts, what Bourdieu refers to as "the legitimate principles of 
legitimation" (Bourdieu 1996 p. 265). 
The analysis is guided by the following questions: 
• What are some of the distinguishing features of the higher education field? 
• \Vhat are some of the particular forms of capital which define institutional and 
individual positions within the field? 
• What are the epistemic rules shaping academic validating practices? 
I conclude this section by illustrating the ·'logic of practice·· (Bourdieu 1990) through the 
external examination system. one of the traditional and deeply entrenched validating 
practices of the academic field. 
I then turn in the remainder of the chapter (5.3 and 5.4) to my primary interest which 
is how individuals 'play the game', that is, how they take-up (contest, negotiate. 
construct) the positions defined by the field. I explore this take-up in the context of two 
different academic communities, one situated in a Humanities faculty and the other in an 
Engineering faculty. Each case begins with an exploration ofthe actual community with a 
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particular focus on its specific "joint enterprise" (Wenger 1998, p. 77), the assessment of 
final year projects and the procedures, events, rules, roles and technologies which enable 
members to carry off the project assessment from year to year. Then I turn to a closer 
scrutiny of actual assessment discourse to explore the particular complexity of 
contingencies (what I call the interpretive matrix) which assessors bring to bear in the 
assessment of student performance. I am interested not only in the differences of 
interpretation which emerge as different interpretive matrices are brought to bear, but 
what is at stake in the negotiation of these differences and how these negotiations are 
resolved. 
This analysis is guided by the following questions: 
• Within the particular assessor roles to which academics are allocated, what are 
some of the dimensions of the interpretive matrices which they bring to bear on 
student performance? 
• Do these interpretive matrices result in different interpretations? 
• If so, what is at stake in the negotiation of these differences? 
I now turn to an analysis of the higher education field. 
5.2 Analysis of the higher education field 
I have argued in Chapters 3 and 4 for a social theoretical and methodological 
approach to the study of academic validating practices. Here I briefly re-cap some of the 
main theoretical points which frame this analysis. I argued that academic validating 
practices only make sense within the logic of the field, that is, the field of higher 
education and the academic profession. The field of higher education is a configuration 
of positions which are defined by the distribution of capital. Thus institutions and 
individuals within the field are differentiated from one another on the basis of their 
particular accumulation of capital, capital which converts to a form of power. It is also 
the field which determines, what Bourdieu (1996) refers to as, the "legitimate principles 
of legitimation" (p. 265), that is, principles which shape and legitimate classificatory acts. 
Given the contestation over legitimacy, fields are always characterized by power 
1 
' 
struggles, power struggles within the field and power struggles to define the field 
(Postone et al 1993). 
99 
I start by noting two particular features of the higher education field ( 5.2 .1). I then 
turn to identify the particular forms of capital which count in this field and the manner in 
which this capital defines institutional and individual positions within the field as well as 
the epistemic rules which legitimate validating practices (5.2.2). In the next section 
(5.2.3) I explore the logic of the external examination system. Within each section I relate 
the theoretical analysis to the South African higher education system and focus on SAU 
in particular. 
5.2.1 The academic field 
One of the notable features of higher education as a field of institutions is that it is 
highly differentiated (Clark 1983, 1987a, 1987b). One of Clark's (1987a, 1987b) central 
arguments is that there is no single experience of the academic profession. The academic 
profession is profoundly shaped by national, institutional and disciplinary contexts. For 
Bourdieu the primary principle of this differentiation is the distribution of capital, that is, 
social, cultural and economic resources. These differentiated forms of capital form the 
basis of a hierarchy within the field which becomes most evident within a national system 
of institutions, with research universities at one end of the spectrum and community and 
vocational colleges at the other (Clark 1987a). One of the implications of this highly 
differentiated system is that the epistemic principles which inform academic validating 
practices are not homogeneous across the field; what is perceived to be legitimate 
knowledge, what are the legitimate criteria for this knowledge, and who can legitimately 
assess and validate this knowledge will vary across institutions and disciplines according 
to their position in the field4. This indeed becomes one of the sources of power struggle 
within the field. 
4 Piper ( 1994) found interesting differences between the responses of academics in the university sector and 
those in the polytechnic and college sector to the question of who could be legitimately appointed as 
external examiner for their subjects. Very few academics in either sector felt that external examiners from 
outside their disciplinary group could legitimately examine their subjects (e.g. a psychologist moderating 
an architectural project). But in response to whether an external examiner from a different but related 
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In addition to institutional differentiation, there is also disciplinary differentiation. 
While the academic field determines the broad epistemic rules which shape validating 
practices, the specialist communities of practice also profoundly shape the particular 
epistemological orientation which academics adopt in their validation work (as the 
Engineering case study illustrates). Becher's study (1989, Becher and Trowler 2001) of 
'academic tribes' argues that any study of academic social life needs to give sustained 
attention to how epistemological orientation shapes academic culture, that is, what 
academics believe, how they feel, how they behave and, I would add, how they assess. 
A second notable feature of the higher education field is that, given significant shifts 
in the global political and economic landscape at the end ofthe 20th century, higher 
education is a field which is currently in the midst of turbulent change, so much so that 
Clark ( 1 998) suggests that "no one knows with any degree of confidence what the 21st 
century holds in store for universities" (p. xiv). Some of these changes include: growth 
in both numbers and diversity of students demanding a tertiary education; a rapidly 
expanding professional labour market with increasing demands on universities for 
competent graduates; greater expectations of accountability from government but 
decreasing state subsidy: massive explosion and fragmentation of knowledge which 
places strain on the range of disciplinary and interdisciplinary fields which any university 
can offer (Becher and Trowler 2001, Clark 1998). This suggests that the epistemic 
principles of legitimacy informing validating practices will feel the winds of change and 
be pulled by the strain of competing discourses. and traditional forms of validation will 
be challenged by new demands. These pulls are power struggles to define the contours of 
the field. Again, depending on institutional and disciplinary positioning, validating 
practices will respond to these competing discourses in different ways. 
The South African higher education system emerged in 1994 from its years of 
apartheid isolation to face two formidable challenges. On the one hand was the challenge 
discipline could legitimately moderate their subject (e.g. a chemist moderating another physical science), 
l8°1o from the poly1echnic sector agreed in contrast to only 6% of university academics. 
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of transforming what was pre-1994 a racially divided and un-coordinated system 
comprised of 36 higher education institutions controlled by eight different government 
departments, a system socially engineered to marginalize South Africa's black 
(specifically African) population and to privilege its white minority population (Bunting 
2001 )5• Thus post-1994 the emphasis of South Africa's initial phase of higher education 
policy was on equity and access, particularly for constituencies (students and staff) who 
had been disadvantaged under apartheid. One of the results of these social-political 
changes (the effects of which were felt long before 19946) was an influx into the higher 
education system of many students who previously had been excluded on racial grounds. 
The impact of this influx was most strongly felt by the historically white institutions 
(initially the English-speaking, but also later the Afrikaans-speaking ones) where the 
diversity in levels of educational preparedness between students was most acute. 
Students who had benefited from the highest standard of schooling in the country sat side 
by side with peers who had been schooled under the worst educational, economic and 
political conditions. This influx of previously excluded students was felt most acutely by 
Humanities faculties. Alternative admissions policies made university entrance possible 
for students who under traditional admissions criteria would not have been admitted to 
higher education. However, these students were seldom admitted to the faculty of their 
first choice (usually the professional degrees) given these faculties' more stringent 
admissions requirements. Thus Humanities programmes in historically white universities 
in particular felt the strain of a rapidly changing student population. As I indicate in the 
case study analysis, this is a social condition of the field which strongly influences 
Yalidating practices, particularly in the Humanities department. 
In addition to its own local social-political transformation process, the other 
challenge for the higher education system in South Africa has been to 'find its feet' in a 
global transformation process. Becher and Trowler (200 1) refer to this as higher 
education in a post-industrial environment, a period characterized by turbulent changes. 
5 In this study, unless otherwise specified, the racial designation 'black' includes groups who under 
apartheid were designated • African', 'coloured', and 'Indian'. 'White' refers to those of European descent. 
6 As early as the 1980s historically white English-speaking universities in defiance ofthe apartheid 
government were admitting students classified as 'African', 'coloured' and 'Indian'. 
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Some of these changes have already been noted, for example, massifkation, 
marketization, managerialism (see Becher and Trowler 2001). One of the significant 
changes in higher education globally has been an altered relationship between 
universities, the state and wider society. In contrast to the past where higher education 
has enjoyed tremendous autonomy, the current climate is characterized by less trust on 
the part of the state and the wider public that higher education is fulfilling its role in 
society. Thus one of the features of this current period is increasing calls for higher 
education to be more accountable to the state and to the wider society for all aspects of its 
practice, namely, its research, teaching, administration and community outreach. 
In relation to the quality of its teaching, I argued in Chapter 2 that assessment has 
been perceived by policy makers to be an essential technology for both the reform of 
curriculum and its quality assurance. I noted the emergence in the 1990s of national 
qualification frameworks (NQFs) in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and 
South Africa. Some of the key characteristics ofNQFs include a national qualifications 
authority, a specified number of levels or standards of learning, definitions of 
qualifications by level, learning outcomes, assessment criteria and accreditation of prior 
learning (D'Andrea et al2001). The purposes of these NQFs vary across contexts. In 
South Africa the purported purpose has been to address fundamental inequalities in 
provision of and access to educational opportunities. While the tertiary sector has been iri. 
principle supportive of the broad political agenda underlying the NQF, there has been 
tremendous resistance 7 to the implementation of the framework, particularly by the 
. . 8 
umverslty sector . 
These local and global challenges pose a set of competing discourses for the South 
African higher education system where on the one hand, the transformation agenda at 
See o· Andrea et al (200 I) and Kraak and Mohamed (200 I) for a discussion of university resistance to 
NQFs. 0 ·Andrea et al (200 I) argue that university resistance to NQFs closely resembles the resistance that 
the academic community has towards many forms of new 'managerial ism' in higher education, which are 
perceived to threaten traditional academic values. Kraak and Mohamed (2001) note that one ofthe primary 
reasons for universities' resistanc-e to the NQF is the perception that NQFs privilege vocational 
qualifications over the formative emphasis of university qualifications. 
8 This resistance by universities is not unique to South Africa. Kraak and Mohamed (200 I) note that New 
Zealand·s NQF. after which South Africa's policy is modelled. has been unable to get buy-in from its 
uni\ ersit: sector which has to date remained independent of the framework. 
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national level prizes issues of equity, access and re-dress of both institutions and 
individuals. On the other hand, in order to survive in a globally competitive system, the 
global agenda prizes quality, efficiency, and excellence. In the face of these potentially 
competing challenges, Maassen and Cloete (2002, p. 32) argue that higher education 
national policy-makers are likely to privilege issues that 'fit' globalization discourse, 
such as efficiency, effectiveness and competition. Specific national issues, for example in 
South Africa such issues as institutional and individual redress, are more likely to be 
marginalized. Thus it could be argued that South African higher education institutions, at 
the level of policy and practice, are negotiating their way through these competing 
discourses. I shall point to traces of these competing discourses in the case study analysis. 
5.2.2. Academic capital, positions and rules 
Bourdieu argues that, "People are at once founded and legitimized to enter the field 
by their possessing a definite configuration of properties. One of the goals of research is 
to identify what these active properties are ... that is, these forms of specific capital" 
(Bourdieu in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 1 07). In this section, I explore some of 
these forms of capital or values of the academic profession, and how these values, in turn, 
define institutional and individual positions within the field, as well as how these values 
shape the epistemic principles of vision and division which constitute academic 
validating practices. specifically academic professional judgment. 
One of the core values, if not the core value of the academic profession is the 
production of knowledge. On the basis of his interviews with academics across a wide 
variety of institutional types (from top-ranking universities to community colleges) Clark 
( 1987a) notes that "knowledge- creating it, caring for it, teaching or otherwise 
transmitting it- proved to be the nearest thing to common ideological ground" (p. 130). 
\Vhen academics think of their service to society, the provision of knowledge is front and 
centre (Clark 1987a). This pursuit of knowledge constitutes the "inner logic" of academic 




Accumulation of knowledge (in the form of research) thus is one of the primary 
bases of institutional and individual differentiation within the field of higher education. 
Institutions which have accumulated large amounts of specialized knowledge are well-
positioned within the "powerful hierarchy of prestige" (Clark 1987a, p. 58). The more 
highly specialized the knowledge, the higher the qualification, the more the prestige; this 
prestigious position is occupied by what Clark (1987a) refers to as research universities 
(although even within this prestigious category there are many differentiations). 
Conversely, the less specialized the research, the lower the institution sits in the prestige 
hierarchy, for example, technikons and vocational training colleges. Individual 
academics' positioning within the field is also inseparably intertwined with their role as 
disciplinary specialists (Becher and Trowler 2001, Clark 1987a and Henkel2000). Not 
only is disciplinary expertise the primary basis of professional identity but this form of 
capital converts to a form of power. Disciplinary expertise is thus also one of the primary 
bases of academic authority (Clark 1987a). 
Another core value of the academic profession, which is intrinsically linked to 
disciplinary expertise, is professional autonomy. Again this value is notably strong in 
research universities; the higher the institution sits in the prestige hierarchy the more 
tenaciously the rights of self-rule are guarded. Both Bourdieu ( 1988) and Clark ( 1987a) 
emphasize the historical link between specialized knowledge and academic autonomy. 
Bourdieu ( 1988) notes how the autonomy of the university field grew constantly through 
the nineteenth century. The "professor of higher education" evolves from being a 
.. dignitary appointed by political authorities and committed to politics" to becoming a 
.. select and specialized teacher ... animated by a specifically academic ideal" (p. 37). With 
reference to the rise of 'academic guilds' in the United States, Clark (1987a) also links 
rising academic autonomy with academics' "gathering control over knowledge brought 
about by research-driven specialization" (p. 16). 
The notion of academic autonomy or self-governance has two levels of application. 
The first is that of individual professional autonomy, that is, the right of an academic to 






teach, and how they assess. The second is the autonomy of the academic community to 
rule itself with relatively few impositions from outside, especially the state. A profession 
which prizes professional autonomy, based on specialist expertise, will elect governance 
structures which best protect these values. These structures have been traditionally 
"bottom-heavy" (Clark 1987b, p. 3 81 ), often referred to as collegial. The higher the 
standing of the university the more "authority rolls around loosely" (p. 152). Ambiguity 
in lines of authority is seen as functional. The effect of this form of governance is that 
academics wield a fair amount of personal control over their research and teaching with, 
as Clark argues, "their judgments ... only minimally circumscribed by bureaucratic rules 
or collegial norms that would foreclose individual discretion" (ibid.). 
Therefore, these forms of capital, knowledge and autonomy serve to explain the 
hierarchy of prestige (or the "space of play", Bourdieu in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 
p. 1 02) within the field of higher education, that is, that on the basis of their accumulation 
of these forms of capital, institutions and individuals are positioned within the field either 
advantageously or disadvantageously. Not only does capital define positioning but it 
defines the principles which shape and legitimate classificatory acts within the field. The 
logic of academic professional judgment or 'taste' is rooted in knowledge or specialist 
expertise. The question then follows: if specialist expertise is the legitimate basis of taste, 
then who will judge these expert tastes? Given the field's investment in autonomy, the 
validity of professional taste can only be assessed by other specialists, by peers. Only 
someone with comparable expertise can legitimately assess and validate the assessments 
of the academic as subject specialist (Becher and Trowler 2001 ). These principles of 
legitimacy, namely knowledge-based expertise and peer-validation, serve to explain the 
logic of academic validation practices for institutions which are well-positioned or aspire 
to be well-positioned within the field of higher education. They also explain resistance 
from the field to any perceived threats to these traditional validation practices. 
In relation to this distribution of capital, where is SAU positioned? Despite an era 
(post -1994) of higher education policies aimed at transforming the system, the pyramid 
of institutional differentiation (and hence prestige) inherent in the apartheid design has 
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remained relatively intact, with the historically white English and Afrikaans universities 
controlling a vast proportion of economic and cultural capital. SAU is among these 
favourably positioned institutions. It is considered to be one of the leading universities in 
South Africa, with some of the highest accumulation of cultural capital (measured in 
terms of research output, highly rated scientists, top-ranking undergraduate and 
postgraduate students) and economic capital (measured in terms of widely diversified 
funding base). From this position of power, Cloete and Maassen (2002) argue that 
institutions like SAU have been able to resist reforms that run counter to their 
institutional culture. They argue that while a few compromises have been made in terms 
of de-racializing the student body and management profile, these institutions have to a 
large extent remained as they were before (p. 468). 
This is well-illustrated by SAU's responses to increased demands from the state for 
accountability for its educational programmes. I noted earlier the widespread resistance 
from universities to the implementation ofNQFs. During the early phase of my study, 
SA U experienced in 1996-1998 an institutional programme re-structuring exercise, and 
then in 2000 a concerted attempt on the part of the State to impose external quality 
measures through an interim registration of qualifications on the NQF. Both exercises 
required academic programmes to be more explicit about programme purposes, learning 
outcomes. forms of assessment. and assessment criteria. Consistent with the international 
experience. the general response from SAU academics was not receptive. I would argue 
that the contestation between universities and the NQF is a struggle over the "legitimate 
principles of legitimation" (Bourdieu 1996, p. 265); NQFs are perceived by universities 
as a threat to their traditional forms of academic capital. They also fundamentally 
challenge the epistemic rules which govern academic validating practices, namely, that 
final authority rests within the disciplinary sub-field and can only be validated by other 
members of this field. The issue of who has final authority is a significant theme in the 
case study analyses which follow. 







5.2.3 Academic practice: the logic of external examination system 
These principles of legitimacy serve to explain the logic of many academic 
classificatory acts (e.g. editorial boards, selection and promotion committees) and 
specifically the curious phenomenon that for most of their history universities have 
guaranteed the quality of their own work. In relation to the quality of their degrees, one 
of the primary validation mechanisms used in the British higher education system and 
many of its ex-colonies (including South Africa) is the external examination system. 
While often the subject of academic scepticism, the external examination system remains 
deeply entrenched as one of the central validation mechanisms. Piper (1994) argues that 
the convention of external examiners is still commonly regarded as the principal 
guarantee that British university degrees are of a "consistent and high standard" (p. 1 ). 
From the early history of British universities through to the present, Piper (1994) 
argues that the most commonly recognized functions of the external examiners are firstly, 
to judge whether the standard of award is on par with other awards in the country, and 
secondly to ensure that students are treated fairly (p. 1 07). Although there has been no 
systematic study of the external examination system in South Africa9, there is some 
evidence from my study that there is, as in the United Kingdom, the perception of a 
strong link between external examiners and the maintenance of standards. SAU's policy 
manual endorses this linlc "The university has a responsibility to the professions in 
particular and to the public at large to ensure that its students attain the required 
professional and academic standards. These can best be maintained through the services 
of examiners external to the university" (University policy manual 5.4.1.1 ). One of my 
interviewees in Engineering argued that the role of externals is strongly associated with 
the question of standards. There is a "popular opinion" that what maintains standards is 
the presence of an "independent arbiter from the outside''; that "anything internal is open 
to corruption" (Ala 00-2). 
9 Since the rise of accountability culture in South Africa there has been some critical reflection on the role 
of external examiners. particularly in relation to their potential role in programme review (see Higher 
Education Quality Council's Improving Teaching & Learning Project: Interim Guides to Good Practice 
2002). To my knowledge there has been no systematic investigation of South Africa's external 
examination systern. There is work-in-progress being conducted by Lee Sutherland of the University of 
Zulu land on the role of moderation in higher education. 
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What is the basis of external examiner authority? The principles of the field 
determine that their basis of legitimacy/authority lies in their disciplinary expertise. 
Piper's (1994) survey found that in the United Kingdom the primary reason for the 
selection of a particular external examiner was his/her eminence in the disciplinary field. 
The second most frequently cited reason was that the external examiner was personally 
known to the internal examiners. Thus from the internal examiners' perspective the 
external examiner is 'one of us'. But a second basis of their authority, I would suggest, 
lies in their alleged impartiality as 'external' to the particular context, in other words, 
they are independent of the university and thus perceived to have no invested interest in 
the students' performances. This principle of independence from the university concerned 
is stressed in SAU's policy manual; only in rare exceptions can an external examiner be 
appointed who is internal to the university and in the case of doctorates (where the stakes 
are highest) an external must be independent of the university (University policy manual 
5.4.1.3). 
This prevalent belief in the privileged status of an external examiner's professional 
judgment remains largely unchallenged until a disagreement arises. In the event of a 
disagreement between an internal and external examiner who has the final say? What is 
the ·official' position? In fact, at SAU there is no 'official' position at university, faculty 
or departmental level. The authority of the external examiner appears to be a matter of 
case by case interpretation. Similarly Piper's study (1994) found that for British 
uni\'ersities there was no national regulation on this matter; the position varied from 
institution to institution. In his study both internal and external examiners were asked, 
·could an external overrule an internal examiner's mark?' The response from internal 
examiners was: 37% agreed that externals could overrule, 37% argued they could not and 
26% offered no reply. The response from external examiners: 64% of respondents agreed 
that externals could overrule. Piper ( 1994) notes, however, that it was clear from 
inter\'iev;s that external examiners seldom had to evoke these powers since differences 
were resolved by ""mutual adjustment" (p. 211). Piper's study suggests that the very 
founding assumptions of the external examination system lie in a powerful belief in the 
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privileged status of the external perspective. However, when it comes to conceding final 
authority, the academic community appears to be divided, reluctant to relinquish their 
right of autonomy to the 'external', albeit 'one of us'. 
5.2.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this analysis was to develop some understanding of the social conditions 
of constraint and possibility which ensure the on-going production and re-production of 
academic validating practices. In Bourdieu's terms this involves sketching out the 
contours of the field, identifying the forms of capital, demarcating positions and exposing 
some of the principles of vision and division which inform academics' classificatory acts. 
I argued that the higher education field is highly differentiated so that the epistemic 
principles which inform academic validation systems are not homogeneous across the 
field. Higher education is also a field in the midst of turbulent changes which suggests 
that validating practices will feel the strain of pull from competing discourses. From 
Bourdieu's perspective, positions within this differentiated field are based on access to 
forms of capital, and I have argued that for higher education these are principally 
knowledge and autonomy. Thus institutions which have accumulated vast amounts of 
capital (measured, for example, through scientific ratings, publication counts, and 
research funding) are advantageously positioned in the hierarchy of institutional prestige. 
The same applies to individual positioning within the field; academics' positioning (or 
professional identity) within the field is, to a large extent, determined on the basis of their 
accumulation of specialist-based expertise. Furthermore, since capital is a form of power. 
it is largely on the basis of this expertise, that professional authority is determined. 
Not only does capital define institutional and individual positioning, but it also 
specifies the "principles of vision and division", that is, "the legitimate principles of 
legitimation" (Bourdieu 1996, p. 265). These are the principles which inform academic 
classificatory acts: what is perceived to be legitimate knowledge, the legitimate criteria 
for assessing this knowledge, the legitimate assessors of this knowledge, and the 
legitimate validators of these assessments. Fie ids are inevitably sites of struggle, 
although the degree of contestation within and from outside the field over these positions 
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and principles will vary. Despite the turbulent changes occurring in higher education 
more globally and in South African higher education locally, I have argued that because 
of its relatively privileged position in the higher education hierarchy, SAU has been able 
to determinedly resist calls for change. In particular, it has been able, to date, to resist 
calls for increasing accountability which challenge the legitimacy of traditional modes of 
validation practice. An example of the latter is the external examination system, a deeply 
entrenched academic social practice which makes best sense within the logic of the 
higher education field. 
Trowler (200 1) argues that universities are dialogical entities, "composed of a 
multiplicity of discourses with plurivocal meanings" (p. 191). He suggests two sources 
of this plurivocality: first, there are the conditioning structures within and beyond the 
university itself. These conditioning structures have been the focus of part one of my 
analysis. But, secondly, there is the operation of the activity system, that is, how 
individuals and communities contest, negotiate, and re-construct these conditioning 
structures. He argues that is it within the communities that "recurrent practices become 
shaped and embedded, where developing meanings are constructed as individuals work 
together on the issues of professional life" (p. 194 ). 
It is to these academic communities which I now tum. 
5.3 Humanities Case Study 
5.3.1 Validating practices 
My first case study focuses on the community of practice whose enterprise is the 
assessment of final year projects in one of SAU' s Humanities departments (henceforth 
referred to as the Humanities department). This community involves most of the 
academic staff of the department (nine members of staff in both 1998 and 1999), an 
administrative assistant and two external examiners who are academics from other South 
African universities. (See Appendix 1 for data on Humanities staff who participated in 
the study). 
Ill 
A series of both national and institutional events in the late eighties and early to mid-
nineties left this community of academics fairly bruised. During the mid to late eighties 
historically white English-speaking universities experienced a significant influx of 
students coming from educationally disadvantaged backgrounds, students who under 
apartheid legislation had been denied access to these institutions. A number of staff 
interviewed commented that the Humanities faculty had become an institutional 'catch-
pool' for these students since their generally low matriculation points10 denied them 
access to other faculties. There was also a perception among some of the staff that the 
Humanities department itself served as a faculty 'catch-pool' for the poorest quality of 
student, what the course convener (in 1999) refered to in an interview as "the bottom of 
the barrel" (Kei 99-3). He argued that the Humanities department was "vital" in the 
context of a university that was taking in increasing numbers of students who for one 
reason or another failed to be admitted to or to make satisfactory progress in the major of 
their first choice (usually commerce, engineering or medicine). "(The Humanities 
department) became the common last chance for a degree for many students ... This meant 
that the department accumulated a large proportion of students who did not intend to 
major in it but were stuck in it and/or were not very highly motivated academically ... "( e-
mail, 1/19/02). 
At the institutional level the department had also suffered badly through a 
programme re-structuring policy which resulted in significant loss in student numbers 
between 1998 and 1999. Given the loss of revenue from student enrolment and 
institutional plans for rationalizing and down-sizing, threats of mergers and 
retrenchments loomed large for this particular community, and staff morale was generally 
low. 
The final year project is located within the context of a third year first semester 
course (referred to as Hum300) which has been in existence since the late seventies, 
largely unchanged in its aim to equip majors in the department to investigate social 
10 'Matriculation points' refers to the score which students received on their final secondary school 
examination. A matriculation exemption (i.e. a pass) is a necessary requirement for university admission. 
Faculties then have specific minimum point requirements for admission to particular programmes of study. 
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phenomena in a wide range of professional fields or to carry on for higher degrees. At 
the time of the study the course had annually enrolled on average 150-200 students over 
the previous few years. As a requirement for the course (and for graduation) students 
conduct research projects which account for 55% of their final mark 11 • Students are 
assisted with these projects by a series of lectures on research methodology. The project 
topics are set by the academic staff and generally reflect the staff member's particular 
research interest or area of specialization. Students select from the range of topics (or 
supervisors) and are allocated to groups on the basis oftheir selection. The groups (of 
approximately 20-30 students) are convened by the staff member who is fully responsible 
for supervising the students and for the assessment of the projects. The actual supervision 
of projects varies. In some cases students work as a class on a common research problem 
which has been identified by the supervisor. In other cases students choose a research 
problem within the area of a specialization. Some supervisors strongly encourage group 
work and others prefer students to work independently. Three weeks into the semester 
students hand in a project proposal (worth 15% of the final mark) and towards the end of 
the semester they hand in a final project (worth 40% of the final mark). The remainder of 
the final mark is made up of a statistics test (worth 10% of final mark) and the final 
examination (worth 3 5% of final mark) 12. 
In terms of the internal moderation of the project marks, the standard procedure is 
that supervisors submit the project marks for their groups to a central administrator. A 
spreadsheet of marks is compiled of all course marks: the proposal mark, the project 
mark. the statistics test mark and the exam mark. Supervisors then come together in a 
meeting to discuss borderline cases, that is, cases where a student's final mark straddles a 
class boundary (e.g. pass/fail, upper second/first). Supervisors are asked to make and 
justify a particular judgment call. At the end of this process a sample of the projects and 
examinations (i.e. a selection of good, poor and middle range marks) as well as all the 
borderline cases of projects and exams are seen by an external examiner. In 1998 
11 Technical!:' to fail the project is to fail the course. However the actual application of this rule varied 
from year to year. In I 997 it seemed to have been applied, but in 1998 it was not. 
1
: There was a slight difference in how the final mark was allocated in 1998 and 1999. In 1999 the course 
convener introduced a series of in-class tests on the course readings which comprised a very small 
percentage of the final mark. 
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Hum300 had two external examiners13 , both from other South African universities. Their 
role was to give feedback on a draft of the examination paper, and to confirm that the 
marks awarded by the internal examiners for both the examination and the projects were 
appropriate. If the external examiners felt that a particular mark was not appropriate, 
they would adjust it. This adjusted mark was considered by the department to be a 
recommendation. While it was common practice to defer to the external examiner, 
particularly in the case of an adjusted project mark, the course conveners (of 1998 and 
1999) were clear that it was the department's prerogative to accept or reject the 
recommendation of the external examiner. I return to the issue of the role and authority 
of external examiners in the next case study. 
During the time of my study ( 1998-1999) there were several modest attempts by the 
course conveners to strengthen the course's validation practices14. These attempts need 
to be understood in part against a double backdrop: national and institutional 
accountability agendas which emerged in the mid to late nineties and a painful and 
protracted departmental inquiry. At the national level the government implemented a 
National Qualifications Framework, in part, a strategy for requiring educational providers 
(including higher education) to be more accountable to the government for their academic 
offerings. In parallel with national policy at the institutional level SAU proposed in 1996 
an Academic Planning Framework which required a more explicit articulation of 
academic programme purposes, objectives, learning-outcomes, methods and criteria for 
assessment. 
An (arguably) more significant event was a high profile inquiry (1996-1997) into 
accusations of racism by a group of post-graduate students in the department. One of the 
issues at stake in this inquiry was the minimum requirements for entry into postgraduate 
level studies. From the perspective of the accused members of staff the faculty had 
admitted students to postgraduate level who "shouldn't have been there". They argued 
13 The rationale for two external examiners was to cater for students in Hum300 who were registered for the 
general degree and those who were registered for a specialization within the degree. 
1 ~ As noted in Chapter I. validating practices refers to all the mechanisms which a community of practice 
puts into place to ensure the reliability and validity of the assessment of student performance. 
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that these students simply did not have "the basic conceptual skills" (Jor 98-1). As 
teaching staff they felt that they were placed in an impossible situation of having to teach 
students who, even with extra assistance, were not able to cope at the expected level. The 
individual academics accused were cleared of the specific charges, but fundamental 
educational issues of access to postgraduate studies were left unresolved. 
Thus against the backdrop of these external and internal pressures, I noted several 
attempts by the course leadership to strengthen the Hum300 validating practices. The 
course convener in 1998 was particularly concerned to establish some benchmarks. At 
the first Hum300 staff meeting ofthe year, he argued that the marks which students 
received for their Hum300 projects needed to signal the extent to which students were 
capable of postgraduate level study. His proposal was that students should not be given a 
mark above 65% for their project unless they were "honours material"15 (field notes, 
16/2/98). His concern was that over-inflated project scores might result in students being 
admitted to postgraduate level studies who were not capable of succeeding. Like his 
predecessor, the course convener in 1999 was also concerned about consistency between 
assessors. He proposed a set of course objectives which appeared in the 1999 course 
outline. He also recommended that all Hum300 staff use a standard marking 
memorandum: he proposed, in fact. that they use his. 
Staff responses to these attempts at standardization were varied. Some felt that 
standardization was important. Mary recalls orienting some postgraduate students who 
assisted her with first year marking. "I told them 65 is an important mark in this 
department. .. I let them know because otherwise you don't know what a particular 
institution does with a particular percentage. You have to tell them how the institution 
feels about these marks" (Mar 98-1 ). Others were more skeptical. Joseph conceded that 
officially a '65%' was a minimum requirement for entry to postgraduate level, but in 
reality he admitted, "I haven't the faintest idea what a 65 means ... someone who has got 
cultural capital and knows how to write nicely, make pretty little borders, puts the right 
references and has got all the things from short-loan on the right day, not the wrong day, 
1
; The Honours year in this faculty refers to the first year of postgraduate study. 
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· and packaged it nicely, then that's 65. And somebody who has made a total mess of 
something (but) is clearly working with something ... you can kind of push it into 65. And 
somebody who is learning how to deal with the way of doing things in the system, you 
know, competently is 65 (Jos 98-1). These two responses reveal something of the social-
situatedness of the assessment process which I explore in more depth in the context of 
actual validating arguments 16• 
5.3.2 Validating arguments 
In 5.1, I explored the social conditions for academic professional judgment, that is, 
the ways in which the academic profession in general and the disciplinary community in 
particular constitute academic 'professional vision'. In Bourdieu's terms, this is an 
exploration of the relationship between positions constituted by the field and agents' 
dispositions. Bourdieu' s "logic of practice" helps us to make sense of the homology 
between the academic "game" and academics' "feel for the game", that is, academics, as 
a result of inhabiting the same field, do share a common "professional vision" (Goodwin 
1994 ). Through the case studies, I now turn to a closer exploration of this professional 
vision. In this next section, I explore assessors' disposition, that is, how they take up 
positions constituted for them as academic assessors. I explore these dispositions 
through assessors validating arguments which emerge in two different contexts: 
supervisors· own accounts of their interpretive process, and the collegial discourse of a 
marking workshop. 
5.3.2.1 Supervisors' accounts 
In the second year of the Humanities study, I asked my interviewees to bring to the 
interview examples of student performance (in this case, the research proposals) which 
had raised particularly interesting assessment issues for them. These four accounts arose 
from these interviews, offering a close-up view of the assessment context and its multiple 
contingencies. 
16 As noted above ( 4.3.4) validity argument refers to the actual discourse which staff use to justify their 
interpretations- whether to students. colleagues or the researcher. 
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Keith 
Keith 17 gives his students considerable latitude in identifying a research question, 
and he strongly encourages students to work on their own rather than in groups. He is 
looking for "self-initiators", students who come with a research interest and can work 
fairly independently. Keith's account of his marking process suggests a systematic, 
largely inductive process of assigning scores to parts, adding up those scores, arriving at a 
total score with some adjustments in light of the whole. Having given a score, he noted 
that he seldom makes adjustments for consistency across the whole range of students' 
scores. He figures this will "come out in the wash". He acknowledges, however, that 
sometimes he will start off with a "certain level of expectation and (after) I've done five 
or ten I think 'Wow, hold on here I'm being too strict or too lenient or something' ... but I 
mean a lot of the markers do that. It's like taking a sample and trying to establish 
whatever the standard that you are going to mark at, and then you go back". 
However, when our discussion turns to actual projects, Keith acknowledges, "It's a 
complicated story, because we are about teaching them (the students) something". He 
elaborates, "A lot of students, for example, didn't have time to do their pilot work and 
so ... they got zero for pilot work .. .I say 'Look, I'll give you a week to go and test your 
question out on two or three people, get some comments on it and come back and tell me 
how you are going to revise it'. So it's like that. A snowball...". With reference to a 
project that initially got 16% on the draft, he argues "It's a jolt ... they (the students) are 
all used to getting passing marks because they are now in third year ... you get a bright 
student. here's one ... she only got 16 percent! So they sober up and they say 'Hey, this is 
not a Mickey Mouse course, we had better get going'. Now (on the final proposal) she 
has got 72 ... I see the marks basically as a sort of carrot and stick thing". 
Keith had given another student a 48.5 %on her final proposal. This meant that she 
had to re-do the pilot study. "I want her to say a bit more about what questions she asked, 
how they responded, whether the data is useable, flesh out that pilot study. She'll bring it 
back to me then at the beginning of next term and that mark will undoubtedly (go up), I 
,-All interview data in this account is drawn from Kei 99-2. 
' ! 
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don't know 58, 62 or whatever depending ... I mean I don't want them to fail and be 
discouraged. I want the person to look at that 48.5 and say 'Hey that's not me' ... and they 
move themselves a bit". 
Mary 
Mary's 18 typical model of supervision in previous years had been a group project 
where all the students are involved in the same research project, collecting and analyzing 
data which was directly related to Mary's own research.· Having collected enough data 
for her own project, she decided in 1998 (the year of the interview) to give students more 
of a "free rein" in selecting their own topics. Mary follows the same procedure as Keith, 
collecting drafts, giving students feedback, and asking them to re-submit. Unlike Keith 
however she does not use a marking memorandum to derive her mark. Mary's process of 
allocating marks consists of reading through the proposal and allocating symbols, for 
example, A, B, orB+. When I ask her how she then arrives at a percentage, she says, "I 
sat there and I thought, 'Well A is going to be 75', I decided to myself, 'Dis going to be 
50', then I decided 'Well B will be 65 since (this is an) important mark in the department 
and C will be 60' ." In terms of what number (out of 100) the student gets within the 
range of marks for a particular symbol, she states, "It's absolutely arbitrary .. .I'm more 
aware than anyone of how arbitrary it is". 
When asked what she is looking for in order to award a proposal, for example, a 
65%. she notes things such as '·signs that they're actually thinking things through", 
evidence that "their minds are ticking", movement "from an idea to an idea'', "creative 
intelligence", "evidence of assimilation, not just pumping it out". She also notes, "I think 
I'd be very unlikely to give a 65 to someone who didn't write English ... I think I would 
be misleading them." When I ask her what she means by "didn't write English", she 
elaborates, "something that would be embarrassing to show to a stranger and say, 'This is 
a student to whom I have given a 65"'. 
18 All interview data for this account is drawn from Mar 98-1. 
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In discussing her assessment of the projects, Mary noted one particular project that 
she was "really worried about". The student had chosen as the topic of study a particular 
moral issue, and it was clear to Mary that the student had "a real problem", something 
was really "bugging" the student with reference to this issue. The student became very 
defensive when Mary raised questions about some of the assumptions that were being 
made in the research design, but the student insisted in proceeding with the project 
despite Mary's reservations. Mary is in a difficult position and admits, "I gave (the 
person) a higher-than-1-should-have mark. I thought 'I really want to give this (person) 
about a C but (they) are going to just say it is because I am opposed to their ideology'. I 
gave (the person) a B orB+. I think I removed the plus before I gave it back to (them). 
Because (this person) is one of the ones that I really worried about and I went back and 
thought 'Okay forget about my reservations. I am supposed to criticize the stuff'". She 
then details how she went through the questionnaire with the student question by question 
pointing out assumptions which were highly problematic. "So once I sort of felt that I 
had sorted that out in my mind then I felt I could pull (the) mark down a bit. I mean I 
didn't feel so bad since I'd managed to rationalize my deep unhappiness with this 
project." 
Joseph 
Joseph's 19 process follows yet another slightly different model of supervision (from 
that of Mary's and Keith's). Like Keith, his students have quite a bit of flexibility in their 
choice of research focus. But in contrast to Keith, he strongly encourages students to 
work in groups. Students hand in a draft proposal which can be a group proposal; he 
gives feedback; students re-work the draft and hand it in. Joseph marks the final 
proposals but does not put the mark on it- he prefers to have a discussion with the 
students about their proposals without having the mark "in the way". Joseph feels that 
this system allows some discussion and feedback to take place which is not completely 
overshadowed by the grade. "In an ideal world, I'd like to do away with marks", he says. 
IY All interview data for this account is drawn from Jos 99-1 and Jos 99-2. 
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In terms of criteria for assessing the proposals, Joseph admits to a tension. On one 
hand, he resists the reduction of complex performances to 'labels' and 'numbers'. On the 
other hand, he acknowledges that students might benefit from those 'labels'. So over the 
years he had produced a number of different marking memoranda ("grids") which he uses 
with some degree of ambivalence. "I'll continue this year using a combination of a grid 
and not using it. I'll have a grid which I'll give to students but when I am actually 
marking the (proposal) I'm not going to tie myself to that grid. I can't. I can't work out a 
tight enough grid to be comfortable tying myself to it". 
Joseph discusses a group proposal which he had failed, which was "a big mess". He 
admits that had he been using some kind of "grid" he would probably have given it 35%. 
Instead he gives the group a 47% so as not to "discourage them". But as a "product 
frozen in time", it was not a "near fail" but a "definite fail". He justifies this judgment on 
the grounds that, firstly, it fails to meet a number of the requirements of a research 
proposal, and secondly, "There's absolutely no basis under which this will work as a plan 
for a research project .. .if they go and try and do this it will just be a complete disaster". 
The overall message which Joseph wants to convey to the students is that they must 
.. disassociate themselves, free themselves from what's in here (the proposal), because it's 
not going to work". Out of what is a "big mess", they need to "pull bits of what is either 
in here, or was meant to have been in here ... and start moulding those bits into a plan 
which will actually make a successful third year research project". 
On the basis of Joseph· s account. it is clear that he is drawing on other 'texts' than 
the draft proposal. "I can see something of a kind of process going on ... I've actually seen 
those people work and I've actually listened to them working .. .it's dramatically better 
than the draft proposal." Joseph is also 'reading' the students: "They are not lazy". It is 
rather a case that "This whole thing (research) is alien to them ... they are separated from 
some of the things which others, using different cultural capital, just smoothly slide 
into ... ''. On the basis of these multiple 'texts', he speculates about the "mess". "What I 
think has happened in this particular thing is that just at the point where they start to get 
somewhere. a whole lot of different ideas start crowding in which they are unable to 
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discipline or handle or organize, so it's exactly because they've reached a point of 
progress that this thing has got more messy than it might otherwise have been." He adds, 
"But I'm sure that they can do it". 
Zora 
Like Joseph, Zora20 also believes strongly in the value of group projects. In terms of 
her supervision, like the other supervisors, she takes in draft proposals, gives them 
extensive feedback, as well as a mark. She also has regular weekly meetings with the 
students. What is clear from her account is that the projects which the students conduct 
are issues which she herself is clearly invested in (e.g. black identity) and has grappled 
with personally and professionally. Many of the students in her option have done a 
previous second year course with her. She has established a relationship with them. There 
is a history which she is building on. 
In terms of marking criteria, Zora does not use an explicit marking memorandum. 
She described her mark as the outcome of an impression that accumulates through the 
process of the proposal development. She is looking for certain qualities, for example, 
.. focus- have (they) managed to narrow down to a specific research question", "literature 
review - does it link with the things they are trying to research", the "quality of the 
interviews .. - but she admits, "Maybe I privilege process ... because I do mark the final 
in relation to what I got from the draft. and in relation to the amount of work they've 
done··. For lora. the mark means something, "in relation to (the) draft proposal, as well 
in relation to my expectations'". 
In relation to particular projects, Zora discusses one group project, where the 
students got a 55% on the draft proposal. She had made copious suggestions on the draft 
for how the students could take the proposal forward. But on the final, "I gave them 58 
because I felt I couldn't give them 60. but they worked so hard that I want to give them 
6o··. She describes a process of re-ordering one of the paragraphs in order to create more 
coherence. She asks the students to go through the proposal and follow her example. "So 
2
u All interview data for this account is drawn from Zor 99-1. 
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what I say to them is, if they do the basic minimum changes, on the basis of my 
restructuring, then I would consider giving them 60% because they've just been working 
so hard ... And I feel as though I want to reward that, but I also don't want to give them 
wrong messages so that if they were to go to someone else with their project, the person 
would say, 'No, but this is definitely not a 60'. So it's that kind of balance that I'm trying 
to work with." She gives them a chance to re-work the "final" proposal again for a 60%. 
"Even if it's just a 2%, (it's) just sort of pushing them beyond a third into a lower second; 
it's also about motivation ... so that they don't lose hope." She concludes, "So it's hard, 
you know, cause you're also dealing with people". 
5.3.2.2 Dimensions of disposition: assessors' interpretive matrices 
These accounts give some insight into a complex set of contingencies which shape 
assessors' readings of student performance. Each interpretive act involves a whole 
complexity of contingencies which influence the final outcome. I introduced in Chapter 
3 the concept of interpretive matrix to describe this complexity of contingencies, where 
'matrix' is understood as a "context or environment" or "womb" (Oxford Dictionary), a 
place where something "originates or develops" (Webster Dictionary). A crucial part of 
understanding academics' validation practices comes from exploring these interpretive 
matrices and how the local exigencies of an interpretive act may result in an adjustment 
or even a divergence from tacitly agreed-upon points of reference or criteria. On the 
basis of the accounts I tease out different functions which assessment is serving, and 
suggest that different functions might privilege different kinds of evidence. 
The four supervisor accounts suggest that within each of these interpretive acts 
assessment is serving simultaneously two different functions. At one level the mark is an 
interpretation of the value of a product. It is a measure of a product against some notion 
of what the community believes to be 'good' research, some standard ofwhat is 
'competent' performance at this level. These marks also come with pre-assigned 
institutional and societal meanings, and accompanying messages. Thus Mary cannot give 
a 65 to a project where the "level of English would be an embarrassment". Joseph has to 
fail the proposal because it does not meet the "requirements"; the project is simply "not 
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going to work". Despite Zora's desire to honour her students' hard work she cannot give 
them an extra 2% since someone else might look at it and say "This is not a 60%". These 
accounts all point to constraints on the interpretive process, constraints which are to some 
extent imposed by intersubjective notions of what is 'good', for example, good research 
and good English. The function of the mark is to convey to students (and other recipients) 
something about this community's notion of what 'good' is, what it values. 
But serving as a measure of product is not the only function of marks. The mark is 
also a measure of a process; it serves as currency in a communicative exchange between 
assessor and student. In Keith's words, as "carrots and sticks"; a means of "jolting" 
students into action (Keith); a means of communicating disapproval (Mary); a means of 
holding up a picture which students can choose to "disassociate themselves from" 
(Joseph) and say "That's not me" (Keith); a means of affirming hope (Zora). For these 
purposes, the mark is, to use Keith's metaphor, a "snowball"; it is not a solid entity with 
fixed and stable meanings but an evolving entity. Just as the snowball changes size as it 
rolls so too a mark gathers meaning as it 'rolls', the changes reflecting different sets of 
contextual considerations. 
The tension for assessors is that at some point in the mark's 'travel' meanings may 
become temporarily fixed. A mark becomes afinal mark. It gets entered into a 
spreadsheet. It gets discussed at a departmental meeting, reviewed by an external 
moderator. aggregated with other scores, printed on a transcript. It becomes reified as a 
signifier of achievement. Decisions are made on the basis of these scores. Students are 
passed or failed, they are admitted to postgraduate level or not, their transcripts are 
looked upon favorably or otherwise. In its reified form the mark's meanings from 
previous contexts may be eclipsed. Where once the mark was a "carrot", it might in 
another context become a "stick". 
All four accounts suggest that this tension between marks as an interpretation of a 
product and marks as an interpretation of a process is an unavoidable dilemma for 
supervisors. One ofthe most insightful articulations of this tension comes from Joseph. 
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He notes the difficulty assessors face when they receive "a written product (that) doesn't 
reflect what I know they (the students) have done" (Jos 98-1). He notes that it is a 
particular feature of a course like Hum300 where "you've worked with those people and 
you've listened to them, you know the difference between what they've said and what 
they've written ... you know the artificiality of what comes onto the paper" (Jos 99-1). 
This creates a dilemma for assessors and they consciously or unconsciously adopt 
strategies to deal with this. Joseph's strategies are conscious. "I give them (the students) a 
mark which tries to account for both (what they have done and what they can do) - I 
don't want to give them signals which are not sufficiently located in the product ... I tell 
them 'the mark I give you has to be a mark for what you've written'. But I also try to 
take account of what they haven't written, or what they write in another thing." Thus, for 
Joseph, the mark is not irrespective of the product- but an interpretation that results from 
a particular view through the product to a person who is in process. Joseph articulates the 
supervisor's position of assessing a work-in-progress and not only progress through a 
course but the progression of their undergraduate career. For Joseph, this is the 
supervisor's privileged position. 
Joseph argues that despite these "subjectivities which we cannot escape", there is a 
kind of "balancing which goes on which I find very difficult to understand ... what is on 
paper and the (assessor's) judgment of the person and the process, they are not far away 
from each other". But this has to be "secured" and the Hum300 offers that kind of 
opportunity because of the active engagement with students. It is that active engagement 
with students, "the extra hour with that person", that brings about that security, that 
consistency. So Joseph feels an obligation to students (as a supervisor) to help them pull 
out what they know, what he knows they know, that is not yet committed to paper. It is 
this process that secures consistency between the judgment of a person, a process and a 
product. For Joseph anyway, this is a validation process. 
While other staff also expressed the same tension- between assessment of person, 
product and process- they adopt different stances. In his assessment Frank 
acknowledges that "the student is on a journey, it is a process". "But," he argues, "I also 
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recognize that this is a product and it does in some ways need to stand on its own. It's a 
proposal. And so I don't want to read too much into it which isn't apparent, (that) isn't 
explicit" (Fra 00-2). Elsie feels quite strongly that it is only product that should be 
assessed. Her perception is that too much emphasis on a student's process runs the risk of 
under-prioritizing the quality of the product and this is potentially threatening to both her 
and the student. "I know there are students who struggle. I can see they are making an 
effort, but at the end of the day, when I look at the reports I struggle within myself. Am I 
doing this student justice in passing this report? Let's assume the report passes, that the 
student gets a job and the next thing when they get to the field, then people start blaming 
me, you see. 'Those black lecturers they employ at (SAU), now she taught us nothing'. 
So I'm scared for my reputation and also for the student. Professionally if I do something 
like that, it's unethical" (Els 99-1 ). 
In summary, these validating arguments give us some insights into supervisors' 
interpretive matrices, something of the 'environment' out of which their interpretations 
are born. The accounts expose a tension between the multiple functions which the 
assessment is serving. On one hand, the mark is a measure of product against some 
tacitly agreed notions which this community (within the wider context of the field) holds 
about ·good· research. On the other hand, the mark is a measure of process, a 
communicative exchange between a supervisor and a student. These functions create 
tensions because they privilege different contextual considerations, different forms of 
evidence. In its function as a measure of product, assessment interpretations may 
foreground products (e.g. the research proposal) and background processes (e.g. the 
drafts. the class discussions, one-on-one time with the student). In its function as a 
measure of process, assessment may privilege evidence from the student (e.g. their effort, 
progress. and attitude) and the immediate, local context of the classroom (e.g. the 
student" s ability in relation to the class). Of less concern from this perspective is the 
meaning of this mark outside the classroom. As Joseph argues, "It's a massive tension, a 
pern1anent tension" (Jos 98-1 ), but, I would argue, one which must be held, for neither 
function is dispensable, neither context can be ignored; all these forms of evidence 
constitute the supervisor's interpretation. 
\ 
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5.3.2.3 Collegial discourse 
I now turn to an analysis of validating arguments which emerge in a different context 
- the context of a marking workshop. Within the marking workshop assessors occupy 
different roles, for example, some are supervisors, some are not (I explain this below). 
My analysis of this collegial discourse seeks to establish how an assessor's role shapes 
his/her interpretive matrix. Do supervisors draw on different forms of evidence for their 
interpretations than assessors who are not supervisors? Does this result in different 
interpretations of student performance? If so, what is at stake in the negotiation of these 
differences? 
For my research purposes it seemed important to have access to collegial dialogue, 
that is, dialogue where assessors justify their interpretations to other colleagues. 
Although some Humanities staff would informally swap projects, a more formal 
occasion, such as a marking workshop, was not a feature of this particular community of 
practice. I thus made a request to the course convener for such a workshop and he agreed 
to organize and facilitate it with my assistance. He felt that such a discussion could be 
particularly beneficial to the new staff members. All staff received a letter from me 
in\'iting them to attend the workshop. The purposes given for the workshop were stated 
as: 
... We thought a discussion of the marking of (Hum300) projects would be useful for two 
reasons: 
1) (The convener) felt that this would be useful given that there are new people teaching 
· on the course who might appreciate some discussion around the criteria for marking. 
2) For the purposes of my research it would be useful for me to hear both the common as 
well as divergent assessments of those involved in marking .... 
(excerpt from letter dated 14 May 1998) 
Time constraints necessitated the selection of two research projects from the 
previous year (henceforth referred to as projects A and B) which had already been 
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marked by two members of staff who were in attendance at the marking workshop. As is 
common practice in marking workshops, the marks, the students' and supervisors' 
identities were all removed from the projects. As there were no commonly-agreed upon 
marking criteria, the workshop participants were simply asked to read the projects, 
allocate a mark and come to the workshop prepared to discuss and justify their mark to 
the group. A couple of weeks before the current year's project marks were due21 , a group 
of eight markers (out of ten), plus myself, gathered for one hour in the departmental tea 
room. The discussion was facilitated by the course convener, Dan. The first half of the 
workshop consisted of each assessor presenting their argument, that is, their mark and 
any justification. This was followed by a general discussion which consisted largely of 
assessors presenting further justification for the marks they had assigned. 
There was no final agreement on the mark for either project by the end of the 
workshop. The range of marks for project A was between 41% and 60% (with four out of 
the seven marks clustering around 50/51%) and the range for project B was between 40% 
and 67% (with four out of the seven marks clustering between 55-60%). The focus ofthe 
debate for project A was whether the project should be passed (as the supervisor argued) 
or failed. Given the significance of 65 in this department, the focus of the debate for 
project B was whether the project warranted a mark above 65% (as the supervisor had 
awarded). 
It became clear both during the workshop as well as in succeeding interviews that 
staff had their own ·theories' about why the workshop was unable to achieve agreement 
on \vhat marks to award the projects. I noted at the outset the artificiality of the exercise, 
that is. assessing projects that had been assessed by the supervisors in the previous year 
may have reduced the 'stakes' in this discussion22 , and curbed any push towards 
consensus. In interviews with staff (some but not all of whom had attended the 
workshop) other •theories · for difference were put forward. In the context of the 
'
1 These marks refer not to the projects under discussion, since as I noted they had already been marked, 
but to the projects which were being submitted in 1998. 
22 Mary argued in response to a draft analysis, "If we had been assessing instead ofta1king about assessing 




workshop discussion, Frank proposed that staff were either drawing on different criteria 
or weighing the same criteria differently. From the perspective of a new member of staff, 
he found this unsettling. Keith attributed differences between staff to "irreconcilable 
positions". He argued that staff comes with different ideological, political, 
epistemological positions, and those influence the "criteria" which staff use to assess 
student writing. For him these differences, while understandable, were "indefensible" 
(Kei 99-3). Similarly Elsie argued, "We have different research values, we have different 
opinions, we have different expectations, so it's very difficult to maintain consistency" 
(Els 99-2). Although consistency was desirable, she doubted whether it was achievable. 
In contrast, Dan argued that it was not different criteria for 'good' research that were at 
stake in the workshop. Staff, he argued, share a common understanding of what 'good' 
research is. Differences in assessment emerge as a result of different contextual 
considerations when assessment criteria are applied to student performance (Dan 98-2). 
And finally, Joseph agreed that there were indeed differences but from his perspective in 
a course like Hum300, consistency may not be desirable. "I think (Hum300) gives people 
(students) the opportunity to develop something which is their own. To work on it 
consistently with somebody who is marking it. To respond to the guidance of that marker 
knowing full well that it wouldn't be happening with another person. That something else 
would be happening with another person" (Jos 99-1). 
I turn to the analysis of validating arguments in the context of the marking 
workshop. The excerpt of argument which I have selected is taken from the very opening 
of the workshop where Keith and Mary present their marks and justification for them (see 
Appendix 2). For the purposes of this analysis my analytical point of entry is the text 
from which I move iteratively between text and context, drawing on other sources of data 
for the interpretation of the text. This context includes the workshop, the context of 
participants· practices (or the community of practice), and the broader departmental and 
institutional context. 
As noted above ( 4.3 .4) topic analysis is a form of textual analysis which attempts to 
get at what the speakers are talking about. Of particular interest are the ways in which 
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speakers chain topics together, and what these topic chains reveal about speakers' 
common sense notions. A cursory reading of this opening marking workshop discussion 
suggests that the topic is about Keith and Mary's assessment of the projects, or more 
specifically a disagreement between them over the assessment of project B. Keith has 
failed project B and Mary has passed it "generously" (MW 3223) with a 67%. However, 
an analysis ofthe various 'links' in the 'topic chain', that is, how the topic shifts, gives 
insight into some ofthe inferences which underlie assessors' interpretations. An analysis 
of the topic chain exposes the multiple functions which the discourse is serving. I focus 
on two main functions which this text is serving. This discourse is functioning 
ideationally, in what I argue is a contestation about what constitutes legitimate evidence, 
and simultaneously the discourse is functioning relationally in the interest of collegiality, 
what linguists refer to as facework. As noted above (4.3.4) 'face' is a term used by 
linguists to refer to the public self-image that people want to claim for themselves. 
'F acework' refers to the various strategies which people use in interaction to manage and 
minimize the threat to their own face and that of others (Ting-Toomey, 1994). 
In the excerpt of text I focus on four links in the topic chain, where each 'link' is a 
new topic. As noted in Chapter 4, of particular interest in this analysis is how the topic 
shifts and the ideational work which underlies these shifts. The first link (MW3-40) 
consists of Keith's argument and the topic of this text unit is clearly the projects, that is, 
the products which all the assessors have before them. Having pronounced them both 
.. terrible pieces of work" (3) the topic then focuses on project A (4-22): "the other 
one''24 (4). ''the A one'' (8), "this one .. .is very weak" (10), "(illjust trots ouf' (12), "i! 
just kind of ends" ( 14 ), "I think i1 has one reference" ( 18), "i! sort of it says" ( 19), "(ill 
doesn't refer to a single source" (20), "i! doesn't locate the topic" (21), "(it's) so very 
weak'' (21 ). The only exception is "if these were my students ... " ( 15-17), where the 
implied topics are Keith's supervision practices and his students. Then from lines 22-40 
where Keith discusses project B, once again the topic is the project: "this one ... this is a 
"' References to data from the marking workshop are labelled 'MW' and followed by the line number. 
Where it is clear from the context that I am drawing on data from the marking workshop, I have omitted the 
· MW' for ease of reading. 
24 I have underlined the actual referent to assist the reader in following the topic chain. 
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terrible piece of work" (22), "you passed!!" (24), "!!just goes nowhere ... !!just ends" 
(36-37), "it's got an appended ... " (38-39). Again there is an interesting exception in line 
(30-32). When Keith is asked to justify his low mark (29), he shifts the topic from the 
report to the student writer of project B. He moves from "this is a terrible piece of work" 
(22) to "well, I mean, this student just is going through the motions but doesn't 
understand what he or she is doing ... misreads tables, doesn't know how to actually do 
anything with the data ... contradicts what's in the tables ... " (30-33). It would appear that 
even though Keith does not know the student writer of project B, there is an inferred 
writer in view, one who in his judgment gets "plug" ( 40). 
In providing the other participants with a justification for his marks, Keith appeals to 
his "old marking schedule" (MW 4). What he means is that he has assessed these projects 
using his marking memorandum, the one which he uses to assess his own projects. It 
would appear that for him, this "marking schedule" serves as a kind of code for a whole 
range of expectations he has when he approaches the projects. He is looking for a certain 
level of methodological and analytical discussion, though what level is not made explicit; 
he is expecting an interview questionnaire in the appendix; he is looking for a certain 
level of coverage of the literature, though again how much coverage is not specified. 
Thus his marks signal the value of these projects in relation to a particular notion of a 
·good' research project, which for Keith these projects clearly are not. 
Later in the workshop, Keith again defends his assessment by giving some insight 
into the rationales that inform his mark: 
"Can I just say something .. .it sounds very mechanical and technicist but it's part of 
skills training for me. I want a student when they graduate from (Hum300) to 
know what an abstract is ... to do a table of contents, to do a decent cover, you know, 
with all the information. The same with an introduction, the review of the literature, 
you know, so every little brick of the report is important. And so I don't want a 
student to get away with just sort of doing a beautiful review of the literature (but) 
never learn to do research. The same thing goes for. .. reflexivity, reactivity, ethics 
that must be all those things must be there. I must tick them off. .. the problem 
comes into honours as you know yourself, even PhD ask a student 'write us a 
proposal' and they write us rubbish as though they've forgotten everything" (MW 
264-268*25). 
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In justifying his mark and his score sheet Keith gives us insight into the interpretive 
process that informs his assessment. For Keith the purpose of the course is skills training, 
providing students with a repertoire of research skills that they must be able to have and 
use to graduate so that they are able to transfer those skills to further postgraduate study. 
Thus for Keith a crucial contextual consideration is what the department values in its 
graduates. 
I now turn to the second link in the topic chain, Mary's argument (MW42-48) where 
a different picture emerges. Mary's discourse starts with the topic as the project: "I gave 
this one 67%" (42), "this is the one I did ... that one" (44). But then we note a topic shift 
from project B to the writer of project B: "this girl", "a really clever girl" ( 46), "I can't 
get her out of my mind" (47). We see in Mary's justification ofher mark a shift in topic 
from ·project' to 'person'. We note the same move later in the workshop when the 
supervisor of project A, Larry, justifies his mark which is higher than other markers have 
awarded. He argues, "You can't over-intellectualize these things, as a supervisor you 
know where the thing comes from and you know what the student has done ... "(MW 
1 07* ). and later in the workshop he defends the student even more emphatically, "Let me 
tell you something about this person ... " and goes on to talk about the student's 
.. enthusiasm", that he was "verbally very impressive", "very persuasive" (MW 188*), and 
that he put a tremendous effort into his interviews. Implied in Larry's defence of the 
student is that as a supervisor he is assessing a product but he also has a person and a 
process in view. that is. the manner in which the student and the research progress over 
time. 
''All references followed by an asterisk refer to parts of the transcript outside the selected excerpt. The 
numbers in brackets refer to text units in NYivo, not line numbers. 
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It is interesting to note that in presenting her argument, Mary does not refute the 
"criticisms" (MW 29) made by Keith. It would be tempting to speculate that this is a 
case of gendered relations, that is, a female of less seniority who may feel disempowered 
by a more senior male in an authority position26. I do not believe that this is the case 
however27 . I would argue that Mary actually agrees with Keith's assessment; she accepts 
that the project is not strong. She concedes, "There are lots of mistakes in here, this is 
wrong, that's wrong"(MW 59). It is rather the case that her interpretations of the 
student's performance are justified from a different evidential base. I return to this point 
below. 
In the third link of the topic chain (49-58) we note another significant shift from the 
student to Mary herself, specifically her supervision practices: "how much prompting did 
you prompt her on the analysis?" ( 49), "did l prompt her?" (50), "did you say ... " (51), 
"we all put the data in" (52), "you leave it up to them" (56), "we were running at a 
different pace" (57-58). We can only speculate about the motives underlying this shift of 
topic, presumably Oliver and Dan are trying to place the student performance in a wider 
supervision context. Dan follows Oliver's lead by asking, "then you leave it up to them, 
then you don't get a draft in and tell them to redo it?" (56). 
At one level Oliver and Dan are asking for information from Mary. I would argue 
however. that they are not simply asking for information; here we see the ideational and 
interpersonal functions of language simultaneously at work. I would argue that Dan 
suspects that Mary's supervision is not as thorough as it could be28 . But he is also aware 
of the risk that this inquiry may be perceived as a threat to Mary's face. In view of the 
26 As noted in Chapter 2 Starfield (200 I) shows the effect of gender relations on assessment discourse. 
27 When I suggested to Dan in an interview (Dan 00-1) that this might be an instance of deference on 
Mary's part. he discounted it. He noted that there was a "bedrock of respect" between Keith and Mary (e-
mail 18/9/99). In response to an earlier draft of the analysis Mary also strongly denied that she had deferred 
to Keith (e-mail 4/21/02). Keith also argued that this should not be interpreted in the "cliched 
gender/power way". He noted "I think (Mary) views me as her intellectual inferior (which I think I am)" (e-
mail 1110/02). 
28 Support for this argument comes from Dan in an interview (Dan 98-2). However, in response to an 
earlier version of this analysis he clarified that it is not that he is questioning Mary's competence as a 
researcher but that under the pressure of time, Mary's supervision is not as thorough as it ideally should 
have been (conversation, 27/9/02). 
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potential risk of threatening Mary's negative face, that is, the threat of intruding into her 
classroom practice, Dan constructs his question in such a way as to minimize the threat of 
interference29 . The tone of his inquiry is non-confrontational, almost apologetic. He 
foregrounds Mary's agency in relation to giving students independence, "you ... leave it 
up to them" (56). Ultimately Dan offers her a face-saving line of escape which she takes, 
"Urn you know I really can't remember that" (57). 
It emerges in an interview with Mary that there are a whole range of factors 
influencing her interpretation of project B. Unlike most of the option supervisors who 
allowed students to choose a particular question or problem within a designated interest 
area, in 1997 (the year project B was conducted) Mary and her students were involved in 
a group research project around Mary's own research. In my interview with her she 
describes the research process on which she and the group were embarked and how it set 
up its own particular set of possibilities and constraints. In terms of its possibilities 
students got experience of an authentic research project; this was a genuine problem to 
which real social science researchers were applying their minds. Students knew that the 
data they were collecting was data that might be used by Mary and others interested in 
this problem. This translated from Mary's point of view into a genuine interest in 
students· findings. as noted in her feedback on one student's proposal, "I will be very 
interested and so will other people researching this little understood contemporary South 
African (issue)" (excerpt from Mary's feedback on draft proposal). 
On the other hand. the authenticity of the research also threw up problems for the 
students. She explains that her group was "running at a different pace from the other 
(groups) because we were sort of held up by each other" (MW 57-58). She related in the 
interview how what had appeared to be a productive research route turned out to be a 
··cul-de-sac" (Mar 98-1 ). The students panicked when they perceived themselves to be far 
2
q Brown and Levinson ( 1987) present a range of strategies that speakers draw on to minimize the threat to 
face Some of the ways in which negative face is redressed are with "apologies for interfering or 
transgressing. with linguistic and non-linguistic deference, with hedges on the illocutionary force of the act, 
\\ ith impersonalizing mechanisms (such as passives) that distance the speaker and the addressee from the 
act. and with other softening mechanisms that give the addressee an 'out', a face-saving line of escape, 
permitting him1 her to feel that his response is not coerced" (p. 70). 
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behind their peers in other groups. Mary was also conscious that the project required 
types of quantitative analysis that many of the students were not adequately prepared for. 
Thus her supervision approach was closer to that of an apprenticeship, where the students 
were to some extent thrown into the deep end to experience first-hand the difficulties of 
social science research, albeit with her support and support from the group. 
So in her assessment of project B, Mary is considering a host of factors which 
inevitably influence her interpretation of this particular student's performance. She is 
keenly aware of the difficulties the students have had to overcome, some of which are not 
of their own making. She is also conscious of the fact that the students' projects are to 
some extent herproject. Thus in assigning a value to the students' projects, Mary is 
drawing on a range of contextual evidence, including her own role as supervisor. 
The final link in the topic chain (MW 60-70) is constituted by multiple and complex 
shifts. In line 59 Mary shifts the topic back to project B: "in here", "this is wrong", 
"that's wrong" (57-59). Mary shifts the topic to her marking practices: "I take", "I 
think", "I rank", "I chuck", "if you want me ... I can ... " (60-61). Keith contests the topic 
of Mary's marking practices: "that's not what we're here about" (63) where "that" 
specifically refers to "jack up my standards". Mary reasserts topic control, "no no that's 
what I"m saying" (64), and shifts the topic to academics' culpability ("our", "we", "our 
courses") in student failure ("the students" "them" "their" "25%" "wastage" 
' ' ' 0 ' ' 
··material") (64-69). 
For the purposes of this analysis I focus on the point at which Mary re-asserts 
control over the topic "no, no, that's what I'm saying ... " (64). I take this to be an instance 
of formulation. A formulation is a type of interactional control where a speaker attempts 
to ··win acceptance from others for his/her version of what has been said, or what has 
transpired in the interaction, which may then restrict the others' options in ways which 
are advantageous to the formulator" (Heritage cited in Fairclough 1992). Mary shifts the 
focus from herself to the staff as a group, "if students are doing so badly that's our fault", 
""we don't fail them", "we have to say", "our courses" (64-67). In part Mary seems to be 
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formulating an explanation for student failure which attributes collective responsibility to 
this group of academics, constructing a version of reality where academics are complicit 
in and culpable of a failing educational project, that is, the production of good graduates. 
As noted earlier there is a commonly held perception that the department is a faculty 
'catch pool' for some of the poorest quality students. It emerges (outside the workshop) 
that Mary feels that her research option is, in turn, the 'catch-pool' for weaker students in 
the course who for a variety of reasons self-select into her group. She refers to them as 
"the rump end of student talent" (e-mail, 28/5/98). According to her calculations 32% of 
the 1998 student cohort for the Hum300 course had to repeat their second year. The 
failure rate in her group, 38%, is above the average. She remarks, "I have the impression 
that most of my (students) scrape along at 52, and (I) look enviously at those (colleagues) 
who've got the highfliers" (e-mail, 28/5/98). 
Against this background, Mary formulates a version of reality which couples 
students "doing so badly" with "our fault" (MK 65). She attributes collective 
responsibility to this group of academics (and perhaps the institution) for the production 
of poor graduates. I speculate here that Mary is not inferring that student failure is a 
, result of her colleagues' poor quality of teaching, but rather the "fault" lies in admitting 
weak students in the first place, and passing them from year to year. Thus the dilemma 
which Mary poses is the inescapable realities ofthe social-political context as an 
influence on assessors' interpretations of student performance. What academic in good 
conscience can fail a student in third year who should not have been passed into third 
year. or who should not have been admitted to the university in the first place? This 
illustrates the dilemma posed by competing discourses, which I noted above ( 5 .2.1 ), of 
equity and access, on the one hand, and efficiency, excellence and competition, on the 
other. 
In addition to creating a particular version of reality, Mary's discursive shift from 
herself to the group may also be a strategy of minimizing threat to her face, in other 
words. diverting attention away from herself to the culpability of the group. Reflecting 
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back on this "complicated interplay" between Mary and Keith, Dan notes that meetings 
such as this can be "dangerous moments" for academics (Dan 00-1 ). Perceptions of 
professional incompetence can result in "real sanctions", what Dan refers to as the 
"power relations of collegiality". "People can close doors to you in areas you want to 
teach in, close committees to you where you want to be, close sabbaticals to you ... all 
sorts of things ... these are things that academics struggle very hard over" (Dan 00-1). 
To what extent is Mary's version of reality shared by others in the group? Oliver 
distances himself from it or at least aspects of it. It is "certainly not all our fault" (MW 
70) he declares. In contrast Dan expresses solidarity, "No, I think that is important" (MW 
71). Later in the workshop, in relation to justifying why report A should get a "50", he 
elaborates "I think this is not good enough for third year research. But I would pass it. 
I'd give it 50 .. .it's coherent enough to not be (too) terrible. But secondly I think that 
(SAU) needs to exclude this kind of person from getting into (here), and we're not. We're 
under pressure in this faculty to accept these sorts of people. So we accept them in first 
year, they just get through and then (they) reach their third year and I think it's a problem 
to then fail them" (MW 158*). 
Sensing a rising tension in the workshop, Dan attempts to bring about resolution by 
affirming supervisors' "freedom of approach": 
"I'm not against a different approach. I think Mary gave them the experience of a 
survey. and then said, 'Look, go for it and see what you come up with'. And ifyou 
take that approach, I think you have to mark within that approach. That's why I 
wouldn't judge this (project B) by Keith's (criteria) because they (the students) 
didn't get what Keith told them ... my own personal opinion is there has to be 
freedom of approach ... I think you to some extent have a personal way of marking. 
depending on what you've told them" (MW 248*). 
I would argue that Dan's argument for "freedom of approach" is discourse 
functioning both relationally and ideationally. In terms of its relational function, Dan, as 
chair of the meeting, is attempting to minimize any further threat to participants' face, 
.. 
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particularly Mary's. But Dan is also trying to articulate something about the nature of 
academic professional judgment. Later in an interview Dan reflects back on Mary and 
Larry's assessments in the marking workshop and re-iterates the importance of giving the 
supervisor "freedom of approach" (Dan 99-1 ); it is the supervisor who defines the 
problem, they know what they have told the students and "(they) have to mark within that 
framework" (Dan 99-1 ). For this reason he argues, "the culture of (Hum300) is to give 
high autonomy to the lecturer (supervisor) because only they know what was defined" 
(Dan 99-1 ). But, in yet another interview, he qualifies this "freedom of approach"; "there 
is (however)", he argues, "such a thing as better research .. .it is not just an arbitrary 
thing ... things are not totally relative" (Dan 00-1 )30. 
Some ofthe participants in the workshop are disquieted by Dan's "personal way of 
marking" approach. In response to Dan, Mary responds, "But we ought to agree to 
norms, (to) standardize ... otherwise students are at the mercy of our idiosyncrasies" (MW 
250*). Frank, who describes himself as the "new boy on the block" (MW 199*), argues 
for commonly agreed benchmarks, for example, the minimum requirements for passing 
and for achieving 65%. He concedes, "Maybe it's an impossible task but ... for me it 
would be better if we had some sort of common understanding" (MW 252*). Later in the 
workshop. he proposes again, "I really feel it would be beneficial for students if there was 
some sort of common ground that their marks were occupying, rather than huge 
ditTerences"' (MW 312*). 
In an attempt to move toward consensus, Dan suggests that they go around the room 
and each participant put forward the conditions under which they would fail a student 
(MW 283 * ). He meets resistance from the group. Mary responds, "In the abstract I find 
it very hard to say whether (a student) is going to fail" (MW 287*). Dan's suggestion is 
not taken any further. The topic changes to how to deal with projects which are blatant 
plagiarism and the workshop adjourns. 
1
" In both the Dan 99-1 and Dan 00-1 interviews Dan is giving me feedback on earlier versions of my 
analysis. Dan wrestled in particular to articulate his position as an assessor, a position which was neither 
objectivist or relativist. 
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5.3.3 Conclusions 
I have explored in this analysis assessors' socially-situated validating arguments. My 
analysis set out to expose some of the dimensions of disposition, what I refer to as the 
assessor's interpretive matrix. Socio-cultural and interpretivist approaches to assessment 
have stressed that 'context matters'. Thus my study set out to explore these contextual 
'matters'. Supervisors' accounts of their own interpretive processes reveal a complex set 
of contingencies which they are balancing. These include the tension between the mark 
as a measure of the product and the mark as a measure of the process. The analysis of 
collegial discourse suggests that different assessor roles will inevitably give differential 
priority to these assessment functions. These functions privilege different kinds of 
evidence, and may generate different interpretations. Keith draws on evidence primarily 
from the project and his point of reference is the context of the course and the kind of 
graduates the department values. His interpretation appeals to a set of implied standards 
against which the performance is to be measured. Mary's interpretation is premised on a 
different evidential base: what she knows about the student, the class, the research 
process and her particular role as a supervisor, as well as the broader social-political 
context and the inevitable compromises this poses. While not denying the standards to 
which Keith appeals, Mary privileges the 'particular' in its more immediate setting. 
A consequence of these different matrices is that assessors will not necessarily agree; 
Mary passed the project and Keith failed it. Thus I posed the question, what is at stake in 
this negotiation ofthese differences? I argued that the discourse is simultaneously 
functioning relationally, that is, in the interest of collegiality, and functioning 
ideationally, that is, there is a contestation between the different purposes which 
assessment serves. One of the stakes in this discourse is collegiality. While these 
academics argue strongly for different interpretations of the performance, they do so 
conscious of the potential threat of these arguments to their own and others' face. 
The other issue at stake in this discourse is this community's perception of 
themselves as a community that can come to consensus, a community that does share a 
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common professional vision of what constitutes 'good' research: Underlying this 
discourse may lurk some form of Cartesian anxiety (as discussed in Chapter 3). At the 
heart of this anxiety is the belief that as assessors we are faced with a choice between two 
alternative forms of rationality. One (what Bernstein refers to as 'objectivism') is the 
quest for 'standards', for 'fixed points', for 'common ground' against which performance 
can be measured. The other alternative (what Bernstein refers to as 'relativism') is a 
resignation to the reality that there is no 'overarching framework' to which we can 
appeal, there are no 'fixed points'; there are only 'your' standards and there are 'my' 
standards. For this community another significant stake in the resolution of difference is 
the implications of dissensus. What does dissensus imply for the kind of rationality that 
informs their interpretations of student performance? 
While the marking workshop discourse constitutes this anxiety, that is, the 
perception of these forms of rationality as an either/or proposition, I argue that the 
members of this community do not hold either of these alternatives as viable options. 
Indeed their very own practices are a testimony to a different kind of rationality, one 
which is "beyond objectivism and relativism" (Bernstein 1983), one which eschews the 
antinomy of objectivity and subjectivity (Bourdieu 1990). Their accounts are articulations 
of an alternative rationality, one which moves iteratively between the general and the 
particular: between on the one hand. a community's abstract and latent notions of what is 
good. acceptable and appropriate, and on the other hand, a specific instance of a person's 
product as an outcome of a particular process. Academic professional judgment is 
constituted out of this tension. I tum now to my second case study in order to further 
elaborate on the rationality which characterizes academics' assessment of student 
performance. 
5.4 Engineering Case Study 
5.4.1 Validating Practices 
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My second case study focuses on the community of practice whose enterprise is the 
assessment ofthe final year projects31 in one ofSAU's Faculty of Engineering 
departments32 . These projects are a requirement for all ofSAU's engineering 
programmes and a standard feature of many engineering programmes around the world 
(Jawitz et al 2002). This community of practice consists of all the academic staff that are 
members of the Engineering department (a group of about twenty in 2000), the external 
examiners (a group of seven in 2000), and one administrator from the department (see 
Appendix 3 for data on Engineering staff who participated in the study3\ 
Like the Humanities department, the Engineering department had experienced a 
significant growth in both numbers and diversity of students in the 1980s. More recently 
there had also been some changes in the staff composition as the department had been able 
to appoint a number of black academic staff34. In contrast to Humanities, however, the 
Engineering department had been largely unaffected by both the institutional and national 
policies for programme re-structuring. Their primary external accountability is to their 
professional body (Engineering Council of South Africa) which had in the year of my study 
conducted an audit ofSAU's Engineering faculty. Although one ofthe objectives ofthe 
audit was to focus specifically on the alignment between learning outcomes, curriculum 
and assessment. for a variety of reasons, it had very little impact on Eng400's validation 
practices, the course in which the final year project is located. 
Consistent with the logic of the field and SAU's position within it. it became clear 
from my initial round of interviews that (with the exception of the administrator) the 
members of this community's primary professional loyalties lie with the communities of 
31 Since in the Engineering department staff often refer to the final year projects as 'theses', I use these 
terms interchangeably. 
3
" Henceforth when I am referring to the department I use the term 'Engineering department'. 
33 As in the Humanities case study, all the names have been changed to protect participants' anonymity. 
14 This is consistent with SAU's transformation agenda, as well as meeting the requirements of the 
Employment Equity Act of 1998 which required institutions to draw up employment equity plans and set 
equity targets against which future employment profiles would be measured. 
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practice where they hold membership on the basis of their research specialization, 
namely, their research communities. These research communities take many different 
forms: some are SAU-based research units which members of the department either 
direct or are affiliated to. These research units represent the archetypal accumulation of 
academic cultural capital. The successful units attract large research projects with multi-
national companies, generous funding, highly qualified and experienced staff, and top-
ranking postgraduate and undergraduate students. For others, not affiliated with a 
research unit, the research community is a less visible but no less significant 
specialization network which includes colleagues (nationally and internationally), 
postgraduate students, conferences, journals, and sources of funding. 
EF35, as a field of study, was characterized in many of the interviews as vast and 
highly diverse. The ex-HOD noted that the differences between two different areas of 
specialization within the department were as great as the differences between accounting 
and physics (e-mail, 2115/02). Another member of staff noted that demarcating the 
boundaries between EF and other fields within Engineering was "contested territory" (Ste 
00-1 ). He contrasted the field of EF to, for example, Physics, where, he argued, there 
would be a fair degree of consensus about what should be taught in the undergraduate 
curriculum. In contrast, ''EF isn't like that at all. It is much more diverse". To illustrate 
this diversity. he noted that two of the top rated EF departments in the world had virtually 
no overlap in their undergraduate curriculum (Ste 00-1 ). 
The diversity in the field was reflected in the wide range of specializations which the 
staff in the Engineering department represented. In fact there was a common perception 
among the staff that there were as many specializations within the department as there 
were members of staff (Rob 00-1 ). The ex-HOD noted however that, as staff left or 
retired. there was a deliberate strategy to recruit new staff to an area of specialization 
already present in the department. The department was home to four broad areas of 
specializations although the alliances within these areas were relatively loose. One 
Js When I refer to the specific field of engineering which is the focus of this department. I will use the 
designation 'EF', i.e. engineering field. 
/ 
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interviewee characterized his area as a group of people who share "the same passage way 
and have similar interests" but at the end of the day "people tend to go their own way" 
(Tho 00-1 ). A member of another area of specialization characterized it as a group of 
people who were working with the same technology but applying it in very different 
ways. Thus there was very little actual overlap in their respective research projects. He 
commented, "Everybody forms a group independently!" (Pet 00-1 ). Illustrating this 
independence, the course convener noted that the assessment of the final year projects 
was one of the few occasions when members ofthe·department came together as a group 
for significant business. All other activities (e.g. research, teaching) required very little 
interaction amongst colleagues (Dav 00-3). 
The process of assessing the final year projects proceeds as follows: in May the 
course convener calls for topics from the academic members of staff. There is no 
screening of these topics36; they are simply posted on a web-page and students select their 
top preferences. The convener then allocates students to supervisors depending on the 
topics they have selected. Students then have approximately three months to complete 
their research. The actual supervision process varies widely. Some supervisors meet 
regularly with their students individually or in groups, others make themselves available 
at students' request. Some supervisors require drafts, others do not. Students submit their 
thesis by the middle of October. After they submit, students are also required to give an 
oral presentation. and make a poster presentation. However, only the thesis counts 
towards the final mark. 
The supervisor is the first to assess the thesis. His mark and any comments he may 
have about the thesis37 are recorded on the official marking memorandum, not on the 
thesis38. Once the supervisor has completed his marking, the thesis then goes to a second 
internal marker allocated by the course convener. There is an attempt to allocate a 
second marker who has related expertise on the thesis topic. The second marker assesses 
36 I note this because pre-screening of topics is a practice in other departments in the Engineering faculty. 
37 In the year of my study all the academic members ofstaffwere male. 
38 This is to ensure that the second and third markers are assessing a 'clean' copy of the thesis and are not 
influenced by the supervisor's commentary. 
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independently of the first marker's mark. In addition to the thesis itself, the second 
marker is expected to attend the student's oral presentation, as well as the poster 
presentation39. If there is a significant discrepancy between the first and second marker, 
the thesis is passed on to a third internal independent marker. In 2000 the HOD 
requested that the first, second and third markers meet to arrive at a consensus mark prior 
to the departmental examination meeting. This was to avoid the situation where internal 
markers argued with one another in the final meeting with the externals. These gatherings 
are referred to as 'consensus meetings'. 
Finally, the theses are assessed by a team of external examiners. (I describe this 
process in more detail in 5. 4. 3 .1). These examiners are chosen for their expertise across 
the areas of specialization. In 2000, five of the external examiners came from three 
different South African universities and two from industry. Final discussion is held and 
decisions are made at the departmental examination meeting where the entire community 
of assessors. both the internal and external, is present. This whole process, from the 
supervisors' assessment to the examination meeting, takes place in a week. Thereafter 
some final adjustments may be made at a later departmental examination meeting where 
all the students' final year marks for all their courses are considered. 
The procedure for assessing the final year undergraduate thesis has evolved over a 
number of years under the leadership of the ex-HOD. He explained that a number of 
changes had been instituted to the system "to make the mark more fair and more 
representative of the value of the thesis" (Rob 00-2). For example, in the past supervisors 
would assess their students' theses and then simply ask a colleague to "check it" (Rob 00-
2). There was no external examination ofthe process. While there was seemingly more 
agreement in those days between the first and second marker (though it was impossible to 
verify). the current HOD felt that there was possibly "too much agreement" (Ken 00-2). 
Commenting on the previous system, he noted that it was too "palsy", with supervisors 
selecting year after year the same second marker. This resulted in markers 
··understanding each other's marking system and being able to guess very accurately what 
''' It was my impression that the majority of staff in the department did attend these presentations. 
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the (other) examiner is going to give the thesis" (Ken 00-2). From his perspective this 
constituted "bias". In contrast, in the current system where second markers are centrally 
appointed and assess independently, he noted, "If you give a thesis to someone who 
doesn't normally second mark your thesis topics, they don't know how you think ... I 
think that's quite a useful exercise. Because if nothing else it stirs the pot a bit and makes 
people think about what marks they're giving. Once you've got the two marks in front of 
you, (you) now have to worry about what the fair mark is for the thesis. If they're close, 
it's an average. If they straddle (a class) or clash there's bit of a problem ... " (Ken 00-2). 
This innovation of a second independent marker did result in some very wide 
discrepancies between supervisor and second markers. The ex-HOD believed that these 
discrepancies resulted from second markers reading the thesis "cold" (Rob 00-2). Thus 
the system was improved by adding more contextualization for the second markers. An 
oral presentation was introduced, not to test students' oral skills but to give second 
markers more information about the thesis. In order to get students to take the oral 
presentation seriously, it was given a mark but these marks were not included in the final 
thesis score. It was additional information that could be used in borderline cases, that is, 
when decisions hovered between a pass and a fail or between classes. Thus while the 
students had several opportunities to display their work. the final mark was "I 00% for the 
thesis" (Rob 00-2). The most recent innovation, again to provide more contextualization 
for the second marker, was that students were encouraged to invite the second marker to a 
demonstration40 . The ex-HOD, who was responsible for introducing this innovation. felt 
that this was "tremendously valuable. It answers a lot of questions, makes a big 
difference and helps you mark the thesis. It gives you some of that insight that the 
supervisor has got" (Rob 00-2). Another member of staff commenting on the value of this 
demonstration noted, "You see the project working at its best, which is good, I mean its 
fair to the student that he41 should be allowed to show the thing at its best" (Ant 00-2). 
~0 I was not able to establish how many students actually took advantage of this opportunity. I was under 
the impression that not many did. 
~~ While not a!l students were male, I noted that it was common for staff to refer to students using 
masculine referents. 
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5.4.2 Dimensions of 'disposition' 
The analysis of the Humanities case study seemed to suggest that depending on their 
roles (i.e. whether they were supervisors or non-supervisors), assessors will prioritize 
different assessment functions and different contextual considerations will be privileged. 
These different interpretive matrices may lead to different interpretations, as noted 
between Mary and Keith. In this second case study, I now tum to a more in-depth 
exploration of these differences of interpretation. 
The Engineering community of practice presents a particularly good opportunity for 
the exploration of difference for two reasons. Firstly, their validating practices open up 
these differences for scrutiny given that there are clearly assigned assessor roles (e.g. 
supervisor, second marker) and given that all staff come together to discuss these 
differences in the departmental examination meeting. Secondly, the year before I 
interviewed, this community had experienced a particularly problematic examination 
meeting which, I contend, served, in part, to de-naturalize their practices. (I elaborate on 
these problems in 5.4.2.1). The problems which emerged from the 1999 examination 
meeting became a useful springboard for staff to explore in interviews their own 
explanations for why differences emerge between markers. On the basis of interviewees' 
own explanations, I draw out some of the features of assessors' interpretive matrices42• I 
stress again that interpretive matrices are highly complex. My study makes no claim to 
comprehensiveness. Certain features have been highlighted and others have been left out. 
The features which emerge from my study are constituted, in part, by the particular 
contexts which I explored, as well as by the particular questions which I pursued; in other 
words, a different set of interview questions would have possibly raised a different set of 
features. I tum to a discussion of three features of assessors' interpretive matrices: 
specialization, experience, involvement. 
42 These features emerged from my NVivo analysis (described in 4.4.2.3.3) where I clustered the interview 
data into 'reasons' offered for discrepancy between markers. The 'reasons' which appeared most 
consistently across interviews were the ones which I pursued in further interviews. These then became 
themes which developed into features of the interpretive matrix. 
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5.4.2.1 Specialization 
The ex-HOD noted in an interview that although the system of assessing the final 
year projects had worked "fairly well" over the years, "the past two years (1999 and 
2000) there have been some problems" (Rob 00-3). An exploration of these "problems" 
exposed some divides in the community about what constitutes a "real engineering 
project"43 as well as what constitutes legitimate evidence for the assessment of projects. 
These divides manifested themselves in heated debates at the 1999 and 2000 
departmental examination meetings. In 1999 the contestation centred on some theses 
supervised by two members of staff, Richard and Victor. In the case of the former, he 
had given two ofhis projects first class passes whereas the recommended marks of the 
second marker and the external examiner were upper seconds. In the end he reluctantly 
accepted the recommended marks. (I return to his justification below). Victor's marks 
however were consistently higher than those recommended by the second markers and 
the external examiners, and he was unwilling to accept these recommended marks. The 
HOD at-the-time decided to send Victor's controversial theses off to a colleague at 
another university for yet another independent assessment. This independent assessor 
"vindicated" the lower mark of the second and external examiner (e-mail, 10/5/02). One 
of the members of staff gave his account of what happened: 
So maybe the supervisor who had clearly in his mind what exactly it was that he was 
setting, gave it (the thesis) a good mark. It would then go blind to a second staff 
member, who would look at it and say 'This is a strange thesis. It is just an essay. 
What has the student done? He hasn't done anything, (though) he has written fairly 
well, so we'll give it a 50. We'll pass it, we can't fail it'. But meanwhile the first 
examiner had given it (the project) a 70 because it's done exactly what he wants. 
Then it goes to a third (external) examiner who is in a quandary, who says 'Well, if 
this were in my university, I would fail it because it is not a thesis at all. But he (the 
student) seems to have done what the supervisor wants, so we had better give it 60'. 
And that happened again and again. And external examiners who were in that 
43 The 2000 Faculty of Engineering handbook describes the thesis as "an opportunity for the student ... to 
tackle a real Engineering project" (p. 177). 
position, who had to make that judgment, complained and said 'We think there 
should be more clarity on what is expected' (Ste 00-1 ). 
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Although the issue of what defines a "real engineering project" explicitly emerged as a 
problem for the first time in the 1999 examiners' meeting, Steven noted that this was not 
a new Issue. 
As I probed, some interviewees felt that the contestation in the 1999 examination 
meeting was an issue of content and form. Richard was part of the ES44 area of 
specialization and some staff members referred to projects from this area somewhat 
disparagingly as "essays" or "studies" in contrast to a "design product". In trying to 
clarify this distinction the ex-HOD elaborated: 
Generally an engineering project involves a design process- identifying a project, 
doing the design and completing the project. And it might be a piece of software that 
does a certain thing, it might be a piece of hardware. It could be something very 
practical. ... but generally it involves design. Whereas a number of projects were 
being offered (by ESS) which were a study: 'Investigate the efficiency of (a 
particular product) .... Investigate this as a viable product'. So it doesn't involve any 
design. It is a survey, it's a study (Rob 00-1). 
Reflecting on the 1999 contestation, he noted: 
We started to find big discrepancies between the supervisor and the second 
examiner, because the supervisor thought (these projects) were worthwhile, it must 
be worthwhile because companies like (X45) want it to happen. Whereas the second 
examiner said 'But this isn't a design project, it is not what engineers (do), it doesn't 
test the design process. So it is lacking'. And interestingly enough the second 
examiners took the side of the externals, and in fact they advised against (these kind 
of) projects, because it doesn't test the design aspect, which is a big chunk of an 
engineering degree ... The staff members concerned tried to defend this and argued 
44 While 'EF' refers to the field of study, I use the designation 'ES' to refer to an area of specialization 
within the field, i.e. engineering specialization. 
45 To protect anonymity of speakers, I have omitted any references to information or specialist discourse 
which would give away their disciplinary identity. 
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that if it is the sort of thing that people do when you go to industry, surely it ought to 
be a legitimate project" (Rob 00-1 ). 
One of the staff members whose students' theses were received unfavourably had a 
different view on what was legitimate. He described one of the particularly contentious 
projects from one of his "very good students" (Ric 00-1)46. The student's project had 
consisted of tackling a problem which had been troubling a particular industry for some 
time. He described it as "exploratory research" where the student needed to investigate a 
problem which would require a team of people and a number of years to tackle fully. But 
as a preliminary exploratory research, the project required the student to collect and 
synthesize theoretical, empirical and practical information which is intellectually 
complex. It was also logistically difficult to retrieve this information since "it's not 
written down", and "when one speaks to people ... you don't always get a consensus" (Ric 
00-1)47 • 
But the project was not assessed favourably by either the second marker or the 
external examiner. Commenting on their perspectives, the ex-HOD noted, ''The external 
examiners (supported by a number of SAU staff members) argued that 'just because 
industry employs engineers to do this work does not justify it as a suitable engineering 
theses topic'." He argued that from their perspective these theses lacked the "rigour" of 
the "'design and build and see how well it compares to your predictions' thesis". The 
external examiners concluded that while this type of thesis might be "acceptable", it 
would be difficult for the students to achieve good marks (e-mail, 21/5/02). From 
Richard's perspective this had a very unfortunate consequence: "One of our top students 
had done an important piece of work and got a second for it". As far as Richard was 
concerned, "he had been done an injustice" (Ric 00-1 ). 
46 To justify his confidence in this student's ability, Richard noted in a later interview that the student went 
on to Oxford University on a Rhodes scholarship. 
47 As further justification for the kinds of projects which ES set, Richard noted (in response to an earlier 
version of this analysis) that there are very real practical constraints (e.g. the cost and size of equipment) 
which made it impossible for those in the ES area of specialization to produce the kind of 'design, build 
and test' type of projects which some staff were arguing for. 
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The contestation was clearly not one of form and content only, but as Stephen noted, 
also methodological approach. "It isn't only in the actual subject matter; it is how one 
approaches the subject matter" (Ste 00-1). He describes the kind of projects set in his 
area where students "build a gadget". They spend all their time "getting it to work" and 
then "quickly write a report". In contrast the ES projects "look more like a sociological 
exercise to me than an Engineering one ... it seems to draw very little on anything that 
they have learned in their degree". Anthony broadens the contestation even further, 
beyond form, content and methodology, to the very nature of engineering as a field of 
study. He argues, "A major cause of disparity comes back to that personal understanding 
of what constitutes engineering, what constitutes a thesis, and what constitutes good 
work". Citing, as an example, one of the ES topics which focused on the "economic 
aspects" of some engineering problem, Anthony commented, "A few years back it made 
me raise my eyebrows a bit, 'Where is the engineering?'. But now I come to realize that 
it is engineering. Engineering and financial aspects are fairly inextricably entwined for 
them (ES staff)." He added, "But not everybody shares my broadness of view" (Ant 00-
1). 
Allan offered further insight into the contestation. He agreed that there may be 
different value systems which are shaping, on one hand, what Richard (and the industry 
with whom he is closely linked) would understand to be a 'good' project, and on the 
other hand, what other members of the community of practice would consider to be a 
'good' project. The problem is that neither proponent is being explicit about those values. 
Allan argues that Richard is locked into a "particular perspective" which is 
"exceptionally important". This perspective shapes how he designs his assessment and 
his projects and "industry is happy with that". But there has to be a "valuing" of the 
objectives of that project experience; "(these objectives) have got to be made explicit" 
(Ala 00-1). 
Although the externals vindicated the lower scores, the community did not achieve 
resolution on some fundamental issues: what is "real engineering" and what is a 
legitimate project? The ex-HOD noted ambiguously, "But we have now, I think we have 
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resolved it.. .I'm not sure we have resolved it" (Rob 00-1). One ofthe staff members 
whose students' theses were received unfavourably was less optimistic. Reflecting back 
on the contestation over what a thesis is, he noted, "It is a definite problem at the moment 
which is still outstanding and hasn't been resolved" (Ric 00-1 ). Another member of staff 
commented in response to whether the problem had been addressed, ''There has been 
some tea time discussion, that's all I'm aware of. I think it might be quite difficult to 
arrive at consensus" (Ste 00-1 ). 
Thus one of the features of assessors' interpretive matrices which emerges from 
interviewees' explanations is their very particular disciplinary specialization. Different 
specializations tackle different kinds of research problems from different methodological 
and epistemological approaches. These approaches will privilege different kinds of 
evidence, and it also emerges that communities of practice have ways of valuing 
particular kinds of approaches and marginalizing others. 
5.4.2.2 Experience 
As the interviewees reflected in particular on the 1999 examination meeting and 
more generally on the differences between markers, another feature of assessors' 
interpretive matrices which emerged was experience, that is, the extent to which 
individual markers have been socialized into the community of practice's 'ways of 
seeing'. Thus one of the theories for why (in some cases) such wide discrepancies 
emerged between markers was that new staff had not yet developed the common 
professional vision of the communit/8. 
The HOD felt quite strongly that the extent of difference between first and second 
markers was directly related to the number of new staff, and the department had had a 
number of recent appointments. His view was that it is "relatively easy" with experience 
to decide whether a project deserves a first, second or third class award. But he 
conceded, "not the first time". The problem of new staff was, he argued "symptomatic of 
university employment ... when a lecturer gets appointed here there is very little guidance 
48 It is not surprising that this 'theory' emerged given that one of the members of staff, Victor, who had 
been at the centre of the 1999 controversy was new to the department. 
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given to the person as to how to go about teaching, how to go about assessing, how to go 
about marking theses. If one comes in from an industrial environment, or another 
university environment, or another department within the university, the chances are that 
the things that one looks at and looks for in a thesis will be different ... " (Ken 00-1 ). 
Similarly another senior member of staff noted, "I think it is very hard, if you haven't 
assessed something like that before, how do you go about it? I don't know how you do it, 
they (new staff) don't get taught, they don't get instructions and they've got the sheet 
(marking memorandum) (but) they can interpret the labels which ever way they want to" 
(Pet 00-1). 
To the department's credit, new members of staff who were inexperienced as 
supervisors were given a light marking load, and in some cases shared a supervisory load 
with a senior academic. Nonetheless many of them admitted to struggling. Kevin, who 
was supervising for the first time, admitted to being unclear about how to go about the 
marking. He raised the dilemma of the student who does "good research" but produces "a 
fairly shoddy report". As a supervisor, "you know ... this is a very competent person. You 
would employ them. You would welcome them into your research group for post-
graduate work." But Kevin queries, "Are we simply trying to assess the report that they 
have produced or are we trying to grade them as individuals, as a measure of competency 
in carrying out a project?". In my first interview with him, he was hoping to find out what 
the "official policy" was on how to formulate a mark (Kev 00-1 ). When I interviewed 
him again several months later (after he had begun to assess), he noted, "I asked our 
HOD and several others, on what basis the thesis is judged ... there actually are no 
guidelines" (Kev 00-2). 
David gave a personal illustration of how his socialization as a marker happened. As 
a new member of staff he recalls feeling very unsure of his marking initially. In his first 
year he was "higher" than everyone, his second year he was "lower". A senior member of 
staff assured him that this "pattern" happens to everyone. 'This is the way in which 
people learn to adjust their marking," they told him. "You get in, you see 'oh this is how 
it's done', and you change ... " David points on the spreadsheet to the scores of a new staff 
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member who had given a student a 25%, "I mean, he won't do that again! He won't go 
there again and give a student 25! Ifhe really wants to fail him, he'll probably give him 
around 40 because he will get to see that people don't do that". When I commented that 
this trial-and-error system might be a somewhat publicly embarrassing for a new member 
of staff, he responded, "Nobody has to tell you anything. I mean ... you learn. You are in 
a place" (Dav 00-2). 
Thus the interviewees' accounts suggest that assessors' interpretations are born out 
of experience; that through membership in a field, over time, one becomes socialized into 
a community of practices' 'ways of seeing'. As one ofthe members ofstaffnoted, "one 
becomes imbued with a form of thinking" (Ric 00-1 ). The dilemma, of course, is that 
novice assessors have not yet developed this vision, and thus seek out an "official policy" 
(Kev 00-1) and guidelines which as the HOD noted "are not written down" (Ken 00-2). 
5.4.2.3 Involvement 
I tum now to the final feature to emerge from interviewees' explanations. Consistent 
with what emerges in the Humanities case, the analysis of the accounts suggests that the 
supervisor's involvement in the performance constitutes a significant feature of their 
interpretive matrix. That is, the supervisor is invested in the topic. The supervisor has 
access to a wide range of different performances which other markers do not have. The 
supervisor is not simply responding to a 'text' but to a person. What emerges from the 
Engineering interviewees, however, is not simply an acknowledgment of these 
differences of perspective (between, for example, the supervisor and the second marker), 
but a problematization of these more external perspectives which are often referred to as 
'cold' or 'blind' perspectives. 
The supervisor's involvement in the performance begins with the topic. In some 
cases the topic is directly related to the supervisor's research. Those supervisors who 
direct research units often set topics which contribute to the overall interests of the unit. 
Some topics emerge out of a joint research interest between the supervisor and a partner 
in industry (as noted with Richard's projects). Thus from its very inception the 
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supervisor has a particular intellectual interest in the project which the other markers may 
not share. As the topic designer the supervisor has some idea of the objectives, scope, 
possibilities, limitations (often based on previous attempts at similar projects) which 
contribute to a particular set of expectations. As supervisor, someone who knows the 
student, he may also have particular expectations. One interviewee noted, "I know for the 
student (with) whom I was familiar ... I know when I came to read his thesis, I already 
had a picture in my mind (of) what I thought he was capable ofbefore I read that thesis" 
(Kev 00-1). 
One interviewee responded to this issue of the supervisor's involvement with this 
insight: 
You read the acknowledgments. On virtually the first page of the document the 
writer acknowledges the contribution of the first marker. Because that's the 
supervisor, immediately the supervisor is tied up in the work, so the first marker 
can't stand right back and say: 'I am objectively assessing this report into which I put 
a whole lot of effort for the past three months'. You have got to be coming at it from 
a different direction. So the second marker is much more detached from it, (pointing 
to thesis for which he is second marker) this is a report from anybody. I don't know 
the person .... I'm not deeply involved in this project and thinking 'I know how it 
should have gone', or, 'Ja, he's done very well'. (pointing to a project for which he is 
the supervisor) This student here, I am involved. I identified this as a problem in the 
first place. I guided him in the study of it and here on the acknowledgment page: 
'Gratitude to my supervisor, my first marker for his input'. It would be foolish to 
think that the first and second marker can both be independent. The first marker is 
deeply involved in the project, every time (Tho 00-2). 
Does this investment impact on the supervisor's assessment of the project? "It 
should affect the marking because I, as the first marker, will give a final mark which 
depends on what I saw of the student, how he performed. I know how many of the ideas 
were mine and how many, if any, were his, for example" (Geo 00-2). Another marker 
noted, "The supervisor will have spent 2 to 3 months agonizing with the student over 
153 
various problems and during that time you get to understand how well the student deals 
with technical issues, how well they formulate them, how well they look at solving them, 
how quick they are at actually implementing the solutions and so on. And that definitely 
has a bearing (on the assessment)" (Ken 00-2). 
Further evidence for supervisors' involvement in students' projects was noted by 
several interviewees; they are sometimes responsible for problems which students 
encounter. Anthony gave a poignant example of this. He set a topic for a particularly 
"fantastic student" but as the student got involved in the project, Anthony realized that 
there was not enough "meat" in the project for the student to get a "good first". He 
admitted, "This was substantially my fault ... a case where a shortcoming on the 
supervisor's part effects the student's mark." Anthony felt that it would be a "travesty" if 
this student did not get a first class honours49 and so he asked to see the student's thesis 
outline "just to make sure he had put in everything that he could put in". The supervisor 
admitted that this might appear "manipulative", as well as "unfair" to other students 
whose work he did not get involved in to the same degree. However his bigger concern 
was that this student's overall capability would not be fully appreciated by the second 
marker. "(The student) would have killed himself in order to get to point X. And the 
trouble was that there wasn't that opportunity (in this project)". He acknowledged this as 
a case where "a shortcoming of the project or a shortcoming of the supervisor causes a 
student to, let's say, get stuck, or not display his full potential. And we need some 
mechanism for, for bringing that into the marking process" (Ant 00-2). Another member 
of staff, Victor, felt even more strongly about this issue. "The blame that is on the failing 
of the student really should be put on the supervisor and not the student." He pointed to 
the terms of reference in the front ofthe thesis which the supervisor, in theory, negotiates 
with each student. If the student follows the supervisor's specific instructions, "Who 
should be failed?", he asked (Vic 00-1 ). 
As I probed these differences in assessor roles and the influence on the markers' 
assessment, interviewees expressed varying degrees of reservations about the soundness 
49 The Engineering faculty has what it refers to as the 'honours ruling'. In order to graduate with honours 
or distinction a student has to get a minimum number of points on their thesis. 
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of the interpretations which came from those more distant from the final project, for 
example, second and third markers and external examiners. As noted earlier the rationale 
underlying the existing validation system was to seek for greater consistency across 
multiple independent interpretations of performance. The theory is that the second 
marker comes to the thesis with expertise in the thesis area, with some contextualizing 
information, but with less investment in the student and the project, and thus, in theory, is 
more 'objective'. 
However interviewees commented on a number of aspects of the official procedure 
which did not always work out in practice. While in theory the second marker is 
supposed to be knowledgeable in the area of specialization, in practice, given the number 
of theses, the limited number of specialists in a particular area, and the need to balance 
workloads, second markers may not be as knowledgeable in the area as the supervisor. 
Even if they have expertise they may not know precisely what the supervisor had in 
mind, as the objectives of the project may only be implicitly signalled in the project. 
Nearly all the staff commented on the difficulty of the second marker role. One 
noted, "You don't know the student" (Ric 00-1). Another commented, "My biggest 
problem is to find out exactly what the student did" (Geo 00-1 ). They also pointed to a 
number of potential 'blind spots' which the second marker may experience. For 
example, projects which depended on software were particularly difficult for second 
markers to judge. A student might produce something which is "really quite fantastic 
from a hobby point of view but there's a question as to how much of that design and 
manufacture has actually been done by the company ... .1 think that the supervisor would 
know and see that but the second marker may not, it depends on their expertise" (Ken 00-
2). George confirms this, "The danger is because I am the second marker and didn't 
know too much about the computer aspects of it, I was perhaps too easily dazzled by the 
computer expertise which these students display ... " (Geo 00-2). Another 'blind spot' 
which the second markers may experience is that a student's language skills might 
conceal conceptual problems. In other words, the student's actual understanding of the 
material is very weak, but the thesis is a "glowing communication in the language that the 
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student has mastered superbly"50• This is a "definite problem" which a second examiner 
may or may not see through (Ken 00-2). 
Another member of staff was more critical. In response to a query about a particular 
second marker's assessment of one of his students, he noted, "I think he (the second 
marker) failed to interpret, apparently he is not so sure about what (a certain procedure) 
is ... I think that one of the (reasons) that students are failing here is not because they are 
supposed to fail or students are passing, not because they are supposed to pass, but 
simply because the second examiners, they don't know, you see. Theses ... they are just 
thrown at us. 'Mark this. You are the second marker', when in fact you don't know" (Vic 
00-1). 
Assessors also problematized the extent to which second markers' viewpoints were 
independent and the extent to which this independence was a good thing. David noted 
for himself that part of the psychology of being a second marker was to "avoid conflict". 
He explained that if he knew that a particular first marker had a reputation ofbeing 
generous, he would assign his own marks accordingly. "In general I wouldn't want to 
pick up a fight, I have enough work to do" (Dav 00-3). In contrast Stephen describes a 
reverse adjustment, "Some of my colleagues are known to be generous in their marks, 
and certainly if I get a thick one to mark from one of them, I think of pulling it down and 
vice versa." David concludes, "Basically what I am trying to get at (is) it's not as 
independent as, it's not like I go and look at this thesis and I mark it independently of who 
the student is or who the first marker is and what topic it is." Stephen concludes, "I think 
there is a whole complex thing that goes on" (Ste 00-1). 
Under the new system of independent markers, dialogue between the first and 
second marker prior to allocating a mark was "discouraged" (Rob 00-2). The ex-HOD 
commented, "It would be totally unprofessional to go to the first marker and ask him 
what he got" (Rob 00-2). Some were sceptical, however. "People talk of transparency ... 
5° Kenneth was referring to students who are fluent first language speakers of English, who have benefited 
from secondary schooling which has equipped them we11 for oral/written presentations, and in addition they 
may be technologica1ly very competent with Power Point presentation and other software packages. 
156 
first and the second marking independently, but you will never know what happens" (Vic 
00-1 ). Others were not sure that it was appropriate, "One talks about trust ... it means the 
staff are going to assess things as honestly as they possibly can. But they should be able 
to go to their colleagues and say, 'Tell me a bit about this', or otherwise say 'I don't 
know, I think this looks like maybe a 63 or 64. What do you think?' or 'What have you 
given it?' And in fact amazingly often it is very very close. And if the other person said 
'Hell I thought it was worth a first', then I think you should say 'Well, perhaps I've 
missed something' and discuss it and go away and think about it again. And if you 
honestly don't think it is worth a first, then you give it to a third person and those can be 
difficult situations but that is the way to try and resolve that" (Ric 00-1 ). Anthony 
problematizes the notion that an independent judgment is likely to be the most fair 
judgment. "I think it might be a mistake sometimes because in a sense what we are 
saying is that we are not going to make a fair independent assessment if we communicate 
stuff outside of the thesis, you know, whereas the prejudice that you get by giving extra 
communication in context is virtually never against the student. I would say it is almost 
always in the student's favour so I have a bit of a problem with that" (Ant 00-1 ). 
Similar criticisms were raised against the external examiners. The HOD noted that 
South Africa is a small country: "It's almost impossible to find enough independent 
people with whom one is not doing research in one's own area" (Ken 00-1 ). 
Problematizing the perspective of the external examiners, Anthony comments, "Many of 
my theses have a very technical content and I find that's not acknowledged by external 
examiners and it's frustrating for me. For example last year I had a student who did a 
piece of brilliant technical work without much theoretical under-pinning and did so much 
superb technical work that I thought he had to get a first. But firstly the external examiner 
never sees the hardware, he just sees the thesis, but secondly he said 'There is very little 
actual theoretical knowledge displayed in this thesis ... to get a first you have to be a good 
theoretician as well as everything else' and I couldn't argue with (him)" (Ant 00-2). 
In summary, an analysis of these explanations for difference of interpretations 
suggests three features which contribute to the constitution of assessors' interpretive 
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matrices: an epistemological orientation that comes from the specialization, particular 
'ways of seeing' that are developed through experience, and a privileging of evidence 
based on different levels of involvement. As with the Humanities analysis, I now explore 
through the departmental examination meeting discourse how different assessors' roles 
constitute different interpretive matrices. The interviewees' accounts suggest that 
supervisors do draw on different kinds of evidence than second markers or external 
examiners and that these different evidential bases will result in different interpretations. 
Does an analysis of examination meeting discourse support this? Again as in the analysis 
of the Humanities discourse, I am interested in what is at stake in these negotiations 
around difference, and finally, how these differences are resolved. 
5.4.3 Where difference plays out: the departmental examination meeting 
5.4.3.1 The constitution of external privilege 
The assessment of the final year theses culminates in a day-long series of meetings. 
The first meeting is a gathering of the external examiners. The procedure in 2000 was as 
follows: the external examiners gathered in the staff room where they had available to 
them all the theses, the internal examiners' reports, and a marks spreadsheet. The 
spreadsheet consisted of the student name, thesis topic, the first marker's mark and 
initials, the second marker's mark and initials, the calculated difference between the first 
and second mark, (and where given) the third marker's mark and initials, and the 
consensus mark51 • The spreadsheet of marks was arranged by difference between first 
and second marker in descending order, in other words, the widest differences and thus 
most potentially problematic theses were at the top of the list. The externals started at the 
top of the list and focused on the theses that had the widest discrepancies between the 
first and second marker, as well as those which were borderlines. They identified 
approximately 40 theses for moderation out of a total of 84. These theses were divided 
among the external examiners according to their specializations (on average 5-7 theses 
each), and a few theses were looked at by two externals 52• 
51 The consensus mark is the outcome of the consensus meeting, that is, the meeting of the first, second, 
and third internal markers which happens prior to the examination meeting. 
52 It would seem that external examiners 'doubled up' on theses which they felt might be particularly 
sensitive cases, as evidenced by the first dispute (discussed in section 5.3.3.2). 
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The general feeling among the staff interviewed is that the role of the external 
examiners is two-fold: firstly, to arbitrate where there are discrepancies between internal 
markers, and secondly, to assist the staff in selecting the top thesis. One of the members 
of staff described the arbitration process: "Occasionally you get a vast discrepancy and 
the way we work is, we don't fix those discrepancies. Those are (given) to the 
externals ... they skim through the thesis and then from comments that are written down, 
they try and ascertain, well, they come down on the side of one or the other. And 
generally they pick one or the other of the sort of high or low, they don't average the 
mark or anything" (Car 00-1). 
Although there seemed to be general agreement that the primary role of the externals 
is to arbitrate between internal markers, what was less clear is what procedurally should 
happen when an internal marker contested an external's recommended mark. Where did 
the final authority lie? The HOD argued that there was no single person with whom 
authority resided; it was the departmental meeting's judgment of the strongest argument. 
Another member of staff also denied that the externals had final authority. He argued 
emphatically that if he needed to defend a student who had done "a good piece of work", 
he would. If he is challenged by the external, "I say, 'I can't accept this' ... that's the 
reason why we are there, to discuss those issues, not just to keep quiet" (Pau 00-1 ). The 
ex-HOD noted that there was, in fact, no official policy on this matter; "It wasn't really a 
problem for us until the last two years ... we seemed in the past to get to consensus" (Rob 
00-3). 
In the afternoon all the external and internal examiners came together in the 
examination meeting to consider the marks recommended by the externals. The 
gathering was chaired by the HOD who was chairing for the first time. Everyone had a 
copy of the spreadsheet of marks (excluding the externals' marks). After introductions 
the chair opened the meeting by reminding the gathering that the "intention" of the 
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meeting was to "go through the results of the thesis projects" (DEM 1053). He reminded 
the participants of the procedure which had been followed. The chair then started at the 
top of the spreadsheet (the same one ordered by discrepancy) and read out the student's 
name and the series of marks allocated to the thesis: the first mark, second mark, the third 
mark and consensus mark (where given), and finally the external's mark (see Appendix 4 
and 5, line 1-2 for examples). If anyone had an objection, it had be made at this point. 
"Otherwise", as the chair noted at the beginning of the meeting, "we will go with the 
mark recommended by the external examiners" (DEM 14 ). 
Despite the HOD's perception that authority lies in the strongest case, an analysis of 
the meeting discourse as well as the exchange structure 54, suggests that there may be 
particular structural constraints in the genre 55 itself which affect the extent to which 
supervisors feel free to present their case. The discourse of the meeting was relatively 
formal. This formality was evidenced by particular meeting protocols which were 
adhered to, for example, the chair was often referred to as "Mr. Chairman", participants 
often raised a hand to indicate that they wanted to speak, at various points the chair asked 
the meeting "to rule" (B 35) in favour of a particular decision. This is a discourse which 
gives pride of place to administrative efficiency and unambiguous decision-making. At 
various points in the meeting, members of staff, particularly one new member of staff, 
attempted to use the meeting to explore some of the ambiguities of the procedure and 
assessment issues more generally. The dominant administrative discourse of the meeting 
however, constructed these explorations as divergences, and the chair urged the meeting 
back to the business at hand. 
The typical exchange structure for these disputes is that the chair reads off the list 
marks, starting with the supervisor's mark and ending with the external's recommended 
53 References to the departmental examination meeting text which are not included in the appendix are 
referenced as 'DEM' and the number refers to the Nvivo text unit. 
54 As noted in Chapter 4 (4.3.3) 'exchange structure' refers to the pattern of tum-taking between 
participants of a conversation. Analysis of exchange structure can illuminate interactional control, i.e. are 
the relations between speakers symmetrical or asymmetrical in terms of degree of the control? (Fairclough 
1992). 
55 As noted in chapter 4 ( 4.3.3) 'Genre' refers to "a relatively stable set of conventions that is associated 
with, and partly enacts, a socially ratified type of activity" (Fairclough, 1992). 
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mark. As noted above, unless someone spoke up at this point, the external's 
recommended mark became the 'final mark'. If a supervisor (or second marker) chose to 
dispute a mark, the onus was on the supervisor to justify why his mark was different to 
the external rather than the onus being on the external. The external then offered his/her 
justification. Thus in terms of the exchange structure the external often had the last word 
(as illustrated in dispute A, line 32-35). 
It emerged in interviews prior to the departmental examination meeting that 
supervisors were conscious of a difficult dynamic that the meeting sets up. In contrast to 
Paul's adamant claim that he would "not keep quiet" (Pau 00-1 ), other supervisors were 
more circumspect. Anthony noted, "The trouble is that having invited these 
examiners ... one can't then contradict them ... they are the final arbiter of what goes on" 
(Ant 00-2). One of the staff members who had been at the centre ofthe 1999 contestation 
(discussed in 5.4.2.1), noted in response to my question about whether he felt he could 
defend his marks, "It was very hard in a staff meeting of about twenty people, discussing 
a hundred student project marks" (Ric 00-1 ). One of the more senior members of staff 
noted that "it takes quite a lot of chutzpah to stand up and say you don't agree with this 
mark allocated by the external examiners and they are all sitting around the table" (Pet 
00-1). 
Another constraint on supervisors presenting their case is what the ex-HOD referred 
to as the 'wounded supervisor syndrome', that "you just argue for a student because they 
are your students" (Dav 00-3). Anthony illustrated from his own experience the 
supervisor's dilemma: 
Last year I had two students who got upper seconds and both should have got firsts, 
I believe. And both on the average of everybody's marks were sitting at upper second 
level and .... you can't argue every one of your students up, even if they all deserve up. 
In that case I had to say, 'Gee I can argue fiercely for one of these guys and ifi argue 
fiercely for both, I'll run the risk that neither of them will get promoted because I will 
just come across as a person who wants all the students pushed up a grade'. And so you 
do a kind of triage you know, you kind of decide maybe I can get him up, maybe I can't 
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get him up, which is a bit horrible. It's not an ideal situation (Ant 00-1 ). 
Thus I would argue that while officially there was no clear position on where the 
final authority lies, and while some interviewees argued quite strongly that final authority 
lay in the strength of the better argument, an analysis of the actual genre suggests that the 
meeting itself (in its discourse and exchange structure) may have in fact privileged the 
interpretation of the external examiner, effectively granting the external the last word. (I 
will illustrate this in the next section when I turn to the analysis of the actual disputes). 
Interviewees' accounts of their own experiences also serve to endorse these constraints. 
"I will speak out ... but you need to be careful," notes David (Dav 00-3). 
5.4.3.2 What's at stake? 
It needs to be stated at the outset that the overall dynamic of this particular 
examination meeting was one of tension. One member of staff declared that the meeting 
was one of the worse that he had ever attended in his long career at SAU (field notes, 
16/11101). I turn to an analysis of the validating arguments with a particular interest in 
some ofthe underlying causes ofthis tension: what is at stake in the negotiations of these 
differences? 
Before turning to the analysis of the actual arguments, the quantitative data reveals 
that some degree of discrepancy between first and second markers is a standard feature of 
more recent departmental examination meetings. Table 1 summarizes the discrepancy 
patterns for the final year projects over a three year period by class difference 56 • This 
data indicates that there appears to be less discrepancy between first and second markers 
in 2001 where a total of97% of the projects have a difference of one class or less 
compared to only 82% and 88% in 1999 and 2000 respectively. However a discrepancy 
of one class (which even in 2001 is 41%) is not insignificant especially when it is the 
difference between a fail and a third class pass, or an upper second and a first class pass. 
56 A 'class' refers to the category of mark which the student is awarded, for example, first class is an award 
of 75% and above, a second class award is between 60% and 74%, a third class award is between 50% and 
59%. Thus a 'one class' difference is, for example, where one assessor has awarded the project a second 
class and another assessor has awarded it a third class. 
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Thus this analysis takes discrepancies between assessors as a given. The point of interest 
is what underlies these differences, what is at stake in their negotiation, and finally how 
these differences are resolved. 
Table 1: Final year project discrepancies between first and second markers: (1999-2001) 
Year Same class One class Two classes Three classes Four classes 
1999 T=102 38% (39) 44% (45) 17% (17) 1% (1) 0 
2000 T=84 49% (41) 39% (33) 7% (6) 2% (2) 1% (1) 
2001 T=103 56% (58) 41% (42) 3% (3) 0 0 
My analysis of the validity arguments focuses on the disputes since it is through 
these collegial exchanges that justifications for assessments are exposed. 'Dispute' refers 
to the situation where one of the assessors, usually a supervisor, would contest the 
external examiner's final recommended mark. There were 16 such disputes in 2000, and 
not surprisingly, the majority of them were disputes over the award of a first class pass or 
the award of a failing mark. Out of the 16 disputed cases in the meeting, six of them 
concerned disputes over the award of first class passes (i.e. projects where the supervisor 
awarded a first class pass and the external marker pulled the mark down). Five of the 
disputes concerned the award of a failing mark (i.e. projects where the supervisor passed 
it and the external examiner failed it). In all but one dispute, the external examiner's 
recommended mark became the final mark. 
Crucial to the contextualization of the disputes which I focus on in more detail is the 
opening dispute. This centres around a thesis which the supervisor, Paul, awarded an 
81%, the second marker, Victor, awarded a 40%, and the external examiners (two of 
them in this case) awarded a 70%. No third marker had been appointed since the course 
convener did not feel that there was anyone in the community with sufficient expertise in 
this area of specialization. In his justification for his mark, Paul gives a detailed 
explanation of the task and the various steps which the student had taken in order to 
complete the task. Paul stressed that the work was "his (the student's) own development, 
nobody else's", "he worked independently ... and very little did he draw from the 
supervisor. . .in order to do what he did. So based on that... this is in fact a first class 
pass" (DEM 20). 
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There ensued a heated debate between the supervisor and the external examiners, 
who conceded that the thesis had many strengths, but "we felt that there were not many 
original ideas" (DEM 28). "I would classify it as a good report, I just thought that it fell 
short ofbeing outstanding because the results, the discussions, that could have been done 
a little bit better. But it is a good report" (DEM 61). There was also a tense exchange 
between the second marker, Victor, and one of the externals, Ella. In addition to 
providing justification for why the thesis should fail (his main criticism seemed to be that 
the student had not accurately labelled the axis of his graphs), Victor appeared to be 
questioning whether the externals could do justice to their task. He says to Ella, "I don't 
know whether you went through it (the thesis) carefully. I'm quite aware your time is 
limited" (DEM 36). And again, "Your time is limited but if ... you go into the most 
technical details of (the thesis) and what the student was supposed to do ... basically it's 
just a useless report" (DEM 40). She responds, "I cannot agree" (DEM 42). At a point of 
seeming deadlock, the chair turned to the ex-HOD for a 'way out'. He responded, "Look, 
we've got two external examiners who are world authorities in this field, and I, I suggest 
we respect their opinion, which is 70%" (DEM 65). 
I would argue that this opening dispute which was characterized by confrontation 
between the internal examiners, as well as confrontation between the external and 
internal examiners, contributed to an atmosphere of tension which pervaded much of the 
meeting. In addition, reflecting back on this particular dispute the ex-HOD also argued 
that the fact that Victor's award was so severely out ofline with the supervisor's and the 
external examiners' resulted in him being discredited. He was perceived as the "odd man 
out" (Rob 00-3). 
The excerpts which I chose for analysis are the second and third disputes of the 
meeting (henceforth referred to as disputes A and B respectively). I chose dispute A 
.t 
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because it best illustrates the typical exchange structure of the meeting. I chose dispute B 
because it best illustrates a disruption to the norms which constitute the meeting. In the 
analysis I focus on the kinds of evidence which assessors draw on to support their 
justifications. I also focus on the facework, that is, the strategies which participants in the 
meeting use to protect their own face or to maintain or threaten others' face. As I noted 
in Chapter 4, one of the ways for getting at facework is through the analysis of modality, 
that is, the degree of certainty or conviction with which utterances are expressed. I noted 
how modality can signal both the degree of commitment to an utterance as well as the 
degree of solidarity the speaker has for other interactants. Thus participants' discourse 
may reveal the balancing of two desires: the desire to express a strong conviction (high 
modality) with the desire to maintain collegial relations (low modality). 
Starting with dispute A (see Appendix 4), I focus on five units of text which 
correspond to each of the speakers' input in the dispute: (A5-8), (A 8-16), (A22-25), 
(A26-32). The chair begins with "the supervisor gave it (the project) 88, second marker 
gave it 72, third marker gave it 69, and the consensus mark was 75, and external 
examiners recommend a 70" (A1-2). 
The first text unit (A5-7) cannot be re-constructed in its entirety due to poor 
audiotape quality of this section of the recording. (This prevents me from commenting on 
the modality). The supervisor awarded the student a high first class pass (88%). The 
evidence he gives in support of this mark appears to be on the basis of the 
interdisciplinary nature of the task and that the student "seemed to get around and sort out 
information from a number of difference sources" (A6). 
In the second text unit (A8-16), the second marker, Robert, makes a strong case for 
the award of a first class pass, though his mark is not as high as the supervisor's. He had 
initially given the thesis a 72%, but had agreed in the consensus meeting to raise his mark 
to a 75%. The evidence which he offers in support of the higher award is that "it (the 
report) is entirely self-initiated, had almost no support from the supervisor whatsoever" 
(A11-12), "the student had worked entirely on his own" (A14-15). This evidence appears 
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to have been gathered from a discussion with this student where he heard "the student's 
story of how he went through this project" (Al0-11). Not only does Robert provide 
evidence for his justification but he bolsters his argument by offering his views on what 
constitutes appropriate evidence. He argues, "It's actually very useful to speak to the 
student and to see how the student approached the problem" (A8-9). He concedes that 
had he read the report "cold" (A13), he might have also given it a 69 or 70 as the third 
marker had. But having talked to the student and seen what the student had actually 
done, "I was convinced to raise the mark from 72 to 75 ... and I think that it's important to 
take that into account" (Al6). 
An analysis of the modality of this unit suggests that Robert felt relatively confident 
about his judgment. This conviction is indexed in the following lexical choices57: "I was 
convinced it should be ... " (A9), "entirely self-initiated" (All), "almost no support" 
(A 11 ), "I was really~ impressed" (A 14 ), and he repeats again that the student worked 
"entirely on his own" (A 14-15), "I was convinced ... " (A15). 
The third text unit (A17-21) provides further insight into some of the values which 
shape assessors' interpretations. Andre was not an assessor of this project and it is not 
likely that he had even seen the project. His input was to "bring out an important aspect" 
(A 17) about engineers being "able to communicate to the outside world" (A 18, 20). The 
inference is that independent work does not constitute sufficient evidence to justify a first 
if the student cannot "communicate to the outside world" (A18). He qualifies, however, 
by stating, "but I think both need to be taken into consideration" (A21 ). Presumably 
"both" refers to the student's ability to work independently, as well as his ability to 
communicate. I would argue that the primary function of this qualifier is to minimize the 
chance of threatening the face of colleagues, the supervisor and the second marker, who 
have expressed views different to his. 
57 I have underlined words that signal modality. 
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The fourth text unit (A22-25) is that of the third marker, who has given the thesis a 
6958 • The evidence he offers in support ofhis award is based on the "write-up itself, the 
thesis" which he argues "is not as good as it should be" (A22). He points to the 
"references" and notes that the "bibliography is not properly documented" (A23). But 
again he concedes in closing, "taking everything into account, yes, he did quite a lot of 
work" (A24). Again I would argue that this concession, like that of the previous speaker, 
operates as a 'hedge' 59 to mitigate what might otherwise be perceived as threatening to 
others who do not share his views. 
Finally, the fifth text unit (A26-32) is that of the external examiner who has 
recommended a mark of 70. His evidence in support of "not recommend(ing) a first" 
(A26) appears to be primarily based on the fact that "some of the parts of the project 
didn't work" (A27). From his perspective a "distinction candidate" (A29) should have 
been able to anticipate certain aspects of the functioning ofhis project, and this student 
did not. He also challenges the supervisor's appraisal of the "multi-disciplinary" detail 
(A31 ). An analysis of the modality of this text unit would suggest that the external 
examiner is committed to his view. There is little hesitation or hedging in his argument; 
"There are a few reasons not to recommend a first" (A26). X is a fairly simple process 
and the student "couldn't get that to work" (A28). He concludes "70% is a reasonable 
mark" (A32). There is finality to his argument; there is no invitation for the others to 
disagree, nor do they. 
Thus we see from the analysis of these text units that different interpretations of the 
student's performance are being justified on the basis of different kinds of evidence, 
offered from the perspective of the different roles which the assessors hold in relation to 
the performance. Evidence presented by the supervisor and the second marker supports a 
first class pass. This is evidence from the nature of the task, the student's independent 
tackling of the task, the student's "story" of what he did, as well as a demonstration of the 
58 Since I did not sit in on the consensus meetings, I do not know whether the third marker actually agreed 
to the '75%' consensus mark. 
59 A 'hedge' is a linguistic device by which a speaker avoids being compromised by a statement that turns 
out to be wrong (Oxford Concise Dictionary of Linguistics). These devices are often used to reduce the 
modality of an utterance. 
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actual equipment (Rob 00-3). Evidence presented by the third marker and the external 
supports a lower and upper second respectively .. This is evidence on the basis of the 
report itself, the manner in which the references were documented, and the fact that 
aspects of the project did not "work". We also note ways in which the various 
participants manage the potential threat to others' face. The second marker clearly feels 
fairly strongly about his mark. The third marker does not agree, but presents his argument 
with a concession which serves as a hedge. The external presents his justification, 
politely, but with certainty. The first and the second markers do not contest his mark and 
the final mark stands at 70%. This discourse is privileging the interpretations of the more 
distant markers (the third marker and external examiner), at the same time negotiating 
these different interpretations in a collegial manner, that is, in a manner which minimizes 
the risk of threatening individual's face needs. 
In dispute B (see Appendix 5) we see once again how kinds of evidence are 
foregrounded from the different assessor positions. The external examiner has given the 
report a 70. His argument that the report does "not merit a first" (B26) seems to be based 
on what he considers to be an inappropriate balance of theory and practice in the report. 
The supervisor has given the report an 80 and supports his mark with evidence from 
aspects of the research process, for example, the amount of time and effort which the 
student expended, the complexity of the task, the fact that the student met the 
supervisor's expectations. The supervisor notes, "I thought he (the student) did exactly 
what was expected of him" (B36). The second marker chooses not to justify his mark-
originally a 65 but he appears to have agreed to a 76 in the consensus meeting. The third 
marker awarded a 72. He justifies his lower mark by agreeing with the external that the 
report is "unbalanced" (B48), "there is no in-depth discussion of the results and I think 
that is what you would expect from a first pass" (B50). Thus in dispute B, as in A, 
evidence presented by the supervisor, based on the task, the student's effort, the 
achievement of expectation, results in an award of a high first class pass. Evidence 
which the third marker and the external examiner draw from the thesis results in an award 
of a second/upper second. 
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As in the Humanities analysis, the analysis of these disputes suggests that from the 
perspective of different roles, assessors inevitably privilege the different functions of 
assessment. The external examiners can only assess the thesis as a product. Their role is 
to measure the thesis against what they believe to be 'good' research at this level of the 
curriculum. Thus from the 'external' point ofview the student concerned in dispute A is 
not a "distinction candidate" (A29) and the project concerned in dispute B "is not 
meriting a first" (B26). In contrast the evidence offered by the supervisors suggests that 
the mark is not only an interpretation of a product but also of a process. Interpretation of 
the process privileges contextual considerations such as the student's "self-initiative" and 
"time and effort", and the supervisor's "expectations". 
How are these differences of interpretation resolved? In dispute A the external's 
perspective is privileged and I argue that the negotiation of these different interpretations 
is done in such a way to minimize the threat to individual and collective face, in other 
words, collegiality is maintained even at the cost of having one's professional judgment 
discounted. I now turn to the analysis of facework in dispute B where I demonstrate that 
in the interest of challenging the external perspective, one member of staff resorts to a 
number of discursive strategies which threaten both individual and collective face60• 
I noted above that the typical exchange pattern for the meeting is the initiation of a 
dispute by the supervisor who justifies his mark, followed by a response from the 
external examiner which often (though not always) constitutes the last word (as 
illustrated in dispute A). In dispute B Victor initiates the dispute. He informs the 
gathering of the outcome of the consensus meeting (between himself and David; it is not 
clear whether the third marker was present): "We agreed that a fair compromise would be 
around a 76. Honestly speaking I don't see why this student should be denied a first 
class, if the externals can justify that" (B6-8). Thus by asking the externals to justify their 
60 My analysis does not really get at the issue of why Victor feels the need to disrupt the norms of this 
meeting. I acknowledge that he was responding to a complex set of factors which went beyond the 
boundaries of the specific issues which I was exploring. By the time I had completed early drafts of this 
analysis, Victor had resigned from SAU and did not respond to any of my e-mails. I was thus never able to 
probe these issues to the extent that I would have liked. 
mark first, Victor disrupts the typical exchange pattern, "if they can tell me where they 
think he missed it ... please" (BS-10). 
In addition to this disruption, implied in Victor's request is a challenge to the 
fairness of the external's mark; the student has been "denied" (B8) a first class pass. 
However, in contrast to later in the dispute, the challenge is not personalized, in other 
words, he is not speaking directly to the external examiner but presumably through the 
chair as is the norm in this type of meeting. His tone is non-confrontational. The 
significant pauses (B 8,9) suggest that this is a genuine request for justification. 
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The exchange which follows between Victor and one of the externals (who is not the 
one responsible for looking at this particular thesis) (B 11-17) is a tussle about legitimate 
sources of evidence, on one hand evidence based on the "report", on the other hand 
evidence from the presentation. It is not clear why Ella raises the issue of "presentation" 
(presumably a reference to the oral presentation which all the students have to give), but 
her point is to stress that the external examiners' assessment ("ours") "is based on the 
report" (B 14). Victor does not accept her point ("no, no" B 13) and speaks right over her, 
arguing that the presentation is an important source of evidence. The chair, however, 
interrupts him and endorses the external examiner, "We are basing this on the report" 
(B 16) and he is chorused by another member of staff, "on the report" (B 17). 
The external examiner responsible for assessing this project presents his argument. It 
would appear that his main criticism of the thesis is that the report relies heavily on the 
theory and the literature, and not enough on "what was actually done" (B21 ). However, 
perhaps as an attempt to defuse the mounting tension, he foregrounds the positive 
features of the report and backgrounds any specific criticisms which would justify his 
mark of70 instead of a first. In the first two lines he repeats "well" three times 
(although qualified) and again when he concludes: "Well, looking at the report it's a well 
written report which explains the theory fairly fairly well, the theory of urn (X) that's 
actually explained quite well ... " (B 19-20). He concludes, "So it was a lot of literature 
survey done, the work that was done was ac~ually done quite well, but not meriting a 
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first" (B25-26). I would argue that this foregrounding of the positive aspects of the report 
and the "actually" which precedes "explained quite well" (B20) serve to soften what the 
external examiner perceives to be a face-threatening act. 
Victor is not prepared to accept this judgment and comes back to present his 
evidence, as noted above, on the basis of the amount of time the student spend on the 
project, the difficulty of the task, the fact that the student has met the supervisor's 
expectations. But he presents his evidence in an increasingly confrontational manner, "I 
thought he did exactly what was expected of him, so in this case, I mean, what is wrong?" 
(B 36-37). The pace of his speech picks up; the incidences of 'whatever' increase (four 
times in B38-39)61 • His challenge shifts from impersonal to the personal: "the student has 
done a lot of hard work but then you find a way of saying 'No, I don't think he has done 
the whatever"' (B40-41 ). He is no longer speaking through the chair but directly to the 
external. In contrast to dispute A where the assessors hedge to avoid face threat, there is 
little attempt on Victor's part to minimize face threat. His modality is very high. "No I 
don't think, I don't agree with you, not at all" (B41 ). There is emphasis on "not" which 
adds to the strength of his conviction. Nor is Victor simply disagreeing with the external 
examiner's (and the third marker's) mark62 . He is challenging the fairness of the external 
examiner's judgment: "If you are to compare (this thesis) with some of the (other) theses, 
don't you think there is too much discrepancy here?'' (B37-39). He repeats again later, "I 
don't think that is fair" (B61-62). 
The exchange structure gives the chair control of how and when a dispute will be 
brought to a closure. In contrast to Victor's personal, direct and high modality discourse 
("you find a way", "I don't agree with you" B40-41) the chair reverts back to the 
impersonal and indirect discourse of the formal meeting. "Could we ask the meeting to 
rule on it, are we going to accept the mark of 70 from the external examiners?" (B43-45). 
61 Victor seems to have a somewhat idiosyncratic use of the word 'whatever'. When I examined his use of 
the word in other contexts, for example when I interviewed him, he tends to use it when he is at a loss for 
the right word. This would suggest that the frequency of the word in these lines signals some degree of 
agitation. 
62 It is interesting to note that the second marker (who had originally given the thesis a 65 and then 
"agreed" to a 75 in the consensus meeting, according to Victor) is silent in this debate, except to invite the 
third marker to offer his justification. 
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The chair becomes "we". A response is requested from the "meeting" "to rule". The 
third marker presents his evidence in support of the external examiner's mark, "the report 
was unbalanced as mentioned" (B47-48). Victor then comes back once again to justify 
his mark (B 51). Despite Victor's protest, "I don't think that this is fair" (B61-62), the 
chair ends the dispute by effectively silencing Victor: "Thank you, Dr. _" (B 63). He 
then continues immediately with the very indirectly formulated question, uttered firmly 
with fluency and finality: "I wonder if we could ask the meeting that we go with the mark 
of70% from the externals?" (B63-64). 
5.4.3.3 How differences are resolved 
As already noted, the departmental examination meeting in 2000 was generally 
perceived to have been a highly problematic gathering63 • Reflecting back on this 
contentious gathering, Robert noted that typically at these meetings there was a "general 
air of politeness" towards the externals. In contrast, Victor had been "very direct ... he 
said what was in his head". Victor had in the examination meeting challenged the 
external examiners and the procedure. Robert notes, "Quite a few people were 
embarrassed by this totally frontal attack ... (they) thought it was insulting to the 
externals". Given that Victor's theses had been at the centre of controversy in 1999 (as 
noted in section 5.3 .2.1) and again in 2000, he was perceived to be the "odd man out". 
Because of this "credibility problem" quite a lot of staff members "leaned towards the 
externals". Thus the way that differences were negotiated in the examination meeting was 
that "we agreed we would go with the external examiners ... the externals obviously 
would have the final say" (Rob 00-3). 
Following the departmental examination meeting, there was a constructive attempt 
on the part of the department (spearheaded by the ex-HOD) to review the system so that 
this experience was not repeated in following years. In an interview the faculty's 
educational development officer noted that although (in his view) there were many issues 
63 The departmental examination meeting was followed by a e-mail discussion amongst members of the 
department which was initiated by Victor. In this volley of correspondence Victor implied that he felt that 
there had been racist attitudes in evidence in the examination meeting. Later on in the discussion he 
retracted his statement arguing that he was articulating a "suspicion" rather than an "accusation" and that it 




that needed to be resolved, the ex-HOD perceived "the bottom line" to be a lack of 
agreement about the role of the external examiners, specifically "a lack of consensus 
around who makes final decisions about what" (Ala 00-2). The ex-HOD articulated the 
problem in an e-mail to all staff: "The difficulty we have is when the internal examiners 
disagree with the external examiners, how do we arbitrate this?" (e-mail, 13/5/00). His 
initial proposal (to be discussed at a staff meeting a week after the examination meeting) 
was that the external examiner should be the final arbiter: "If the internal and external 
examiners are unable to agree, the meeting will uphold the external examiners' mark" (e-
mail, 13/5/00). However, after consultation with both SAU academic staff and the 
external examiners, he withdrew the proposal and proposed instead that a committee be 
established to review the existing final project assessment system (e-mail, 16/11/00). 
It appeared that a number of staff members had changed their minds about whether 
the external examiner should have the final say, including the ex-HOD. Robert conceded 
that Victor "might well have been out ofline"; "He's new, not used to the system, not 
used to the students, not used to the standards" but he highlighted that "We've got a 
problem ... we don't know how to come to consensus between the external examiners and 
the supervisor who believes his marks are correct" (Rob 00-3). Victor had "one very 
good point" which he raised, both during and after the meeting. Victor was arguing, 
according to Robert, that a staff member has been: 
supervising (a) student for 12 or 13 weeks and he's really got to know that student's 
work. The external examiners come in and they've got something like 10 or 12 
theses each in the space of one morning. How can an external examiner, albeit an 
expert in the field be so confident that they're correct when they've had half an hour 
to assess a thesis, and what's more they've never been present at an oral and they've 
never seen the equipment? And they never interviewed the student, and the only 
thing they've got is a document. With an under-graduate thesis project with the time 
scales, that's not adequate64 (Rob 00-3). 
64 In my interview with one of the external examiners, he argued that it was not a case of the externals 
needing more time or expertise. The problem was rather a case of an "inexperienced person" who was not 
sufficiently familiar with South African standards (Nic 01-1). 
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Robert noted, "I had a lot of sympathy with what he was saying. And that's the basis of 
reviewing the system" (Rob 00-3). 
Kevin confessed that he too had felt quite strongly during the examination meeting 
that the department should accept the mark awarded by the external examiners, but "I 
later changed my mind". His view now was that the externals' mark should rather be 
treated as a recommendation to the department, not as final. It was the department's role 
"taking into account both the internal and externally awarded grades" to make a decision. 
He justified his change of mind on the basis that "the external sees only the written thesis 
and does not know factors like, e.g. a) how much input was provided by the supervisor 
towards the success of the project, b) how much initiative was shown by the student; did 
he/she drive the project, c) the ability of the student to solve problems encountered during 
the course of the project." He argued, "To disregard the internal's mark completely 
assumes that the internals are somehow less qualified than the externals to judge the 
project. I doubt that is the case." He goes on to add, "Our department does not have a 
clear policy on how a mark should be awarded. For example, should a thesis be marked 
on the written document alone, or should the mark include a contribution from the oral, 
or should the hardware constructed be judged on its quality of construction or on how 
well it works? No guidelines have been written down" (e-mail, 27/11100). 
The committee completed its review in mid-2001. It had been tasked to address "the 
one big problem ... ofthe external examiners" (Dav 01-1). One of the final 
recommendations was that "a thesis project board be set up consisting of mainly senior 
staff members and other interested members. The job of this board would be to deal with 
cases where there was no consensus agreement even after the external marking meeting." 
This proposal seeks to give final arbitration decision to the thesis project board (e-mail, 
20/6/01). Explaining the rationale behind this proposal, David argued, "We really do 
need these people from outside ... but do you give these people the power to actually tell 
you how to do your job?" (Dav 01-1) Last year "they had the power to act. Right now 
what we are doing (is) taking (that) away. We are saying that they can recommend ... we 
accept it (their mark) as recommendation" not the final word (Dav 01-1). The proposal 
was accepted unanimously. 
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Thus, procedurally there seemed to be resolution. The role of the external examiners 
had been clarified. I argue however that other substantial educational issues were still 
unresolved. In a final interview, David admitted that some common understanding 
among the staff about what a thesis is had not been achieved (Dav 01-1). Nor as Kevin 
argued was there, as yet, any clear policy on "how a mark should be awarded", in other 
words, what kinds of evidence can legitimately be drawn on to support the assessor's 
interpretation. These are fundamental validity issues, fundamental to the process of 
evaluating interpretations, and are yet to be addressed explicitly and extensively by this 
community of practice. 
I now turn to a brief summary of the key insights gained through the Engineering 
case study in response to my guiding questions. 
5.4.4 Summary 
The Engineering community of practice provided me with an ideal opportunity to 
search for explanations for both the common ground which academic assessors share, as 
well as the differences in interpretation. From the analysis emerge three features which 
contribute to the constitution of assessors' interpretive matrices: an epistemological 
orientation that comes from the specialization, particular 'ways of seeing' that are 
developed through experience, and a privileging of evidence based on different levels of 
involvement. I then explored how these interpretive matrices contributed to different 
interpretations; how from the perspective of their various roles, assessors interpret student 
performance based on different kinds of evidence. 
What is at stake in the negotiation of these differences? Consistent with the 
Humanities analysis, I argue that there are two issues at stake in negotiating the 
differences which emerge in the moderation meeting. One issue is collegiality: the 
individual and collective face needs of both the internal and external examiners have 
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been threatened. Up until 1999 this community had been able to manage these face 
needs, but in the 2000 examination meeting one member of staff disrupted the facework 
conventions. Arguing his position and saving his own face was more important than 
maintaining the face needs of this collegial community. 
As I argued earlier in relation to the Humanities case, a second issue at stake is what 
constitutes legitimate evidence for the interpretation of performance. There is in this 
discourse a contestation between two modes ofknowledge: one which privileges the 
more external, distant, uninvolved view, and the other which privileges the internal 
perspective, the one closest to the performance. I argue that the former mode of 
knowledge is privileged in the 2000 departmental examination meeting. This privileging 
is to some extent structurally constituted by the discourse and the exchange structure of 
the meeting. The privilege of the externals was further strengthened as a result of the 
community's need to demarcate turf, to set boundaries, to label what and who was 'out of 
line'. 
And finally, how were these differences resolved? The contestation which emerged 
in the moderation meeting was resolved in two stages. In the context of the meeting, 
resolution was achieved by privileging the external examiner's perspective. The effect of 
this was to diminish the authority of the internal examiners in general, but specifically to 
discredit one particular internal examiner. Following the event, procedures were put in 
place to ensure that final authority rested with the department. However, fundamental 
issues about what constitutes legitimate evidence for the assessment of final year projects 
remained unresolved. 
In the next chapter I tum to the task of pulling out the major insights which emerge 
from the case study analysis - insights which offer a deeper and richer understanding of 
assessment as a social practice. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions 
It is this double truth, objective and subjective, which constitutes the whole truth of the social world. 
(Bourdieu in Wacquant and Bourdieu 1992, p. 255) 
6.1 Introduction 
This study set out to explore a problem in practice, namely, how academics evaluate 
the soundness of their assessment-based interpretations. I explored this problem within 
the context of final year undergraduate projects in two different communities of practice, 
one in the Humanities faculty and the other in the Engineering faculty at SAU. With 
respect to their validation practices I was interested in the following issues: 
• Firstly, academic communities of practice, by definition, share some common 
ground. What is the basis of this 'common ground'? In other words, what 
explains the manner in which academic assessors, with minimal co-ordination or 
explicit articulation of 'norms', are able to get on with the numerous classificatory 
acts which are required of them as members of a particular disciplinary field? 
• Secondly, I was specifically interested in the phenomenon of multiple 
interpretations of the same task. What explanation is there for these differences in 
interpretation? What can dissensus within a community of interpreters expose 
about the complexities of assessment as an interpretive process? 
• Thirdly. reaching consensus between assessors about what value to award an 
instance of student performance is not always simple to achieve. The negotiation 
of interpretive differenc-es can be a site of struggle, and this struggle implies that 
there are certain stakes in the resolution. Thus I inquired. in the context of 
collegial dialogue. what is at stake in the resolution of differences? 
• Finally I asked, if consensus is not a given, how then are differences resolved? 
Specifically, how is power exercised in the resolution of these differences? 
Consistent with the goals of critical discourse analysis (and critical theory more 
generally. see Calhoun 1995), my goal was to open up these validation practices for 
scrutiny. In each case I used specific 'moments of crisis' (Fairclough 1992) in the life of 
these communities as springboards to de-naturalize their practices. I used the methods of 
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ethnography and critical discourse analysis to interrupt the every day common sense of 
institutional life (Luke 1995-1996). This de-naturalization entails illuminating 
unsuspected connections between what is often perceived, in assessment, to be an 
antagonistic relationship between objective and subjective modes of knowledge. What 
my analysis exposed was the 'objectivity of the subjective' (Bourdieu 1990), that the 
objective and subjective are in a mutually constitutive relationship. Ultimately the goal 
of this opening up is not simply to disrupt but to offer alternative conceptualizations of 
these very practices. Chouliariki and Fairclough (1999) note that neither CDA nor any 
other forms of critical social science are in the business of prescribing alternative 
practices but are there to help clear the ground for those invested in the practices, by 
clarifying obstacles to change and possibilities/or change. 
In this chapter I summarize the insights which I gained from this study by responding 
to the four sets of questions which have guided this study. I then conclude by drawing out 
the specific ways in which this study extends our understanding of assessment as a social 
practice. These conclusions have implications for our task as academic communities of 
interpreters, and I explore some of these implications in the final chapter. 
6.2 Discussion 
I took as a premise for this study what Bernstein ( 1983) refers to as the "recovery of 
the hermeneutical dimension" (p. 171 ), that is, a growing recognition of the role of 
interpretation at every stage of scientific inquiry in both the natural and social sciences. I 
noted that even psychometrics (as presented by Messick and Cronbach) has had to reject 
the .. permanent division between observation and theory" (Bernstein 1983, p. 172). 
Accepting "the universality of hermeneutics" (Flyvbjerg 2001, p. 28), the crucial question 
is, on what basis do we evaluate the soundness of our interpretations? I argued in 
response to this question, that different approaches to validity inquiry will have different 
goals and thus prioritize different criteria. The goal of psychometrics is the construction 
of generalizations across individuals and contexts. Only stripped of their particularity can 
interpretations be meaningful across individuals, groups and contexts. The challenge of 
this scientific inquiry is to delineate the limits of generalizability (Moss et al 2002). In 
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contrast, interpretive science is interested in particularity and would argue that social life 
is best understood in context, because that context is constitutive of its meaning. The goal 
of interpretive and socio-theoretical approaches to validation is to understand the actions 
of individuals in context, "to understand what humans mean and intend by what they say 
and do, and to locate those understandings within the historical, cultural, institutional and 
immediate contexts that shape them" (Moss et al 2002, p. 7). 
As the theoretical framework for this investigation I proposed a social theoretical 
approach, based on Bourdieu's theory of practice, which I argued would illumine validity 
inquiry in productive ways. In particular it would illumine the constitutive role of 
context, the generative exploration of differences, and the inevitable relations of power. 
As I argued before, these concerns do feature in psychometric approaches to assessment, 
but they are not foregrounded sufficiently. In contrast, from a social theoretical 
perspective, these features are privileged as central to an understanding of assessment as 
an interpretive act, as well as central to the task of validation. In other words, from a 
social theoretical approach the task of evaluating the soundness of assessment 
interpretations cannot be undertaken without consideration of context, difference and 
power. 
I now tum to a discussion of my central questions. 
6.2.1 Academics' 'feel for the game' 
My first set of questions was: What is the basis of academic assessors' ·common 
ground'? How is it that they are able to get on with the numerous classificatory acts 
which are required of them as members of a particular disciplinary field? 
From a social theoretical perspective, I have argued that we cannot make sense of 
validating practices outside of the logic of the field. In the context of this study, this 
means that academic validating practices only make sense within the logic of the 
academic profession, and within the sub-field of disciplinary communities of practice. 
Bourdieu argues that it is the field that determines the kinds of capital which are valued, 
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and I have argued that for higher education these are principally knowledge and 
autonomy. These forms of capital in tum define institutional and individual positions 
within the field, positions which are either advantageous or disadvantageous in relation to 
capital accumulation. Thus institutions which have accumulated vast amounts of capital 
(measured, for example, through scientific ratings, publication counts, and research 
funding) are advantageously positioned in the hierarchy of institutional prestige. The 
same applies to individual positioning within the field; academics' positioning within the 
field is, to a large extent, determined on the basis of their accumulation of specialist-
based expertise. Furthermore, since capital is a form of power, it is largely on the basis of 
this expertise that professional authority is determined. 
Not only does capital define institutional and individual positioning, but it also 
specifies the "principles of vision and division", that is, "the legitimate principles of 
legitimation" (Bourdieu 1996, p. 265). These are the principles which inform academic 
classificatory acts: what is perceived to be legitimate knowledge, the legitimate criteria 
for assessing this knowledge, the legitimate assessors of this knowledge, and the 
legitimate validators of these assessments. Fields are inevitably sites of struggle, 
although the degree of contestation within and from outside the field over these positions 
and principles will vary. Despite the turbulent changes occurring in higher education 
more globally and in South African higher education locally, I have argued that because 
of its relatively privileged position in the higher education hierarchy, SAU has been able 
to determinedly resist calls for change. In particular, it has been able, to date, to resist 
calls for increasing accountability which challenge the legitimacy of traditional modes of 
validation practice. An example of the latter is the deeply entrenched external 
examination system which serves to maintain those values which the field prizes most. 
As members of the field and members of disciplinary communities, academics 
acquire practical mastery, or what Bourdieu refers to as a 'feel for the game'. With very 
few explicit codes, rules or criteria, seasoned members of the field know how to get on 
with the myriad of classificatory tasks which are required of them. This explains the 
appeal to intuition which became a dominant theme in the interviews as I probed for the 
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implicit and explicit criteria which academics draw on in their interpretive processes, that 
is, their notions of assessment as a matter of 'taste', as a 'qualitative judgment', as 'art', a 
'stamp of approval', an 'academic feeling'. But the basis of this intuition is not 
subjectivity in its common sense understanding, that is "'merely' a matter of personal 
opinion, taste or bias and consequently idiosyncratic" (Bernstein 1983, p. 11). My study 
found these judgments rather to be "socialized subjectivity" (Bourdieu in Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992, p. 126). Academics' intuitions are "internalized externality" (Bourdieu 
1996, p. 29), that is, the internalization of the objective social conditions of the field and 
the sub-field in which they find themselves. It is a knowledge which develops through the 
experience of working through thousands of concrete cases in an area of expertise over 
time (Flyvbjerg 2001). This is what grants them practical mastery; this is what explains 
how "without any conscious reference to a norm" they are able to "harmonize" their 
practices (Bourdieu 1990, p. 58). As the Engineering course convener noted, "No one 
has to tell you anything, you learn. You are in a place" (Dav 00-2). 
I noted the challenges this poses for newcomers to the field who are required to 
perform these classificatory acts without having had time to develop the requisite 
professional vision (Goodwin 1994). By their own accounts, they flounder. This 
floundering does not go unnoticed by the more senior experienced staff. but explicit 
strategies for the development of such a professional vision either are not a priority, or 
are deemed superfluous; as one interviewee noted, "It's unnecessary ... they'lllearn 
quickly on the job" (Geo 00-1). According to one staffmember's perspective, it would 
seem that "coming into line'' with the community's 'ways of seeing' is essentially a 
matter of time. He recounted how in his first year of marking his marks were too high, 
the following year his marks were too low. He anticipated in his third year that he would 
be more "in line'' with the others (Dav 00-2). This was the pattern he was told to expect 
by senior colleagues. 
Unfortunately for others, the process may not be so straightforward. More deliberate 
strategies are required by the community to bring outliers into line, and communities of 
practice have a repertoire of strategies by which they preserve some degree of closure, 
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namely, strategies for demarcating the territory, for delineating the boundaries, and 
positioning individuals accordingly. The process of dealing with outliers can be painful 
for both communities and individuals. To avoid the pain communities may choose to 
ignore the differences and the conflict which these differences might evoke. The 
Humanities HOD admitted, "I think we actually know (our practices) are extremely 
problematical but (we) suppress (them) because of painful experiences we have had in 
trying to deal with the problems (e-mail, 22/9/99). With respect to individual responses to 
conflict, there are a variety of responses. When confronted, individuals may opt to give 
in. Another strategy which they may adopt is to continue to fulfil the obligations of their 
job but to divest from committed engagement. Yet another strategy is that individuals 
may choose to leave the community altogether. 
If we were to leave the story here, we would be left with a highly determined 
account of academic professional judgment, that is, professional judgment as essentially 
the outcome of social conditioning, in which assessors are either 'in-line', 'out of line' or 
in the process of 'coming into line'. But assessors' accounts of their interpretive 
processes revealed another context which also profoundly constitutes the interpretive 
process. This is the immediate context of the assessment task and all that this entails. 
Their accounts revealed a complexity of contingencies which they bring to bear in the 
assessment of student performance. This was illustrated in the Humanities case study 
through the analysis of Mary's validity argument. There a range of factors were exposed 
which influenced her interpretation of a particular student's performance: her relationship 
with the student and the class, the research process and her particular role as supervisor. 
the broader socio-political context and the inevitable compromises this posed. This 
complexity of contingencies was also illustrated in the Engineering case study through an 
analysis of Robert's validity argument in which he argued for a particular interpretation 
based on the complexity of the task, the student's independence, as well as the student's 
ability to explain and defend himself. A significant reference point for these 
interpretations is the immediate context, in particular the students' efforts, commitment, 
engagement, and interests; the supervisors' interests, intentions, and expectations; as well 
as the development of a research project with all its possibilities and risks. As one 
member of the Engineering staff noted with reference to the thesis, "How much is the 
supervisor and how much is the student? If it's something I really care about, I'm 
involved" {Dav 00-1 ). This is the complex and inescapable subjective terrain of 
assessment. 
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Thus the study has shed some insight on supervisors' interpretive matrices; it has 
illuminated something of the environment out ofwhich interpretations are born. 
Assessors' interpretative matrices are constituted, in part, by the objective conditions of 
the field and of the community of practice. These are objective because they are to a 
large extent independent of the individual assessor; they are conditions which apply as a 
result of being a member of the field. But at the same time, assessors' matrices are 
constituted by the particular context of the assessment event. This is a highly subjective 
terrain, that is, it is significantly dependent on the assessor and the particular assessment 
circumstances. As the Engineering HOD candidly noted, "A lot of the mark is going to be 
a quality judgment and it's going to depend on the characteristics ofthe supervisor" (Ken 
00-1 ). 
The tension between these two contexts, these two modes of knowledge was 
acknowledged by many interviewees in a variety of different ways. I tried to capture the 
essence of this tension in the distinction between the mark as a measure of product and 
the mark as a measure of process. On one hand, the mark is a measure of product against 
some tacitly agreed notions which a particular community (within the wider context of 
the field) holds about ·good' research. On the other hand, the mark is a measure of 
process. a communicative exchange between a supervisor and a student. These functions 
create tensions because they privilege different contextual considerations, different forms 
of evidence. In its function as a measure of product, assessment may foreground products 
(e.g. the research proposal) and background processes (e.g. the drafts, the class 
discussions. one-to-one time with the student). In its function as a measure of process, 
assessment may privilege evidence from the student (e.g. their effort, progress, and 
attitude) and the immediate, local context of the classroom (e.g. the student's ability in 
relation to the class). I argued that this "massive and permanent tension" (Jos 98-1) is 
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one which has to be held as fundamentally constitutive of assessment-based 
interpretations. 
6.2.2 Academic interpretive matrices 
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I turn now to my second set of questions. With regard to the phenomenon of multiple 
interpretations of the same task, what explanations are there for these differences? What 
might these differences expose about the rich complexity of assessment as an interpretive 
process? 
As argued above, Bourdieu's 'logic of practice' helps us to make sense of the 
homology between the academic 'game' and academics' 'feel for the game', that is, 
academics as a result of inhabiting the same field, do share a common professional 
vision. This vision (or what Taylor 1987 and Goodwin 1994 both refer to as 
intersubjective meanings) is not the same as consensus. It is rather a pre-condition for 
both consensus and dissensus. As Taylor ( 1987) argues it is because of this set of 
intersubjective meanings that differences of interpretation emerge. 
In interviews with staff from both communities I explored their own explanations for 
the differences which emerge between assessors' interpretations of the same 
performance. These explanations brought further insight into the constitution of 
assessors· interpretive matrices. I stress once again that interpretive matrices are highly 
complex constructs and the particular features which emerged in my study were strongly 
influenced by the context of the data and my own particular interests. I am therefore not 
suggesting that my analysis is a comprehensive picture of features that influence 
assessors' interpretations, nor am I assuming that these features are generalizable across 
contexts. Further investigation would need to be conducted in other communities of 
practice to determine the extent to which the features which have emerged from my 
particular sites are generalizable to other sites. 
Academics' accounts exposed three features which, in part, constitute assessors' 
interpretive matrices: specialization, experience and involvement. With reference to 
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specialization, the study revealed that assessors will bring particular disciplinary and 
specialist orientations to the assessment act which will influence their interpretations. It 
appears that different disciplinary specializations tackle particular research problems 
from different methodological and epistemological standpoints. It also emerged that 
assessment may serve as one of the primary means by which communities of practice 
implicitly signal which standpoints they value and which they do not. In other words, 
assessment becomes the battle ground for disciplinary border disputes. With reference to 
experience, the accounts from both novices and more experienced staff testified to the 
process by which assessors become socialized over time into a community of practice's 
'ways of seeing'. As one experienced member of staff noted, "It's relatively easy to 
decide whether a project deserves a first, second or third class pass. He conceded 
however, "But not the first time" (Ken 00-1 ). 
Finally with reference to involvement, the interviews as well as the analysis of 
collegial discourse suggests that different assessor roles (whether, for example, an 
assessor is a supervisor or not) will inevitably give priority to different assessment 
functions, different assessment contexts, and different kinds of evidence. This was 
illustrated through the Humanities case study in the differences which emerged between 
Keith and Mary's validity arguments. Keith, who is not a supervisor of the student 
project. draws on evidence primarily from the project and his point of reference is the 
context of the course and the kind of graduates the department values. Mary's 
interpretation. as a supervisor, is premised on a different evidential base: what she knows 
about the student, the class, the research process and her particular role as a supervisor. as 
well as the broader social-political context. I noted similar differences of interpretation in 
the Engineering moderation meeting between Robert and Victor. on the one hand, and the 
external examiners on the other. From the perspective of different assessor roles, 
different interpretations of student performance are justified on the basis of different 
kinds of evidence. 
I noted how traditional approaches to assessment have viewed differences of 
interpretation as a threat to the validation process, and in some cases a great deal of 
185 
resources are invested in devising procedures which will ensure the elimination of these 
differences. To value and work towards consistency of interpretation is a desirable goal. 
But, as Moss and Schutz (2001) argue, there may also be some value in suspending the 
goal of consensus, if only temporarily. As my study has revealed, an exploration of these 
differences can enhance our understanding of what assessment is. We are afforded a 
deeper appreciation of the complex interpretive environment, that is, the multiple 
constitutive contexts out of which our deeply intuitive judgments emerge. This deeper 
appreciation will also sharpen our critical stance. Moss and Schutz (2001) argue, 
"Dissensus can lay the groundwork for critical evaluation and guard against taken-for-
granted beliefs and practices that might dominate our thinking" (p. 65). 
6.2.3 Academic stakes 
My third question was: In the context of collegial dialogue, what is at stake in the 
resolution of differences? As noted above, a consequence of these different matrices is 
that assessors will not necessarily arrive at the same interpretations. Mary passed the 
project and Keith failed it; Victor awarded a first class pass and the external 
recommended a lower second. In neither case, were they able to reach consensus. The 
analysis of the validity arguments suggested some of the underlying reasons for these 
differences. But I was also interested in what was at ·stake in the negotiation of these 
differences. 
I argued that the collegial discourse of the moderation meetings is fulfilling two 
functions simultaneously. It is functioning relationally, that is, to preserve or challenge 
interpersonal relations between participants. It is also functioning ideationally, that is, it 
serves to sustain or challenge systems of belief and knowledge held by members of this 
group. In relation to the former function, I argued that one of the stakes in these 
moderation meetings is collegiality. In the negotiation of differences of interpretation, 
there is the potential risk of threatening individuals' face needs, that is, a person's need to 
be well thought of and not to be imposed upon. Equally important is collective face, that 
is. a group· s need to be well-thought of by another group whose opinions they respect, 
for example. the internal examiners' need to be found reputable in the eyes of the external 
. . 
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examiners and vice versa. In a context where professional identity and status are 
primarily based on specialist expertise, a challenge to an interpretation (whether an 
individual's or a collective's) can be perceived as a challenge to professional credibility. 
Thus colleagues weigh carefully the risks involved in such a challenge. While these 
academics may hold to their interpretations with a fair degree of certainty, they do so 
conscious of the potential threat that such differences may pose to individual and 
collective face needs. As one member of the Humanities staff noted, a threat to one's face 
may have very real negative sanctions. Academics may even at times, for the sake of 
collegiality, seemingly concede to a position that they in fact do not fully embrace. I 
argue, therefore, that collegiality is one stake in the negotiation of differences . 
In relation to the ideational function of this discourse, I propose that another stake in 
these meetings is these communities' perceptions that they do share a common 
professional vision. Early in my study, I found that on several occasions members of staff 
in both communities felt the need to assure me (and perhaps themselves) that there was a 
common professional vision. The Humanities course convener, for example, argued, 
"Most of our staff have a common concept of (a particular disciplinary form of) 
insight .. .it might be different to the Afrikaans lecturers at (an Afrikaans-speaking 
university) but we (at SAU) have a common concept" (Dan 98-1). A member of the 
Engineering staff noted, "Statistics might call me a liar but the sense I get is that in fact 
most first and second markers are very close. Sometimes it is spot on, so it means there is 
a common understanding of what a thesis is about" (Car 00-1 ). I would suggest that 
academic communities are heavily invested in a belief that they do share a common 
ground. Piper (1994) explains the logic of this belief. He argues that the sharing of 
esoteric knowledge is the "cement" which binds specialist-based professions. Thus 
agreement between assessors is an affirmation of mutual membership in a disciplinary 
community. It is a "signal that they have a common professional understanding of quality 
as manifest in their subject" (p. 80). Thus, Piper argues, there is a deep-seated vested 
interest in this perception of agreement since it touches academics' very identities, 
identities which are both professional and personal. 
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But then how do these very same communities make sense of the dissensus which 
arises out of the moderation meetings? I argue that underlying this discourse may lurk 
some form of Cartesian anxiety (as discussed in Chapter 3). At the heart ofthis anxiety is 
the belief that as assessors they are faced with a choice between two alternative forms of 
rationality. One alternative, what Bernstein (1983) refers to as 'objectivism', is the belief 
that there are 'standards', there are 'tixed points' against which performance can be 
measured. The other alternative, what he refers to as 'relativism' is a resignation to the 
reality that there is no 'overarching framework' to which we can appeal, there are no 
'fixed points'; there are only 'your' standards and there are 'my' standards. Assessors 
may well wonder, if they cannot reach consensus, what does this suggest about the forms 
of rationality that inform their discipline? A form of rationality in which 'anything goes' 
will result in, as Mary argues, "students being at the mercy of our idiosyncrasies" (MW 
250*). Underlying the tension which characterizes these negotiations is the haunting 
spectre of relativism, that point where "nothing is fixed, where we can neither touch 
bottom nor support ourselves on the surface" (Bernstein 1983, p. 18). At stake, I argue, 
are these communities' perceptions of themselves as rational communities of interpreters. 
While the moderation meetings may constitute this anxiety, I argued that in their 
actual professional judgments the members of these communities do not hold either of 
these options as viable. They have rejected the claims of objectivism, and rue equally 
sceptical of relativism; it is not the case that 'anything goes'. The rationalism that informs 
their interpretations is something beyond either of these positions. Their judgments are 
constituted by the tension between the macro and the micro contexts, between objective 
and subjective modes of knowledge and between the various kinds of evidence which 
these contexts and modes of knowledge require. Indeed their very own practices are a 
testimony to a different kind of rationality which is "beyond objectivism and relativism·· 
(Bernstein 1983), one which eschews the antinomy of objectivity and subjectivity 
(Bourdieu 1990). In describing the kind of rationality which characterizes expert 
judgment, Dreyfus and Dreyfus ( 1986 cited in Flyvbjerg 2001) propose the concept of 
·arationality' (in contrast to irrationality). They argue that in the West rationality has 
become synonymous with analytical thinking, that is, the conscious separation of whole 
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into parts and the application of context-independent rules or criteria. Their study of 
expert judgment suggests that professionals' judgments do not always conform to this 
Western notion of rationality; it is rather a context-dependent, experience-based, and 
situational judgment1• I would suggest that academics' professional judgment is an 
illustration of 'arational' judgment, what Flyvbjerg refers to as 'phronesis'. As noted in 
Chapter 3, this is a form of judgment which is pragmatic, variable, context-dependent, 
based on practical value-rationality. Part of the reason why moderation meetings are sites 
of unresolved and unproductive conflict is because communities of practice have failed to 
recognize and value this form of rationality. I return below (6.3) to elaborate on features 
of the rationality which constitute academic professional judgment. 
6.2.4 The exercise of academic power 
As noted above, at stake in the negotiation of difference is both collegial relations 
amongst the participants, as well as the community's perception of itself as a rational 
community of interpreters. The final question which I explored was how these 
differences were resolved. In responding to this question, I put the issue of power 'on the 
table·. But as Flyvbjerg argues, it is a particular understanding of power; it is power 
understood as the force of relations2. Thus the important question is not, 'Who has 
power?· or 'Where is power located?', but 'How is power exercised?'. 
In Humanities. I argued that the differences of interpretation were not resolved; they 
were acknowledged as problematic by the HOD, but for a variety of reasons it was not in 
this community·s interest to commit itselfto working through these differences. This task 
was perceived (by some anyway) to be very difficult, if not impossible. With reference to 
the Hum300 course I asked, "What would it take to arrive at consistency in the marking? 
Is it possible?" Elsie responded: "Honestly, it's not. ... with resea;ch we have different 
values. we have different opinions, we have different expectations, so it's very difficult to 
maintain consistency" (Els 99-2). The HOD noted," ... perhaps we need more marking 
workshops. But I wonder. .. some of our differences are fairly deep" (e-mail, 22/9/99). 
1 These findings are consistent with the work of Paul Hager and David Beckett (Hager 2000; Beckett and 
Hager 2000) who argue for the crucial role of context in professional work-place practical judgment. 
2 Flyvbjerg (200 I) is drawing on a Foucaultian understanding of power. 
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In Engineering there were two different stages of resolution; there was resolution in 
the context of the moderation event itself and resolution which arose out of the events 
which followed the meeting. In the context of the meeting, resolution was achieved by 
privileging a particular perspective, that of the external examiner. The effect of this was 
to diminish the authority of the internal perspective, in general, but specifically to 
discredit one particular internal examiner. Thus it would seem that the best way to 
preserve collegial relations (particularly between the.external examiners and the SAU 
examiners), as well as to uphold the community's belief in itself as rational, was to 
castigate the one who was 'out ofline'. This is indeed a solution that communities may 
choose to adopt when faced with conflict. (I, however, propose an alternative approach in 
the final chapter). 
Outside the event, the process of resolution took a different tum. Once removed 
from the tense dynamics of the meeting, some members of the community were able to 
reflect more critically on what had happened in the meeting. The issue that was explicitly 
put on the table was: in the case of a dispute between an internal and external examiner 
who was to have the final say. Some argued in the moderation meeting that the external 
examiners were arbiters of internal disputes, and thus were the final authority. But the 
collective position which eventually emerged was that, in fact, final authority should rest 
with the department. In order to give effect to this decision, an alternative procedure was 
recommended for future practice, one which placed final authority with the department. 
Thus a procedural resolution was achieved, but as one of the members of staff argued, 
there was as yet still no clear policy for how a mark should be awarded (e-mail, 
27111/00). This lack of clarity pointed to fundamental educational issues, specifically 
what constitutes legitimate evidence for the assessment of the final year projects, which 
remained unresolved. 
6.3 Conclusions 
In conclusion, this study offers two contributions to a small but growing body of 
research which takes a sociological perspective on assessment. The first contribution is a 
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theoretical and methodological approach to the study of assessment practices. The 
second contribution is that, by exposing some of the complexity of the interpretive 
environment out of which academic professional judgment emerges, we achieve a deeper 
understanding of assessment as a social practice. This in turn illumines some of the 
features of the kind of rationality which constitute academic professional judgment. I 
turn now to elaborate briefly on each of these contributions. 
I noted at the end of Chapter 2 that educational assessment finds itself at the nexus of 
complex and highly contested expectations for social and political change. In response, 
scholars from more interpretivist and socio-cultural traditions have been critical of the 
role of assessment as a technology of educational reform and control. Underlying these 
agendas are "conceptual mythologies" (Davis 1998, p. 1) about assessment based on 
particular notions of science which these scholars would reject. They argue that 
assessment is a politically and conceptually complex social practice, and the theories and 
methodologies for exploring this complexity are undeveloped. Thus there is an urgent 
call for theoretical and methodological approaches that enable us to better understand the 
ways that assessment works within the local context (Moss 1996). 
Drawing on social theory, on the one hand, and the methods of critical discourse 
analysis and ethnography on the other, I have constructed a theory and method of inquiry 
which illumines aspects of assessment as an interpretive process which have been 
obscured by traditional psychometric approaches. With respect to other socio-cultural 
and interpretivist studies, I feel that my study has demonstrated the particular value of 
analyzing assessment discourse using the tools of CD A. There is still much research to be 
done in exposing relations of power which are pervasive in assessment discourse, not 
only among fellow assessors (my focus) but as importantly between assessors and 
assessed. 
Luke ( 199_5-1996) argues that one of the challenges in educational research has been 
to bridge macro and micro analysis of educational practice. His argument is that much of 
critical education research has focused on one or the other; but few have been able to 
show "how large-scale social discourses are systematically (or for that matter, 
unsystematically) manifest in everyday talk and writing in local sites" (p. 11). 
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Consistent with the goals of social theory and Bourdieu's theory in particular, I have 
attempted to construct a theoretical and methodological approach which links macro and 
micro analysis, that is, the structural social conditions and the particular acts of agents. I 
have, however, privileged the acts of agents and given less attention to the broader social 
conditions. I felt that this emphasis is an important corrective to traditional approaches to 
assessment which have privileged the analysis of regularities and are less interested in 
how assessment works locally. But as Moss et al (2002) argue, both emphases are 
necessary. More work is needed to develop socio-theoretical methods of analysis which 
link the macro and the micro, "to grasp particularity within generality and generality 
within particularity" (Bourdieu in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 75). I believe that the 
particular theoretical and methodological approach which I have constructed is a 
contribution to further research in this area. 
The second contribution ofthis study has been to enrich our understanding of the 
complex interpretive environment out of which academic professional judgment emerges. 
By ·drilling down' into differences of interpretation, I have illuminated the multiple 
contexts which constitute academics' judgments. These multiple contexts include the 
macro-social conditions of the field and the way in which these conditions constitute the 
··principles of vision and division'' (Bourdieu 1996, p. 265) that inform academic . 
classificatory systems: the meso-level context of disciplinary (and sub-disciplinary) 
communities of practice with their particular epistemological orientations; and finally the 
micro-level context of assessors' interpretive matrices, which are significantly constituted 
by their disciplinary interests, professional experience and levels of involvement. My 
study has shown how 'context matters' by exposing the multiple layers of contingency 
that shape assessor's interpretive matrices in predictable and unpredictable ways. 
In addition to illuminating the multiple contexts which constitute academics' 
judgments. this study also took up Bernstein's challenge that our move beyond 





in Chapter 3). As I examined more closely academics' interpretive processes and the 
ways in which they negotiate the tensions between these multiple contexts, I gained 
insight into patterns of rationality which underlie academics' professional judgment: a 
rationality which I have argued is neither objectivist nor relativist. I noted the work of 
Flyvbjerg (2001) who has taken up Bernstein's challenge but my overall impression is 
that in terms of the task of re-conceptualizing an alternative, more has been said about 
what this rationality is not (by way of critiques of objectivism and relativism, modernism 
and post-modernism) than about what it is. I offer therefore, in conclusion, some tentative 
proposals of what some of the features of such a rationality might be. 
If as Bourdieu ( 1992) argues social reality is a "double truth" (p. 255) then human 
rationality might be usefully characterized as a double reading, as an iterative movement 
between two modes of knowledge which comprise the objective and the subjective. On 
one hand, there is the objective reading, that is, the attempt to "grasp from the outside" 
(Wacquant in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 8), to observe, measure and map reality 
independently of the representations of those who live in it (both the assessed and the 
assessor). This is the task privileged by psychometrics, the task of ascertaining context-
independent regularities. This is an important task; student performances do exhibit 
regularities and these must be understood. These regularities in turn powerfully shape the 
classificatory schemes which are re-applied in the interpretation of this objective reality. 
This is the manner in which the field sustains itself. As one of the interviewees argued, 
··The university is a self-sustaining institution. The belief that the university matters as 
an important place. that it is the site where knowledge is produced, is constructed by the 
university. It constructs a lot of things which allow it to continue its existence" (Jos 99-
1 ). As I have argued these objective regularities also explain how without reference to 
explicit criteria, standards or benchmarks, academics are able to get on with the myriad of 
classificatory acts required of them as members of their profession. Their intuitive 
judgments are internalizations of the objective regularities of the field they inhabit. Thus 
human rationality, as it is characterized by academic professional judgment, entails an 
objectivist reading. 
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The other mode of knowledge which comprises this rationality is the subjective 
reading. This is the reading which is deeply invested with the self, the reading which 
acknowledges professional judgment as inescapably (in part anyway) an embodiment of 
the assessor. This is an insight which assessors are acutely conscious of as illustrated by 
many interviewees' testimonies to how deeply implicated supervisors are in their 
students' performances. This subjective reading is also relational, in that it is a 
communicative exchange between the assessor and the assessed. It thus inevitably has to 
acknowledge and contend with power, that is, the force of relations. This subjective 
reading is situational, in that not only are judgments invested with the assessor but they 
are also invested with the particularities of the assessment event. This subjective reading 
is also profoundly pragmatic, in that, in their judgments, academics are cognizant of the 
multiple functions which their assessments are playing. They are also extremely sensitive 
to the consequences of their assessments both for themselves as professionals as well as 
students. Therefore far from being mere personal opinion or an arbitrary 'taste' or 'gut-
feel', this subjective reading is a socially constituted, practical mastery. This is an aspect 
of human rationality which has been greatly undervalued, and yet it is essential to an 
understanding of assessment as an interpretive process and to professional judgment 
more generally. 
In a nutshell, this study contributes to an understanding of professional judgment -
and the forms of rationality which underlie it -as a double reading, as an iterative 
movement. As Bourdieu argues, "It is this double truth, objective and subjective, which 
constitutes the whole truth of the social world" (Bourdieu in Bourdieu and Wacquant. 
1992. p. 255) (italics in the original). 
These insights into the nature of academic professional judgment and its underlying 
forms of rationality are not simply theoretical issues; they have implications for how we 
conduct our task as an academic community of interpreters. I turn therefore in the final 
chapter to explore some of the implications of this study for academic validation 
practices. 
·:! 
Chapter 7: Implications for practice 
What had become manifest is that the movement beyond objectivism and relativism is not just a 
theoretical problem but a practical task. 
(Bernstein, 1983, p. 230) 
7.1 A focus on value 
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One of the insights which has emerged from this study is the crucial function which 
assessment serves as one of the primary means by which communities of practice 
implicitly communicate (to each other as well as to students) what they value as a 
community. This includes, as I noted before, the values of knowledge and autonomy and 
the implications of these values for what is considered to be legitimate in terms of the 
forms of knowledge, the assessors of this knowledge, and the validators of these 
assessments. 
In both case studies I noted how each of the communities stopped short of the task of 
articulating this value-basis and its impact on the assessment of the final year projects. 
Although the Engineering community of practice succeeded in bringing some resolution 
to the particular issue ofwhere final authority lies for assessment decisions, several 
members of staff pointed out that there were still no clear guidelines on how marks are to 
be awarded (see 5.4.3.3). I interpret this not as a call for tighter marking memoranda 
(although this might emerge as one of the outcomes) but rather a call for more 
opportunities for dialogue about, as Joseph put it, ''what we believe we are doing and 
why'" (Jos 99-1). 
These communities of practice are not exceptional in this failing; it characterizes the 
higher education community as a whole. We are like fish which do not feel the weight of 
the water and thus take the world for granted (Bourdieu in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, 
p. 127). We have tended to believe that the soundness of our interpretations is self-
evident. As a community our primary substantial investment in validation has been the 
external examination system, and varying degrees of validation that come from 
professional bodies. But for a substantial number of our academic programmes it has 
been validation enough to have our external peers' annual comments about the extent to 
which. for example, the examination was "good", it was "fairly marked", and the "overall 
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course results are fair"1• Various other validation mechanisms, for example, marking 
workshops, departmental examination meetings, faculty board meetings, are all 
essentially technologies of reliability where the main goal is to make sure there are no 
inconsistencies around a groups of markers or across a particular student's set of marks. 
Even on occasions when there are contestations about a particular assessment, we still 
rarely confront the very meanings of the marks which are being contested. 
The problem is not these reliability technologies. They have an important role to 
play in a validation system. The Engineering department is a notable example of a 
community that has invested considerable resources in reliability, and these practices are 
commendable. The problem is that far fewer resources have been invested in addressing 
other issues which are fundamental not only to our assessment practices but to our 
academic programmes as a whole. The central issue I would suggest is what we as 
communities of practice value. What is a 'good' engineering research project? What is a 
'good' humanities research project? On the basis of what criteria shall we judge them? 
These are difficult questions, but our task is made somewhat more manageable if we 
fixate not on finding answers (i.e. what can concisely be entered into a faculty handbook) 
but rather on committing ourselves to a process. So the question I tum to in this final 
chapter is: In what ways can this study assist us in this on-going validation process? 
Before turning to this question, I need however to clarify who I mean by 'us', to 
whose practice are these implications addressed. Ultimately this is a question about who 
is responsible for change. First and foremost, 'us' are members of the communities of 
practice, that is, academics who are responsible for the design, administration, 
supervision, and marking of assessment tasks, as well as the design and administration of 
the broader assessment system. We2 are the ones who have the greatest invested interests 
in assessment systems which give rigorous and systematic attention to validation. If we 
1 These are some examples of the issues which SAU external examinations are asked to comment on. They 
are taken from the Report by the External Examiner to the Head of Department which all SAU external 
examiners are meant to complete. 
:. I say ·we' because as well as being an educational developer, I am also a member of a community of 
practice responsible for the delivery and assessment of an academic programme. These recommendations 
are as much intended for my own practice as they are for others. 
are not invested in this process, then no amount of pushing and probing, no 'carrot and 
stick' set of incentives from outside the community will bring about meaningful change. 
In the context of a discussion about the problems of university transformation, Clark 
(1998) argues that it is the operational units (what I refer to as 'communities of practice') 
that are central to any significant change; "Change in colleges and universities comes 
when it happens in the trenches; what faculty and students do is what an institution 
becomes. It does not happen because a committee or a president asserts a new idea" 
(Leslie cited in Clark 1998, p. 145). Thus while pressure for change may come from 
outside (as it currently is in higher education), change itself can only come from within. 
The other constituency comprising the 'us' are outsiders whose role it is to support 
these communities of practice in a variety of different ways. These include individuals 
within the faculty office, for example, the Dean, who is accountable for the overall 
development of the quality of teaching and learning, and other faculty office positions 
who are responsible for the day-to-day management of these processes. It also includes 
higher education development staff and others who are responsible for various forms of 
institutional development. If communities of practice responsible for assessment are 
inwsted in the strengthening of their validation systems then there are many ways in 
which these outsiders can support them in this task. but the prime responsibility for 
change rests with the community of practice. 
I now turn to explore some features of such a validation process. 
7.2 Implications for validation 
7.2.1 Validation as a community process 
One of the central themes of this study has been the recognition of assessment as an 
interpretive act. If we accept this, then it follows that the validation of our assessment-
based interpretations is a community process. While this is clearly an emphasis within 
more socio-cultural approaches to assessment, it is a point which Cronbach ( 1989) and 
\kssick ( 1989) also acknowledge. Cronbach argues that acceptance of the outcomes of a 
particular validation inquiry gains support within the relevant community and "the 
process is social as much as rational.. .it is inherently a community process" (p. 164). 
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Bernstein (1976) has argued that striving for objectivity is a community process. In 
contrast to objectivism (as discussed in Chapter 3), Bernstein argues that objectivity is 
essential to responsible intellectual inquiry. By 'objectivity' Bernstein means that in any 
domain of human inquiry there are "intersubjective standards of rationality or norms of 
inquiry by which we attempt to distinguish personal bias, superstition, or false beliefs 
from objective claims" (p. 111 ). There is however no "single univocal set of criteria for 
distinguishing what is objective from what is not" (ibid.); there will be significant 
disagreement about what the criteria should be and how they should be applied. The 
crucial issue, he argues, is "the existence of a community of inquirers who are able, 
willing and committed to engage in the argumentation" (ibid.). Thus the kind of 
rationality which emerges in the move beyond objectivism and relativism is one which is 
dialogical, a rationality in which there is choice, deliberation, interpretation, judicious 
weighing and application of 'universal criteria', and even rational disagreement about 
which criteria are relevant and most important" (Bernstein 1983, p. 172). I recall once 
again Nietzsche's quote at the opening of Chapter 2, "the more eyes, different eyes, we 
use to observe one thing, the more complete will our 'concept' of this thing, our 
'objectivity' be" (Nietzsche cited in Bourdieu 1990, p. 28) (italics in the original). 
Bernstein (1983) poses the question however, "What .. .is to be done in a situation in 
which there is a breakdown of such community, and where the very conditions of social 
life have the consequences of furthering such a breakdown?" (p. 226). These are apt 
questions for higher education where many academic communities of practice are in a 
fragile state. Indeed some have argued that the notion of 'academic community' is under 
threat (Henkel 2000). In Chapter 5 I noted some of the structural conditions which 
contribute to this fragmentation, namely, growth in number and diversity of student 
intake, increasing demands from the labour market for particular kinds of graduates, 
massive explosion and fragmentation ofknowledge, destabilized employment conditions, 
and shrinking state subsidization. One ofthe Humanities staff members noted, "There's 
been a change in the department. We used to have Collegiality with a capital C, where we 
met more often, had tea. There's been a real breakdown ... it's been very fragmented for a 
whole lot of reasons" (Dan 00-1 ). The extent of social fragmentation within the academic 
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institution is likely to have a significant effect on the extent to which genuine validation 
dialogue can occur. This also points to a potentially unique role that assessment can play 
in helping to develop community. The Engineering course convener contrasted the 
intensive interaction amongst staff over the assessment of the final year projects to the 
rest of the year, "The rest of the year we never meet ... but for this (the final year 
projects) you have to (meet) ... this is the point where people exchange ideas and talk 
about what their expectations are .. .it forces you to face up to each other" (Dav 00-3). I 
inquired whether there were no other opportunities for dialogue. "Other than 
that...there's tea", but he noted "(some) hardly ever come to tea" (Dav 00-3). 
Bernstein ( 1983) argues that none of us need to be reminded of how fragile our 
community life really is, and that the threat of extinction is not an "abstract possibility but 
most imminent" (p. 229). In the current higher education climate of "disquieting turmoil 
that has no end in sight" (Clark 1998, p. xiii), I propose that a commitment to on-going 
evaluation of not only our assessment interpretations, but our assessment systems as a 
whole, can provide an extremely challenging and rewarding opportunity for the 
development of what are increasingly fragmented communities of practice. 
7.2.2 Validation which prioritizes community values 
Another central theme of this study has been to characterize the kind of rationality 
that informs academic professional judgment where neither objectivism nor relativism is 
a viable alternative. The rational basis of our professional judgment is neither in relation 
to nor in defence of either of these positions. Once freed of this Cartesian anxiety, we 
can begin to articulate an alternative kind of rationality, a rationality which is contextuaL 
experiential and. perhaps most importantly, value-based. I suggest that while this 
alternative rationality is what implicitly informs our interpretive judgments, we struggle 
as communities to articulate and legitimate it. Without a language to describe the 
rationality which has informed our intuitions we become easy prey to our individual and 
collective insecurities as communities of interpreters (not to mention the growing threat 
of litigation). 
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I would suggest that a starting point for our validation dialogue is to prioritize, as I 
noted earlier, a discussion about values3. In characterizing this 'arationality' or phronesis, 
Flyvbjerg argues, "(It) thus concerns the analysis of value, i.e. what is good and bad for a 
person, as a point of departure for action .. .it focuses on what is variable, on that which 
cannot be encapsulated by universal rules .. .it requires an interaction between the general 
and the concrete; it requires consideration, judgment and choice" (p. 57). Flyvbjerg 
suggest that a dialogue based on phronesis needs to begin with Aristotle's three classic 
questions: Where are we going? Is this desirable? What should we be doing? Flyvbjerg 
argues, however, that Aristotle's and most modem day scholars' explications of 
phronesis do not take seriously the issue of power. Thus Flyvbjerg adds a fourth 
question, "Who gains and who loses and by which mechanisms of power?" (p. 60). 
Thus, at the heart of validation is 'value' (as Kvale 1993 notes, 'value' being the root 
word of validity). And yet, as communities this is where we have been most inarticulate. 
In critique of his own department, one of the members of the Humanities department 
noted, "There's a lot of presumption and assumption ... we are so used to constructing the 
least problematic nothingness that what everyone believes never gets stated. So I think 
there would be great value in us saying what we believe we are doing, and why we're 
trying to do it and why we think it's right or important or problematic ... at least to know 
\vhat each other thinks" (Jos 99-1 ). 
One fairly standard approach to making our values more explicit is the design of 
marking memoranda. In Chapter 2 I noted the common practice (supported by 
educational developers such as myself) of encouraging participants in marking 
workshops to design a marking memorandum on the assumption that this set of criteria 
will be useful to students and assist the markers in adopting a consistent framework. 
3 One of the critiques which I have of Bourdieu 's theory of social practice, and of social theory more 
broadly. is the self-referentiality ofthe 'double reality' (see 3.4.1). I find this a potentially limiting theory 
for a discussion of values. Further research into the ethical basis for assessment-based interpretations will 
require a different set of theoretical resources. For example, I note developments in the field of systems 
theory and cybernetics which argue for 'a third order cybernetics' as a way of moving 'beyond objectivism 
and relativism'. This 'third order' holds out the possibility of being 'ethical'. I am grateful to Rosemary 
Kearney for pointing me to these developments and their great potential for a value-based approach to 
validation practices. 
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Broad (2000) offers an insightful critique of marking memoranda (or 'rubrics', as he calls 
them). He argues that firstly, contrary to expectation they rarely eliminate disagreements. 
(In my experience they often compound disagreement since assessors disagree not only 
about the marks about also about the memorandum). But more importantly, Broad 
argues, these rubrics support the mistaken notion that assessment consists of identifying 
characteristics in the text and assigning them relative values. Rubrics describe textual 
features but are completely silent about the "prejudices and foreknowledge" which are 
inevitable and valuable in interpreting a text (Moss cited in Broad 2000, p. 247). 
Ultimately, he argues, rubrics are misleading. They are completely silent about the value 
system which underlies the interpretive acts. 
I would propose, therefore, as communities of interpreters that we need to move 
beyond the task of designing marking memoranda which focus on qualities of text. While 
our discussion may start there, we need to explore more deeply the implicit values which 
underlie those textual qualities. This discussion is of course not to be confined to 
colleagues; it must also engage students. It must start, however, as a commitment on the 
part of the disciplinary community to make more explicit the value base which underlies 
their professional judgment. 
7.2.3 Validation which respects difference 
Once a community begins to engage in dialogue about the values that inform .its 
assessment-based interpretations, inevitably differences in value perspectives will arise. 
would suggest two principles which need to guide our validation process. Firstly, as I 
have argued throughout this study, differences can be a resource which strengthens our 
validation practices. Secondly, some value differences may be irreconcilable. Thus while 
consensus may be an ideal to strive for, the reality is that it is not always possible to 
achieve. I will deal with each of these principles in turn. 
One of the central themes of this study has been the importance of exploring 
differences of interpretation as a means of gaining deeper insight into assessment as an 
interpretive process. This would suggest that rather than a threat to validation, dissensus 
is a resource (Moss and Schutz 2001 ); conflict can be productive. As the Engineering 
course convener noted, "I think the conflicts that we have ... they are very 
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important. .. they are helping all of us .. .if everything was great, you know, no arguments, 
no fights, we'd never grow. But now we allow people to be independent and we 
encourage them to give their views on things and work out things, then all of us get 
challenged" (Dan 01-01 ). As McCarthy argues, "There is no surer path to awareness of 
unspoken preconceptions and prejudgements than communicative encounters with others 
who do not share them" (McCarthy cited in Moss 1998, p. 55). Neither should the 
foregrounding of differences of value need to be perceived as a threat to collegiality. It 
will however require a willingness to relinquish (some of) our rights of autonomy which 
we prize as individuals and as a profession. It also requires re-building levels of trust 
where they have been severely eroded within departmental communities. 
Secondly we need to accept the possibility of irreconcilable differences. The reality 
of pluralism which characterizes our communities poses a serious challenge for the 
achievement of consensus. One might well argue that is it all well and good to respect 
differences of opinions, but at the end of the day only one mark will be entered in the 
spreadsheet. I offer what I recognize is not a fully satisfactory response to thi~ dilemma. 
Moss and Schutz (200 1) distinguish between consensus and agreement. Consensus 
assumes that all parties reach an understanding that all interpret in the same way4 . 
Agreement, as they define it, is where all parties accept a particular conclusion in a 
particular context, but what is agreed upon may actually be (and they argue, to some 
extent always is) interpreted differently by each person (p. 59). Agreement is the practical 
reality that a judgment has to be made based on the best evidence that we have before us, 
but it is not consensus. The advantage of this distinction is that it identifies the final 
decision for what it is- a compromise. And, if nothing else, community life is about 
learning to live with compromise. 
Someone might ask, but what about the students? I recall one of my interviewees' 
confessions that in relation to students' perceptions of their assessments he often found 
4 They argue that this is a Harbemasian definition of consensus. 
202 
himself in collusion with what he knew to be the myth of objectivity. He argued, "This 
whole evaluation thing ... (we're) kind of trapped. I sometimes have tried to pop the 
bubble of it, but you've almost got to collude in it and keep the belief going" (Kei 99-2). 
This collusion is, to some extent, something which we are all trapped in as educational 
assessors. Recalling Bourdieu's argument that it is a "double truth, objective and 
subjective, which constitutes the whole truth of the social world" (Bourdieu in Bourdieu 
and Wacquant, 1992, p. 255) (italics in the original), I wonder whether we do our 
students a favour by colluding with the myth of a partial truth rather than the reality of a 
double truth. Challenging as it may be, I would suggest that as communities of 
interpreters we need to open up our assessment practices to students; much greater 
transparency is required of us. The spin-off is that by exposing students to and modelling 
for them the contextual complexity of professional judgment we prepare them for the 
kinds of rational thinking which their future professional contexts will require of them. 
This might be one of the most crucial life-skills we have to offer our students. 
7.2.4 Validation which acknowledges power 
I propose as a final practical consideration that we put firmly on the table the issue of 
power. This could start with the acknowledgement that our collegial dialogues are not in 
reality dialogues among equals. Bourdieu' s theory of practice illumines significant 
differentials of power, based on the dissemination of particular kinds of capital which are 
valued within the field. In relation to this capital we are not all equally endowed, (e.g. we 
are not all experts, we are not all equally experienced, and we are not equally articulate). 
This would suggest that in all kinds of ways our dialogues are structured to 
ad\·antageously position certain perspectives over others. This structural privilege will 
ensure that. while we might all contribute to the dialogue, those who are positioned 
advantageously, will be able to effect change in ways which those who are less 
advantageously positioned will not be capable of. This is not necessarily a bad thing. The 
issue is how those who are better positioned to effect change use that power. These are 
Flyvbjerg·s (2001) questions, 'Who wins and who loses?' and 'Whose interests are 
served?'. 
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There is a sense, however, in which those endowed with less capital (and thus power 
to effect) have a different kind of positional advantage. They are best positioned to 
disrupt the practices simply through the posing of nai"ve questions, such as the new 
member of staff who asked of his HOD, 'What is the official policy on how we should 
mark?' Thus newcomers and outsiders have a unique capacity for disruption, and this is 
a role which must not be underestimated. This is not to say that the established members 
of the community cannot also be disruptive, but the very fact that they have become 
established, that they have acquired a 'feel for the game', means that they are less likely 
to question 'the game'. 
Thus the challenge for communities committed to the validation task is to re-
structure our discourse (e.g. rethinking the kinds of meetings we have and how they are 
conducted) in such a way so that those who - by nature of their expertise, their 
experience, their rank, their gender, their race, their language- are in less advantaged 
positions are re-positioned to more fully contribute. This is a particularly challenging 
responsibility for those in leadership positions. 
As a final consideration of the implications of an alternative rationality for academic 
\'alidation practices. I close with a quote from Bernstein (1992). This seems fitting given 
that his work has so much influenced my intellectual journey. Though he is addressing 
primarily the issue of philosophical plurality, I believe his points are relevant to the 
plurality of assessment interpretations. He writes, "There can be no escape from 
pluralism- a plurality of traditions. perspectives, philosophic traditions" (p. 329). He 
goes on: 
Such a pluralistic ethos places new responsibility upon each of us. For it means 
taking our own fallibility seriously- resolving that however much we are committed 
to our own styles of thinking, we are willing to listen to others without denying or 
suppressing the otherness of the other ... What makes this task so difficult and 
unstable is the growing realization that there are no uncontested rules or 
procedures ... But because there are no uncontested decision procedures for 
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adjudicate( ion) ... , it is always a task to seek out commonalities and points of 
difference and conflict. The achievement of a 'we'- where 'we' are locked in 
argument with others - is fragile and temporary achievement that can always be 
ruptured by unexpected contingencies. Conflict and disagreement are unavoidable in 
our pluralistic situation. There is little reason to believe that 'we' ... will ever achieve 
any substantive permanent consensus, and there are many good reasons for 
questioning the desirability of such a consensus. What matters, however, is how we 
respond to conflict. The response ... is a dialogical response where we genuinely seek 
to achieve a mutual reciprocal understanding - an understanding that does not 
preclude disagreement" (p. 336-337) (italics in original). 
· Appendix One 
Data on Humanities Staff 
(All information is for 1998 unless otherwise specified] 
Name Age Sex Nationality Race Language 
Charles ? M Tanzanian Black Swahili/ 
English 
Dan 53 M South African White English 
Elsie ? F Lesotho Black Sotho/ 
English 
Frank 37 M South Africa White English/ 
Afrikaans 
John ? M South African White English 
Jordan 37 M South African White English 




I Keith 55 M South Africa White English 
i Larr; ') M 
' 
Scuth African White English 
I 
I 




] Oliver 1 45 M South African White English 
I 
I Zora 37 F South African Coloured English 
I 
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Rank Dept. Yrs. in Dept 
position 
Visiting Visiting 0-5 





Ass. Course 16-20 
Prof convener in 
1998 
Lecturer Option 0-5 
convener in 
1998-1999 
Lecturer Option 0-5 
convener in 
1998-1999 
Ass. Head of ? 
Prof. Department 
in 1999 
Sr. Lecturer on 0-5 
Lecturer Honours 
course 
Lecturer Option 11-15 
convener in 
1998-1999 
Ass Option 26-30 








Ass Option ? 
Prof? convener in 
1998-1999 
Sr. Option ' 0-5 
Lecturer convener in 
1998 
Sr. Option 0-5 
Lecturer convener in 
1998-1999 
Option 0-5 
Lecturer convener in 
1999 
Appendix Two 
Excerpt from the Humanities marking workshop 
Code 
I interruption 
(*) unclear word 
Text in parentheses is either my additions for clarity or it is non-verbal forms of 
communication. 
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DAN: /why and then a lot of a lot the discussions comes out that way, so maybe (Keith) shall 
we go around this, do you want to start? 
KEITH: Yes alright uh I I thought they were both terrible pieces of work and I, you know, I used 
my old marking schedule, you see. So for the one I gave 41% and the other one 40 %/ 
5 DAN: Which one 41? 
KEITH: The the 
DAN: Not that it's that much different (Dan laughs). 
KEITH: Well I gave 41% for uh the A one which is this uh I suppose it's Larry's (Project A title) 
(moan from someone) and the other one on (Project B title) I got 40 for uhhh (laughter 
I 0 from someone). Ja look, this this one doesn't, I mean is very weak methodologically/ 
DAN: Which the first A? 
KEITH: uh you know just trots out, you know, what what uh certain respondents said. Uh you 
don't know even know who· s talking and why the people were picked on and uh then it 
just kind of ends \vithout any analysis or anything like that but uh you know my marks 
15 are lO\\ because if these were my students they would have known they would have had 
to do some kind of assessment data presentation. would have to do quite a lot of 
methodology. Uh they would have had to include, you know. the one doesn't have any 
(**)questionnaire interview schedule in the appendix. Uh I think it has one reference. 
uh? There's absolutely no uh in the introduction there's no reference. It sort of says 
.20 "there's a lot of work being done in this field internationally etc .. etc ... '' but doesn't refer 
to a single you know source (***).It doesn't locate the topic so very weak. And uh this 
one jo! (reference to B) this is terrible piece of work. 
MARY: I passed it generously (laughter in background). 
KEITH: You passed it? 
25 MARY: Yep! 
KEITH: Generoush 0 
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MARY: Ja 
(lots of overvoice) 
DAN: Let's come to you Mary. (turning back to Keith) What are your criticisms? 
30 KEITH: Well I mean uh this student just is uh going through the motions uh but doesn't 
understand what uh you know what he or she is doing uh uh (flipping through report) 
sort of misreads tables, doesn't know how to actually, you know do anything with the 
data but it's there. Uh you know contradicts what's in the tables, and also just there's no 
analysis at the end it just ends, boom, sortuv saving grace is that she's read (reference to 
35 
. 
some article used) and done some, you know, literature work reading etc. So that that's a 
reasonable section at the start, the review and the introduction. But it just goes nowhere 
and then it just ends. Bingo! There's no discussion, no analysis, in the theoretical sense. 
Urn quite a nice uh reference list (chuckling from someone) and then it's got an 
appended questionnaire which is actually a group one so you can credit the student too 
40 much for this. So that's why they got plug! 
DAN: OK alright urn, Mary? 
MARY: Uh well(****) I'm sorry to say. I gave this one 67%/ 
DAN: This is this is the B? 
MARY: This is the one that I did (Project B title). Yep and urn wow if you're going to give that 
45 one 40 all the rest of mine should have got 20 is all I can say for last year. Urn let's see I 
(the student's name) I know this, really clever girl, really clever hard-working. nice. 
(Mary's anxious laughter and laughter from others). I can't get her out of my mind 
(chuckle from someone). 
OLIVER: How much prompting, did you prompt her on the analysis? 
50 MARY: Did I prompt her on the analysis? 
OLIVER:Did you say(*) 
MARY: No no we all put the dataja we just put the data in and that was it/ 
DAN: Then you let them/ 
MARY: /and then I show them how to use stats graphic package and they can do what they like 
55 and urn/ 
DAN: And then you leave it up to them, then you don't get a draft in and tell them to redo it? 
MARY: Urn you know I really can't remember that, I know that we were running at a different 
pace from the other ones because we were sort of held up by each other. I mean there 
were there are there are lots of mistakes in here(**). This is wrong that's wrong but uh 
60 taking. I take the whole bunch of them and I think, well, 20% might fail but no more. 
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This is one of the better ones. I rank them. I chuck some marks at them. So uh ja I can, if 
you want me to jack up my standards, I can but I 
KEITH: No no, that's not what we're here about. 
MARY: No no that's what I'm saying, you know I just think if if the students if the students are 
65 doing so badly, that's our fault. We don't fail them because in their third year they are 
doing badly. We have to say, this is an average group of students. They've sat here for 
three years. They've been through our courses and you know up to 25% may fail, maybe 
less. That's a very high wastage rate into third year. So uh there we are. I just say this is 
the material we've got. We just put some figures onto it and uh (clears throat) off we go. 
70 OLIVER: Certainly not all our fault (laughter from the group). 




Data on Engineering Staff 
[All information is for 2000 unless otherwise specified] 
Name Age Sex Nationality Race Home Rank Dept. Yrs. in Dept 
Language position 
SAU Academic staff 
Allan 46 M South African White English Sr Educational 0-5 
Lecturer Dev. Officer 
Anthony 35 M South African White English Ass. Supervisor 0-5 
Prof. 
Carl 50 M South African White English Ass. Supervisor 11-15 
Prof. 
Thomas 53 M South Africa White English Ass. Supervisor 0-5 
Prof. 
David 35 M South African Black English Sr. Supervisor 0-5 
Lecturer Course 
Convener 
Donald ? M South African White English Prof. Supervisor 31-35 
George 63 M South African White Afrikaans Sr. Supervisor 31-35 
Lecturer 
Peter 64 M South African White Afrikaans Prof Supervisor 11-15 
Kenneth 50 M South African White English Prof. Supervisor 11-15 
HOD 
1 
Kevin 33 M South African White English Sr. Supervisor 0-5 
i Lecturer 
i Kurt 29 M South African Indian English Lecturer Supervisor 0-5 
1 Paul 
I 
57 M South White English Sr. Supervisor 11-15 
African/ Angolan Lecturer 
Richard 59 
I 
M South African White English Sr. SupervisoJ I 11-15 
Lecturer 
Robe11 i 56 
I 
M British/SA White English Prof Supervisor 16-20 
I 
I Ex-HOD ! 
Stephen 160 M 
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South African White English Prof. Supervisor 21-25 
1 Victor ') M Zimbabwean Black ? ? Supervisor 0-5 
I 
Andre ? M ') White ') ') ? ') 
I 
James ') M South African White English Prof. Supervisor 31-35? 
I 
External Examiners 
' Ella ? F South African White Afrikaans Prof. External n/a 
' ' exam mer 
' 
Philip I 43 M South African Black English Prof. External n/a 
examiner 









Excerpt from Engineering departmental examination meeting: 
Dispute A 
Code 
(X) To protect anonymity of speakers, references to specialist discourse have been 
omitted and replace with an X. 
















Mr V (the student), the supervisor gave it 88, second marker gave it 72, third marker 
gave it 69, and the consensus mark was 75, and external examiners recommend a 70. 
(**) 
You wished to make a remark? 
It was about the (X), it was vague on the(*). It's a multi-disciplinary subject and he 
seemed to get around and sort out information from a number of different sources 
but you're recommending 70 (**) 
Could I say that I gave it 72, and it's actually very useful to speak to the student and 
to see how the student approached the problem. I was convinced it should be a first 
after discussing the project with the student and hearing the student's story of how he 
went through this project. It was entirely self-initiated, had almost no support from 
his supervisor whatsoever, and and from the report, for instance, Prof. R. gave it 69, 
and I think if I came into it cold. and I read the report I would have given it a 69 or 
70. but I was really very impressed with the fact that the student had worked entirely 
on his own. and I was convinced to raise the mark from 72 to 75. and I think that that 
it's important to take that into account. 
This brings out an important aspect is how much the candidate is able to 
communicate what he's doing to the outside world and how important that is. We've 
had in past many excellent guys but as part of an engineer you must be able to 
communicate to the outside world. That you can't do this, I think this must weigh 
against that, but I think both needs to be taken into consideration. 
I think looking at the write up itself, the thesis, is not as good as it should be, the 
references are not and the bibliography is not properly documented, and on that 
account I gave it (*) but taking everything into account, yes, he did quite a lot of 
work. 
I think there are a few reasons not to recommend a first. One ofthem is that some of 
the parts of the project didn't work. There was an (X) that was supposed to operate 
evel) six hours and he couldn't get that to work, a fairly simple (X) process of (X). In 
addition he couldn't (X), and really for a distinction candidate you'd like to have 
these things anticipated in advance and then in the project report itself, really there 
wasn't great multi-disciplinary detail, for example, (X). There was no additional 








Excerpt from Engineering departmental examination meeting: 
Dispute B 
Code 
In order to protect the anonymity of those involved in the research I have omitted specialist 
discourse which would give away the disciplinary identity of those involved. Where it has 
been necessary to do this, I have in parentheses and italics included a brief description of 
what has been omitted. 
( • ) pause, one ( • ) per second 














K Mr R (the student). the supervisor gave it 80, the second marker gave it 65, and the 
externals recommended 70. 
V Nol 









so ur.1 what happened was yesterday we sat down myself and uh [the second 
marker], when we did a lot of(*) and we agreed that(*) fair compromise would be 
around 76. Honestly speaking I don't see the reason why this student should be 
denied a first class, if the externals can justify thatL ••• If they can tell me where they 
think he missed it •• 
[please] L 
Wel[L we ]didn't hear that presentation •• 
No. no [the presentation actually deter]mines one of the best/ 
[Ours is just based on the report] 
We are basing this largely [on the report] soL 
[on the report] 
Well looking at the report its a well written report which/ explains the theory fairly 
fairly welL the theory of um (x) that's actually quite well, and that constitutes about 
80% of the thesis. The other 20% describes the work that was actually done and the 
major part with that work really revolves around understanding the (a particular 















forward, to be able to configure different network topologies, and from those 
network typologies determine the(****). Sol it seems it was a lot of literature survey 
done, the work that was done was actually done quite well, but/ not meriting a first. 
Uh can I just please answer this oneL I think this guy actually spent a lot of time. In 
the first place I think we've got to understand that (the package) is quite a very 
difficult package to master. Plus basically what he was looking after he had validate 
to make sure that the (****) is within the (speed) which is the whatever the 
maximum which is acceptable that is for real-time(**) over any network. So that is 
what he was trying to investigate. And he tried that with several configurations 
including the whatever (name of something) which is based on the market protocol 
levels. He also had to try different configurations especially between Mauritius and 
across Africa and so forth and in most cases he was actually exceeded the (speed) 
which is the acceptable delay. So in this case I thought he did exactly what was 
expected of him, so in this case I mean what is wrong? Really if you are to compare 
with some of the theses that are said to be whatever with whatever that are said 
whatever in whatever(*), don't you think there is too much discrepancy here? The 
student has done a lot of hard work/ but then you find a way of saying, no, I don't 
think he has done the whatever/ no I don't think that I uh agree with you, not at all. I 
personally would think that a 76/ or so/ would be the fairest mark for that stu[ dent.] 
[Could] 
we could we ask the meeting to rule on it, are we going to accept the mark of 70 
from the external examiners i 
Ja, let me this thesis had a third marker Prof._ and I think he it's [72] 
[ja] I think the 
report was unbalanced as mentioned. Because uh although the results are uh reported 
I think are four pages, there were no in-depth discussion of the results and I think that 
is what you would expect from a first [pass]. 
[Yes], but as far as I know what 
he intended to do there was to check whether in that the (**) exceeds the expected 
whatever the threshold which is (the speed), yes or no. In as much as let's say for 
instance he wanted to establish let's say a real time connection across a (**) it 
depends (*****).That's what you'll see in(**) agrees with that. If it does agree with 
that. that"s fine. Why would he start putting up junk. filling up the whole whatever 
with junk. I see that most of the students here what they do is they will actually get. 
whatever problem and they just think (*)relevant, whatever problem from whatever 
american search and whatever put them in the report just to try to spice it up when in 
fact it's of no relevance at all. But here is a student who is trying whatever to report 
whatever his work, I mean present his work in a very mature manner. (*) I don't 
think that is fair. 
Thank you Dr V. I \vonder if we could ask the meeting to that we go with the mark 
of 70% (*)from the externals. 
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